On 2012-03-08 1:52 AM, Matteo Dell'Amico wrote:
On 07/03/2012 15:02, danimoth wrote:
Il giorno mar, 06/03/2012 alle 16.34 +0000, Michael Rogers ha scritto:
If you're modelling a DHT as a game then who are the players, what are
the possible strategies, what are the payoffs, how much do the players
know about each other's strategies and payoffs, and what strategy do
you
want to encourage?
That's are the questions I'm asking to myself since first post, and
looking to other's work (if exists) applied to p2p networks maybe could
help me.
There's actually plenty of work on incentives to cooperation in P2P
systems that can actually interest you. The keywords to look for in
Google Scholar are probably "p2p incentives", "p2p reputation".
The papers about the topic that I like most are: "Incentives build
robustness in BitTorrent" by Bram Cohen (P2PEcon 2003) and "Sybilproof
reputation mechanisms" by Alice Cheng and Eric Friedman (P2PEcon 2005).
Available at http://www.ee.ucl.ac.uk/~mrio/papers/infocom09.pdf
I would summarize their proposal as ripple for bittorrent with a routing
algorithm.
The paper fails to consider the UI for managing reputation information,
or the UI for finding and identifying services
With a method for finding torrents and information about torrents, would
be a major improvement on bittorrent, since it provides seeding incentive.
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