Gary R., List: As you know, I understand Peirce's late topical conception of continuity to be top-down, not bottom-up; the whole is ontologically primordial, not an assemblage of discrete parts. From that standpoint, the notion of *locating *the continuity of semiosis does not really make sense--the *entire universe* is a vast semiosic continuum from which individual signs, individual sign-users, and larger inquiries can be prescinded as artifacts of analysis. This obviously does not entail that the entire universe is properly characterized as *intelligent*; on the contrary, it still encompasses discrete things and their brute dyadic reactions, including the sequential operations within a digital computer, as *degenerate *outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.
When most people refer to "artificial intelligence," it seems to me that they are ascribing intelligence to an individual artificial system--exactly what I find problematic--not the larger inquiry that results when humans *use *it for that purpose. In fact, one of the most interesting presentations at a conference that I attended last month advocated greater attention to human interaction with "AI" systems, which effectively turns them into "HAI" systems. Research suggests that improvements in that interface might make a bigger positive difference going forward than further advancing the capabilities of the technology itself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jul 7, 2026 at 3:11 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I wonder if it is possible that we are now considering somewhat different > questions. It seems to me that you are commenting more on *the semiotic > character of the AI system* itself, while I increasingly find myself > reflecting on *the semeiotic character of the larger inquiry *in which AI > seems to me to be capable of participating. Your sticking point as I see > it seems to be that the internal operations of present AI systems consist > entirely of dyadic reactions and, therefore, cannot participate in the > continuous triadic semiosis that Peirce identifies with intelligence. > > Say, for the sake of argument, that everything you say about the machine's > internal operations is correct, still does it necessarily follow that the > larger inquiry within which those operations become signs for further > interpretation cannot, then, exhibit genuine semiosis? > > So, I'm beginning to think that our principal disagreement has less to do > with AI, but increasingly seems concerned with *where one ought to locate > the continuity of semiosis itself*. Is it primarily within the individual > sign-user, or may that continuity also characterize the larger inquiry > through which interpretants are generated, criticized, corrected, etc.? If > the latter, then intelligence may be seen in the living semiosis through > which inquiry continually develops. > > Best, > > Gary R. >
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