Hi, Ole,
On 22/5/23 15:36, Ole Troan wrote:
[...]>>
As a host and networking stack developer, I view the network and these
arbitrary inconsistent security policies as the problem not as the
solution to application and host security. The best tool developers
have is to encrypt as much of the packet as possible to keep network
providers from meddling in protocol layers they shouldn't be, but
unfortunately that isn't applicable to all protocols like EH for
instance (although, given that IPsec was on Fernando's approved list
of extension headers, I suppose we could hide all the extension
headers we want in IPsec :-) )
I don’t think Fernando has argued the case that some EHs should be filtered in
public transit networks?
No, I certainly wasn't. -- I was just arguing about filtering at e.g. an
Enterprise edge.
As for transit networks... it's tricky. In a lof of cases, the dropping
of such packets doesn't have to do with trying to protect the
destination AS, but rather because EHs may result in e.g. performance
issues when the transit AS tries to protect e.g. their own
infrastructure (see RFC9098). In such scenarios, I'm not sure there are
many alternatives to just dropping the offending packets (even if
undesirable).
In the whole I think it’s not a good idea that the IETF has some working groups
working hard at defining new protocols and other working groups working hard at
defining policies to block them.
FWIW, I don't think anyone wants to block them, but rather to provide
guidance about what's sensible to do. e.g., what to do with EHs at the
Enterprise trust boundary is a usual question from Enterprise folks.
Now for EHs in general. Their functionality of providing a separate signalling
channel independent of the application… it might be time that we accept that
this was a bad idea. Which deployment status has confirmed.
Agreed on this.
Cheers,
--
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fg...@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: F242 FF0E A804 AF81 EB10 2F07 7CA1 321D 663B B494
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