Greetings, memang betapa tempting untuk memiliki behemoth seperti citigroup dengan seharga U$ 1 / stock. tapi apakah anda tau kalau citigroup itu sudah menjadi zombie bank , istilah bank yang sudah mati tapi di-animate oleh US government untuk menjaga citra dan shockwave financial collapse kalau dibiarkan file for chapter 11. saya tidak mau omong panjang lebar, yang namanya high risk juga memberikan high reward. Prince Alwaleed membuat namanya karena di tahun 90an dia membeli saham citi seharga U$ 2 dan menyentuh 50an di peaknya. sekarang kolega2 saya mengibaratkan saham citigroup seperti US lottery, bisa bikin bust dan kaya. it's your call. bisa aja dukungan politik2 membuat bank ini hidup lagi seperti kasus perbankan indonesia di tahun 1998, contoh BCA, dari setengah mati akhirnya bisa jadi kuda hitam perbankan nasional. tapi let me give you a good head up, market kapitalisasi citigroup skrng sisa U$6.2B , dan US government akan tetap menginjek U$ 45 billion buat common shares di city, saudara punya otak sendiri 6.2/45 = 0.137 Dilution. sekarang ambil saja harga pasaran citigroup dikalikan 0.137 , dan anda akan mendapatkan harga asli citigroup. GOOD LUCK WITH YOUR CITIGROUP. sebenarnya ada bank amerika yang akan menjadi survivor dan paling besar setelah ekonomi amerika recover dan harga sahamnya akan naik hingga 200%. kalau anda rajin sedikit anda bisa riset dan mengetahui bank apa itu, sekarang 1/2 harta saya, saya telah benamkan untuk membeli bank itu. GOOD LUCK !!!
--- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, "adjies2000" <ad2...@...> wrote: > > --- In obrolan-bandar@yahoogroups.com, Hoki Tralala <hoki.tralala@> wrote: > > > > AIG sama eropa hubungannya apa ya? :-) > > > reply : > > AIG dari bisnis traditional asuransi sudah berubah menjadi raksasa sebagai > HedgeFunD dan hancur lebur.......bisnis AIG yang sudah kait mengkait dengan > ekonomi Europa, dampak domino yang akan membuat system Banking, Insurance, > PensionFund dll berantakan. > > "AIG used to be in the conventional insurance business, covering identifiable > risks it knew something about, until it took advantage of deregulation and a > lack of government surveillance to come up with contrived new financial > products. Even Maurice Greenberg, the man who built AIG from the ground up > over a span of 40 years before he was forced out amid corruption charges in > 2005, admits that he didn't understand the newfangled financial gimmicks that > the company was peddling. This week, claiming he too was swindled, Greenberg > sued in federal court, charging the AIG execs who forced him out with "gross, > wanton or willful fraud or other morally culpable conduct," over the credit > default swap portfolio that was part of his settlement. > > US taxpayers now have ownership of almost 80 percent of AIG, but with the > company's once solid traditional insurance business now suffering a steep > loss of consumer confidence, it's not likely that even the formerly healthy > parts of the company will be worth much. What we have here is all pain and no > gain for the taxpayers roped into this debacle, which is proving to be the > story of the entire banking bailout. ' > > Reference dibawah ini. > > regards > > AIG: Billions Dished Out in the Dark > By Robert Scheer > > March 4, 2009 > > * Email > * Print > * Share > o Buzz up! > o Buzzflash > o del.icio.us > o Digg > o Facebook > o Add to Mixx!Mixx it! > o Reddit > > What is this? > * Take Action > * Web Letters (2) > * Write a Letter! > * Subscribe Now > > Robert Scheer is the editor of Truthdig, where this article originally > appeared. His latest book is The Pornography of Power: How Defense Hawks > Hijacked 9/11 and Weakened America(Twelve). > > This is crazy! Forget the bleating of Rush Limbaugh; the problem is not with > the quite reasonable and, if anything, underfunded stimulus package, which in > any case will be debated long and hard in Congress. The problem is with what > is not being debated: the far more expensive Wall Street bailout that is > being pushed through--as in the case of the latest AIG rescue--in secret, > hurried deal-making primarily by the unelected secretary of the treasury and > the chairman of the Federal Reserve. > > Share this article > > * > * > * > * Add to Mixx! > * > * > > * Related > * Also By > > * > Comes the Change > > U.S. Economy > > Robert L. Borosage: Obama's first budget is an audacious plan to > transform America. But in sad testament to how deeply we've fallen, it is not > bold enough. > * > America Is #... 15? Subscribe > > U.S. Economy > > Dalton Conley: Because of income inequality, the United States scores > poorly on a new index of general well-being. > * > A Bank Bailout That Works > > U.S. Economy > > Joseph E. Stiglitz: Banks have polluted the economy; it's a matter of > equity and efficiency that they clean it up. > > » More > > * > AIG: Billions Dished Out in the Dark > > U.S. Economy > > Robert Scheer: Taxpayers now own 80 percent of virtually worthless > AIG--for us, this bailout is all pain and no gain. > * > Obama's Toughest Task > > U.S. Economy > > Robert Scheer: Obama's address to Congress was a gift to a dispirited > nation. Now the hard work begins to transform vision to reality--but how can > we do it by waging another war? > * > Good Money After Bad > > U.S. Economy > > Robert Scheer: Obama's stimulus bill is far too modest to arrest an > economy in free fall. But if it were up to the GOP, which largely created the > mess, we'd be doing nothing at all. > > Six months ago, we taxpayers began bailing out AIG with more than $140 > billion, and then it went and lost $61.7 billion in the fourth quarter, more > than any other company in history had ever lost in one quarter. So Timothy > Geithner and Ben Bernanke huddled late into the night last weekend and > decided to reward AIG for its startling failure with thirty billion more of > our dollars. Plus, they sweetened the deal by letting AIG off the hook for > interest it had been obligated to pay on the money we previously gave the > company. > > AIG doesn't have to pay the 10 percent interest due on the preferred stock > the US government got for the earlier bailout funds because that interest > will now be paid out only at AIG's discretion, which means never. The > preferred stock, which got watered down, carried a cumulative interest, > meaning we taxpayers would have recaptured some money if the company ever got > going again, but that interest obligation was waived in the new deal. > > We've already given AIG a total of $170 billion--an amount that dwarfs the > $75 billion allocated to helping those millions of homeowners facing > foreclosures. And more will be thrown down the AIG rat hole because President > Barack Obama is blindly following the misguided advice of his top economic > advisers, who insist that AIG is too big to fail. > > "AIG provides insurance protection to more than 100,000 entities, including > small businesses, municipalities, 401(k) plans and Fortune 500 companies who > together employ over 100 million Americans," the joint Treasury Department > and Fed statement declared while insisting that for that reason, plus the > "systemic risk AIG continues to pose and the fragility of markets today, the > potential cost to the economy and the taxpayer of government inaction would > be extremely high." > > What about the cost of inaction by Treasury and the Fed before this meltdown? > If AIG were so important to the American economy, shouldn't government > regulators have been looking more closely at its activities? They couldn't > then, and even now they don't understand what AIG has been up to, because the > company was allowed to operate in an essentially unregulated global economy > in which multinational corporations have their way. As the Treasury/Fed > statement concedes: "AIG operates in over 130 countries with over 400 > regulators and the company and its regulated and unregulated subsidiaries are > subject to very different resolution frameworks across their broad and > diverse operations without an overarching resolution mechanism." > > Oh, really? And you're discovering that only now, when you're making us bail > AIG out? It wasn't that long ago that a couple of hustlers operating out of > an AIG office in London were going wild making money off selling insurance on > credit default swaps that no one could understand, but the company execs > loved those huge profit margins. To challenge their maneuvering, as some in > Congress attempted, was said by their defenders, including Geithner, to put > them at an unfair disadvantage in the world market. Ignorance was bliss... > until the bubble burst. > > This was all belatedly conceded by Bernanke in his Senate testimony on > Tuesday: "AIG exploited a huge gap in the regulatory system. There was no > oversight of the Financial Products division. This was a hedge fund, > basically, that was attached to a large and stable insurance company, made > huge numbers of irresponsible bets--took huge losses. There was no regulatory > oversight because there was a gap in the system." > > AIG used to be in the conventional insurance business, covering identifiable > risks it knew something about, until it took advantage of deregulation and a > lack of government surveillance to come up with contrived new financial > products. Even Maurice Greenberg, the man who built AIG from the ground up > over a span of 40 years before he was forced out amid corruption charges in > 2005, admits that he didn't understand the newfangled financial gimmicks that > the company was peddling. This week, claiming he too was swindled, Greenberg > sued in federal court, charging the AIG execs who forced him out with "gross, > wanton or willful fraud or other morally culpable conduct," over the credit > default swap portfolio that was part of his settlement. > > US taxpayers now have ownership of almost 80 percent of AIG, but with the > company's once solid traditional insurance business now suffering a steep > loss of consumer confidence, it's not likely that even the formerly healthy > parts of the company will be worth much. What we have here is all pain and no > gain for the taxpayers roped into this debacle, which is proving to be the > story of the entire banking bailout. > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2009 at 11:58 PM, adjies2000 <ad2000@> wrote: > > > > > > > > Hello. > > > > > > ADa yang tahu peraturan delisting NYSE mengenai batasan harga saham untuk > > > Delisting ? > > > > > > Dari Rule 496=501A tidak kelihatan secara spesific. > > > > > > Contoh kasus : > > > > > > Bears Stern - harga terus turun dibawah USD 1. 0.8, 0.4 sampai NOL > > > > > > Citicorp semalam ditutup USD 1.01 > > > = Tidak mungkin Delisting meskipun harga dibawah USD 1 (apa betul ?) > > > > > > = To big To fail, 40% saham sudah dibeli Pemerintah US. ? % milik ABU > > > Dhabi > > > > > > = US Banking adalah kunci dari recovery US economy, pasti di Bail-out > > > habis2an(dikeluarkan/diambilalih Toxic asset dari Balancesheet(pakai SPV) > > > dan disuntik modal baru), seperti juga AIG mati2 di suntik karena > > > kejatuhan > > > AIG akan menghancurkan ecomomy Europe > > > > > > IT is the time to Buy Citicorp Stock ! > > > > > > Pls comment > > > > > > Salam > > > > > > ====================================================== > > > Listing and Delisting (Rule 496501A) > > > Rule 496. Requirements for Independent Agents Acting As or In Lieu of New > > > York City Transfer Agents of Securities Listed on New York Stock Exchange, > > > Inc. > > > > > > [ Rule 496 was removed as part of NYSE-2004-62; please see NYSE Listed > > > Company Manual 601.01 for information regarding Transfer Agents.] > > > > > > Adopted. > > > > > > June 24, 1971. > > > > > > Amended. > > > > > > July 5, 2005 (NYSE-2004-62). > > > Rule 497. Additional Requirements for Listed Securities Issued by NYSE > > > Euronext or its Affiliates > > > > > > (a) For purposes of this Rule 497 the terms below are defined as follows: > > > > > > (1) "NYSE Euronext Affiliate" means NYSE Euronext ( "NYSE Euronext") and > > > any entity that directly or indirectly, through one or more > > > intermediaries, > > > controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with NYSE Euronext, > > > where "control" means that one entity possesses, directly or indirectly, > > > voting control of the other entity either through ownership of capital > > > stock > > > or other equity securities or through majority representation on the board > > > of directors or other management body of such entity. > > > > > > (2) "Affiliate Security" means any security issued by a NYSE Euronext > > > Affiliate, with the exception of Investment Company Units as defined in > > > Para. 703.16 of the Listed Company Manual. > > > > > > (3) "New York Stock Exchange LLC" (the "Exchange") is a wholly owned > > > subsidiary of NYSE Euronext. > > > > > > (4) "NYSE Market, Inc." ( "NYSE Market") is a wholly owned subsidiary of > > > the Exchange. NYSE Market is the entity that will manage the Floor trading > > > of securities. > > > > > > (5) "NYSE Regulation, Inc." ( "NYSE Regulation") is a wholly owned > > > subsidiary of the Exchange and will perform the self-regulatory > > > organization > > > responsibilities pertaining to regulating the NYSE Market and the > > > Exchange. > > > > > > (b) Prior to the initial listing of the Affiliate Security on the > > > Exchange, > > > NYSE Regulation shall determine that such securities satisfy New York > > > Stock > > > Exchange LLC's rules for listing, and such finding must be approved by the > > > NYSE Regulation Board of Directors. > > > > > > (c) Throughout the continued listing of the Affiliate Security on the > > > Exchange, NYSE Regulation shall > > > > > > (1) prepare a quarterly report on the Affiliate Security for the NYSE > > > Regulation board of directors that describes: (a) the NYSE Regulation's > > > monitoring of the Affiliate Security's compliance with the Exchange's > > > listing standards, including, (i) the Affiliate Security's compliance with > > > the Exchange's minimum share price requirement and (ii) the Affiliate > > > Security's compliance with each of the quantitative continued listing > > > requirements; and (b) NYSE's Regulation's monitoring of the trading of the > > > Affiliate Security including summaries of all related surveillance alerts, > > > complaints, regulatory referrals, adjusted trades, investigations, > > > examinations, formal and informal disciplinary actions, exception reports > > > and trading data used to ensure that the Affiliate Security's compliance > > > with the Exchange's listing and trading rules. A copy of said report will > > > be > > > forwarded promptly to the Securities and Exchange Commission ( > > > "Commission"). > > > > > > (2) Once a year, an independent accounting firm shall review the listing > > > standards for the Affiliate Security to insure that the issuer is in > > > compliance with the listing requirements and a copy of the report shall be > > > forwarded promptly to the Commission. > > > > > > (3) In the event that NYSE Regulation determines that the Affiliate > > > Security is not in compliance with any of the Exchange's listing > > > standards, > > > NYSE Regulation shall notify the issuer of such non-compliance promptly > > > and > > > request a plan of compliance. NYSE Regulation shall file a report with the > > > Commission within five business days of providing such notice to the > > > issuer > > > of its non-compliance. The report shall identify the date of the > > > non-compliance, type of non-compliance, and any other material information > > > conveyed to the issuer in the notice of non-compliance. Within five > > > business > > > days of receipt of a plan of compliance from the issuer, NYSE Regulation > > > shall notify the Commission of such receipt, whether the plan was accepted > > > by NYSE Regulation or what other action was taken with respect to the plan > > > and the time period provided to regain compliance with the Exchange's > > > listing standards, if any. > > > > > > Adopted. > > > > > > February 27, 2006, effective March 8, 2006 (NYSE-2005-77). > > > > > > Amended. > > > > > > February 14, 2007 (NYSE-2006-120). > > > Rule 499. Suspension from Dealings or Removal from List by Action of the > > > Exchange > > > > > > [ Rule 499 was removed as part of NYSE-2005-15; please see NYSE Listed > > > Company Manual Sections 801-804 for information regarding delisting.] > > > > > > Amendments. > > > > > > April 15, 1965. > > > > > > May 23, 1968. > > > > > > October 17, 1968. > > > > > > April 17, 1969. > > > > > > July 15, 1971. > > > > > > April 24, 1972. > > > > > > May 2, 1974. > > > > > > May 13, 1976. > > > > > > March 9, 1977. > > > > > > December 21, 1983. > > > > > > May 9, 1984. > > > > > > October 3, 1988. > > > > > > May 5, 1994. > > > > > > October 26, 1998. > > > > > > June 9, 1999. > > > > > > December 1, 1999. > > > > > > May 30, 2000. > > > > > > January 10, 2003. > > > > > > March 1, 2004 (NYSE-2004-02). > > > > > > May 5, 2005 (NYSE-2005-15) [Rescinded from Rule book and users referred to > > > Listed Company Manual Sections 801-804.]. > > > Rule 500. Removal from the List Upon Request of the Issuer > > > > > > [ Rule 500 was removed as part of NYSE-2003-23.] > > > > > > Amendments. > > > > > > June 21, 1956. > > > > > > July 21, 1999. > > > > > > October 30, 2003 (NYSE-2003-23). > > > > > > May 5, 2005 (NYSE-2005-15). > > > Rule 501A. Withdrawal from Listing and Registration Under Securities > > > Exchange Act of 1934 > > > > > > [ Rule 501A was removed as part of NYSE-2005-15.] > > > > > > Amendments.. > > > > > > May 5, 2005 (NYSE-2005-15). > > > > > > > > > > > >
