Vinicius, Gary R., Kees, list,
I agree with Gary about the role of purpose in interpretation. Vinicius
does, however, seem to allow of it in connection with the final
interpretant, and to wish merely that Kees had somehow put it into those
terms. On the other hand, I think Vinicius underplays the role of
purpose. It's hard to see why interpretation would take place at any
level except for an end, bringing standards and norms of value into
play. The world in its thermodynamic decay scrambles information, and
life prospers in sorting some information out as more important,
valuable, to the purpose, for life; some call it 'decoding', which makes
sense provided that one remembers that there is in life a purpose or
function of extracting information from mixed and scrambled signs and
sign systems, both as to particular questions and in general ways that
'add value' (e.g., not just deducing whatever is deducible, but, since
no deduction concludes in anything really new or complicative, deducing
that which nonetheless brings a new or nontrivial perspective to the
premisses). If one conceives of inference or interpretation as taking
place in some more or less 'quasi' way at purely material and dynamic
levels, then one still needs to suppose an end, even if that end merely
be thermodynamic decay or the conservation of certain physical
quantities - i.e., probable and (in the classical limit) extremal
outcomes. These things do not involve retroactive causation by ends. In
inference, aim or purpose 'solicits' (to borrow a Scholastic term) and
guides determination by the premisses; the reasoner hopes and supposes
that there are ways to do that without stacking the deck, i.e., without
interfering with the determination to truth.
In the case of the _/question/_ asked about the weather, Peirce
identifies the purpose with the question's final interpretant and has it
depending in some sense on the asker of the question, but, yes, one can
consider the purpose merely as 'given' with the final interpretant of a
given posed question. Letter to William James, CP 8.314, 1909,
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/*finalinterpretant*.html
<http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/finalinterpretant.html> :
[....] But the Significance of it, the _/Ultimate/_, _/Final//,
//Interpretant/_ is her _/purpose/_ in asking it, what effect its
answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day. [....]
In turn, the final interpretant of the _/reply/_ given at the time to
the posed question is the sum of the reply's lessons (scientific, moral,
etc.).
In the 1909 letter to William James in EP 2:493-4, Peirce says
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/*interpretant*.html
<http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/interpretant.html> :
But that which the writer aimed to point out to you, presuming you
to have all the requisite collateral information, that is to say
just the quality of the sympathetic element of the situation,
generally a very familiar one - a something you probably never did
so clearly realize before - _/that/_ is the Interpretant of the
Sign, - its 'significance.'
I don't know whether Peirce means to associate purpose with the final
interpretants of posed _/questions/_ in particular, and ultimate lessons
with the final interpretants of given _/replies/_.
Still, Peirce does not leave the roles of purpose and collateral
experience in a riot of idiosyncrasies, but generalizes from the role of
mind to the roles of quasi-mind, commind, etc. If the painting's viewer
lacks the requisite experience collateral to the signs in respect of the
object, then the viewer's adequate consideration or investigation of the
painting includes acquiring such experience. Since generally one does
not know everything, and the increase of knowledge is a basic part of
what signs are for, the need to increase one's acquaintance with the
represented object in order to reach a final opinion on a nontrivial
question seems the rule, not the exception.
Best, Ben
On 3/25/2014 7:11 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Vinicius, Kees, list,
Thank you, Vinicius, for these first two valuable and most stimulating
posts. I'm certain that Kees appreciates both that you recognize the
extreme space limitations placed upon him, and that his choices of
what to include were anything but arbitrary, rather, based on several
considerations, perhap especially that of introducing Peirce to those
who may not be very familiar with his work, including his sometimes
complicated terminology. In rereading his book I was reminded of how
much Kees was able to pack into a mere 164 pages, how clearly he
presents some of Peirce's most important, even difficult concepts, and
yet how readable the whole is.
However, your pointing to what he wan't able to include is also
valuable. But, again, I find it remarkable that in the 19 pages which
comprise the chapter on semeiotics that, at least as I see it, he was
able to say more of value concerning that field than, for example, Tom
Short was able to say in the 347 pages of /Peirce's Theory of Signs/,
a work which I know Joe Ransdell considered--and I agree--to be an
idiosyncratic distortion of Peirce's semeiotic, what Joe once
suggested might better be titled /Tom Short's Theory of Signs/ (which
is not to suggest that it doesn't include many original, valuable
insights--but, I'd say, only for those well-schooled in Peirce).
Be that as it may, and as your first mentioned of two issues
objections to Kees' presentation of hypostatic abstraction has
already, albeit briefly, been discussed, I'd like to comment on your
second objection. You quote Kees:
*CdW: "Thus we can say that, though any object, say a footprint on
the beach, can give rise to a great variety of signs (human
presence, the firmness of the sand, etc.), and though any sign can
give rise to a variety of interpretations (a spouse's infidelity,
the movement of the tide), each object limits, or determines, what
may be a sign of it, and each sign similarly limits what may be an
interpretant of it. _Peirce's account suggests that what is picked
out as a sign and how it is interpreted relates to the purpose of
the interpreter"_ (emphasis added).*
And remark:
*VR: I think this might not the best way to describe a genuine
triadic relation. The object appears here as some "thing" quite
independent of the other correlates and that "can give rise" to a
variety of signs. Actually the object of the sign is always in a
logical relation to the sign. If the relation does not subsist,
then it is not the object of the sign. Besides that, a sign might
have several objects (or a complex object), but _I don't see how
an object cannot "give rise" to several signs._ *
As I read the snippet from Kees' chapter, he is not saying, as you
wrote immediately above, that "an object cannot 'give rise' to several
signs; indeed, he seems to be saying just the opposite in explicitly
stating that a object "can give rise to a great variety of signs."
Rather, he says that what i 'picked out as a sign' depends on the
interpreter's (we're discussing human semiosis here) /purpose/ .
This seems to be what you are objecting to as you c ontinue:
*VR: On the same vein, it is true that the sign can produce a
variety of interpretations, but each interpretation effectively
produced is the result of the potential that the sign itself has
to be interpreted independently of any psychological consideration
such as "the purpose of the interpreter". The purpose, which might
be understood as related to the final interpretant of the sign,
must also be considered part of the logical relation and should
not be introduced "ex machina".*
It appears to me that you are here suggesting, in writing " *of the
potential that the sign itself has to be interpreted independently of
any psychological consideration such as "the purpose of the
interpreter,"* that the sign somehow /functions/ independently of its
being a sign of /something/ for someone. You continue by stating that
"the footprint [is] the sign."
*VR: I would rather consider the footprint as the sign. Taken as
an individual, it is a sinsign. Considered as a true symptom, it
is an index that represents existentially its object, which is the
very foot (and the person related too such foot) that determined
the form of that singular footprint. As an indexical sinsign, it
only represents that "something with this shape was here", which
is its interpretant dicisign. I am assuming that the interpreter
has already familiarity with the shape of a shoe, that shoes leave
their marks on the sand etc. We could put this into the analysis
too, but would lead us to nearly an infinite regress. As Peirce
states, we must start our inquiry with our own prejudices, or the
"state of information" about the universe we live in.*
But it is not simply familiarity with "the shape of a shoe" that is
critical here. It appear that Kees sees it somewhat differently in
writing that a*"footprint on the beach, can give rise to a great
variety of signs (human presence, the firmness of the sand, etc.)"*
Spring-boarding off the end of that snippet ("the firmness of the
sand"), but offering yet another example, consider the case of an
archaeologist who, while quarrying, comes upon a footprint of a
perhaps small to mid-sized reptile from the age of the dinosaurs. one
which he immediately identifies from his collateral knowledge of
previous footprints, as well as a very few other fossil remains which
he, and those in his field, are familiar with.
So the question here is not what extinct reptile this footprint is a
sign of (already known) but, say, because the texture of the material
is well known, and the footprint, clearly that of an adult of the
species, the print here being not shallow, but deep, the
anthropologist, combining those bits of information, is able to
surmise the approximate weight of the animal--new information, perhaps
wholly unexpected (e.g., he might earlier have thought it was quite
small, but it appear to be considerably larger based on his new
knowledge).
So here the sign is not the footprint alone, but for the
archeologist's /purposes/ it is the footprint, its depth, the
constitution of the material it's contained within, etc.
You continued by remarking that it is /not/ the purpose, but merely
the familiarity from collateral knowledge which is significant here.
But it seems to me that purpose, in consideration of gaining /new/
knowledge, /is/ important (otherwise one would be blind to the
possibility of even discovering new knowledge). In the present
example, the purpose of the archaeologist is /not/ to identify the
maker of the print (already known) but to arrive at the approximate
weight (and so possibly also size and height) of this not well known
extinct reptile, Yet, perhaps you are saying something like this in
writing:
*VR: If memory of these past experiences is vivid enough in the
mind when the sign footprint comes to the phaneron, associations
will follow naturally, even unconsciously, putting it in relation
with information already in the memory. _This synthetical
inference, which is an abduction, will create a new and more
developed sign_ * (emphasis added)
Possibly I've misrepresented either or both you and Kees in this
matter of 'purpose'. Little doubt that I'll find out.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Vinicius Romanini wrote:
Dear list members,
In this second message I will comment on Kees' excursion on Peirce's
definition of signs and its elements: the representamen (or the sign
prescinded from the other correlates), the object the sign professes
to represent and the interpretant as the effect of the action of the
sign. Kees gives us a rather succinct overview and avoids going too
much into questions still open to scholar debate, sometimes with very
strong disagreements (that's what I would do too, by the way, if I
were to write a panoramic text).
Actually, I have never found two Peirce scholars who would totally
agree when it comes to Peirce's theory of signs - and I would not
expect this will happen during this seminar either. I myself have
some disagreements with Kees in minor details but also on some at
least one important example of applying the above mentioned analysis
of the correlates.
As we know, Peirce wrote dozens of different definitions for "sign"
in his more than 40 years of work around the subject and it seems
that he ended his life never totally satisfied with any, for his last
MS's, from 1908-11, are full of tentative definitions to accommodate
his commitment to pragmatism, the reality of the three categories but
also his further division of the three correlates into ten a aspects.
These variations use verbs like "represent", "determine" , "affect",
"influence", "cause", "specialize" etc. Although written in different
wordings, all of them have the same fundamental goal which is to
define what a genuine triadic relation is. Since there are three
correlates, one can choose how to punctuate this triadic relation.
Kees explains all this and also warns us that Peirce would sometime
write a definition that he thought would be more intelligible. He
would use for example the term "interpreter" instead of the more
logical "interpretant" - a word that Peirce himself created to
eliminate traces of psychologism in his logic.
Having the above in mind, I two disagreements with Kees' account:
- The first is that Kees suggests that all signs might be hypostatic
abstractions (either entia realis or rationis) but I do not see why.
Although hypostatic abstractions are certainly signs (such as the
relations among the objects of a proposition), there might be signs
which are not abstractions. Since any cognizable can be a sign, this
would include real possibilities and existents not yet cognized. For
example, I recall Peirce saying that a fossil fish is thought (and
hence a sign) even if not yet found by anyone. Maybe Kees could
clarify what he meant.
- The second objection is the example he offers on page 80:
"Thus we can say that, though any object, say a footprint on the
beach, can give rise to a great variety of signs (human presence, the
firmness of the sand, etc.), and though any sign can give rise to a
variety of interpretations (a spouse's infidelity, the movement of
the tide), each object limits, or determines, what may be a sign of
it, and each sign similarly limits what may be an interpretant of it.
Peirce's account suggests that what is picked out as a sign and how
it is interpreted relates to the purpose of the interpreter (...)".
I think this might not the best way to describe a genuine triadic
relation. The object appears here as some "thing" quite independent
of the other correlates and that "can give rise" to a variety of
signs. Actually the object of the sign is always in a logical
relation to the sign. If the relation does not subsist, then it is
not the object of the sign. Besides that, a sign might have several
objects (or a complex object), but I don't see how an object cannot
"give rise" to several signs.
On the same vein, it is true that the sign can produce a variety of
interpretations, but each interpretation effectively produced is the
result of the potential that the sign itself has to be interpreted
independently of any psychological consideration such as "the purpose
of the interpreter". The purpose, which might be understood as
related to the final interpretant of the sign, must also be
considered part of the logical relation and should not be introduced
"ex machina".
/Data maxima venia/ , I thought it would be interesting to offer to
the members of the list a more detailed description of semiosis
involving this example. This would certainly not be the case in a
book directed to a more general audience, which would only lead to
perplexity. But since I assume that most of us here are already
passed the state of perplexity when dealing with Peirce's
terminology, I will risk bothering you with my own interpretation
from the same example.
I would rather consider the footprint as the sign. Taken as an
individual, it is a sinsign. Considered as a true symptom, it is an
index that represents existentially its object, which is the very
foot (and the person related too such foot) that determined the form
of that singular footprint. As an indexical sinsign, it only
represents that "something with this shape was here", which is its
interpretant dicisign. I am assuming that the interpreter has already
familiarity with the shape of a shoe, that shoes leave their marks on
the sand etc. We could put this into the analysis too, but would lead
us to nearly an infinite regress. As Peirce states, we must start our
inquiry with our own prejudices, or the "state of information" about
the universe we live in.
Anything beyond this will depend on the familiarity of the
interpreter with the object being represented by the sign, gathered
by what Peirce calls collateral experience. Not the "purpose", but
the familiarity. In the case of the tide, the mental habits about how
ocean waves usually erase footprints, how tides come and go. In the
case of the spouse infidelity, the knowledge that people are
sometimes unfaithful, etc.
The important here is that his knowledge must have been gathered by
previous experiences with related situations, be it directly or
indirectly perceived from from other sources (books, movies,
newspapers, conversations etc). If memory of these past experiences
is vivid enough in the mind when the sign footprint comes to the
phaneron, associations will follow naturally, even unconsciously,
putting it in relation with information already in the memory. This
synthetical inference, which is an abduction, will create a new and
more developed sign.
But how is new sign and its information is created? The indexical
sign "footprint" is attached to this "idea" already present in the
mind (the immediate object of this new sign), which is a sort of
composite image of all similar situations that are present in the
mind. Attaching an index to an idea embodied on a particular moment
produces the cognition - which is the sign that brings information to
the mind.
In the case that the inference is about the spouse's infidelity, the
complex object of this new sign (the hypothesis) will be the owner of
the foot that produced the footprint (her lover), the spouse, and
the act of infidelity. The predicate would be the logical principle
that holds all these objects together (that is, the form of the
argument that prescribes that "if something would be true, than the
observed relations among the objects would follow logically". That
is: "if the spouse is unfaithful, then the foot of the footprint
could be from her lover".
In the case of the tide, a similar set of objects and a relational
predicate would be necessary to produce meaning, which is always
interpretations.
Furthermore, it might be the case that a mind seeing the footprint
will produce both inferences (about the tide AND about the spouse
infidelity). These two former inferences would appear then as
premises of a new and more developed sign, which now gets the shape
of an argument.
This is what Peirce's rhetoric (or methodeutic) is about: a
continuous production of hypostatic abstractions and putting them in
communication to create ever more embracing arguments about the
reality. Starting with facts and cognitions initially not associated,
a systematic and more coherent view becomes diagrammatized in the
mind. Deduction then would extract the necessary consequences and
induction would eventually put them to the text of experience.
Certainly this outline could be refined to bring into scene the
plethora of Peirce's types and classes of signs. I write all this to
show, in advance, how difficult it is to put a "tag" such "this is
an index, that is an abduction" without considering the whole
"movement of the thought" involved. As in my next message we will
have to deal with Peirce's classes of signs, I think it is good to
keep this in mind.
All the best,
Vinicius
--
Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.
Professor of Communication Studies
School of Communications and Arts
University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
www.minutesemeiotic.org
www.semeiosis.com.br <http://www.semeiosis.com.br/>
Skype:vinicius_romanini
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