On 2012-03-08 1:52 AM, Matteo Dell'Amico wrote:
There's actually plenty of work on incentives to cooperation in P2P
systems that can actually interest you. The keywords to look for in
Google Scholar are probably "p2p incentives", "p2p reputation".
The papers about the topic that I like most are: "Incentives build
robustness in BitTorrent" by Bram Cohen (P2PEcon 2003) and "Sybilproof
reputation mechanisms" by Alice Cheng and Eric Friedman (P2PEcon 2005).
If I understand the proposed system
http://www.ee.ucl.ac.uk/~mrio/papers/infocom09.pdf correctly:
Every entity has a public key.
Leechers issue IOUs to seeders. This creates a network of IOUs. The
pledgeroute software looks for ways to cancel out IOUs, thus honoring
them - for example Ann seeds Bob, Bob seeds Carol, and Carol seeds Ann.
If your IOUs get cancelled out, your key gains reputation, causing your
IOUs to be valued.
It is not clear to me how the sybil attack is avoided: Is it that you
only gain reputation with those benefiting from the cancellation?
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