I concur with Jerry. A proper clarification will be most helpful. Steven
On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 2:25 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < [email protected]> wrote: > Jeffery: > > I cannot make any sense out of your response to Steven, > > The concept of “formal" has deep metaphysical and semantic > interpretations; your response (by reference) is inadequate to distinguish > among the potential forms, at least for me within this context. > > Can you find the spare the time to clarify your meaning? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > On Aug 17, 2014, at 4:39 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > > > Hi Steven, List, > > > > See the later post where I refer to Peirce's discussion of Aristotle's > and Kant's uses of this distinction between formal and material (CP > 6.353-63). For my part, I'm trying to follow Peirce's lead in the use of > these conceptions--especially when I'm engaged in the project of > reconstructing his arguments. > > > > --Jeff > > > > Jeff Downard > > Associate Professor > > Department of Philosophy > > NAU > > (o) 523-8354 > > ________________________________________ > > From: [email protected] [[email protected]] on behalf of > Steven Ericsson-Zenith [[email protected]] > > Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2014 1:24 PM > > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard > > Cc: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L; Gary Fuhrman; André De Tienne > > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic > category theory > > > > Entertaining, except for one ambiguity: what, exactly, do you mean by > the term "formal?" > > > > Steven > > > > > > On Saturday, August 16, 2014, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Gary R., Gary F., André, List, > > > > Peirce makes two suggestions for doing phenomenology, and both are > reflected in the place he gives this kind of science in his architectonic. > > > > 1) We should ask: what formal categories must be in experience in > order to make valid synthetic inferences from the things we've observed? > Or, putting the question in a more particular form: what formal elements > must be in the observations we made of some surprising phenomenon in order > to draw a valid adductive inference to an explanatory hypothesis? The same > kind of question could be asked about inductive inferences from a set of > data. > > > > 2) In order to answer this question, we should look to math and see > what kinds of mathematical conceptions and principles might be borrowed > from this science so as to give us insight into those formal features of > the phenomena we observe. > > > > These suggestions are reflected in Peirce's placement of phenomenology > between math and the normative theory of logic. > > > > In order to see why these suggestions might be helpful for understanding > Peirce's theory of phenomenology (i.e., phaneroscopy), I'd suggest that we > take up a sample problem. Here is a question that mattered much to > Peirce. What kinds of observations can we draw on in formulating > hypotheses in the theory of logic about the rules of valid inference? > Peirce's answer to this question is that we are able to make a distinction > between valid and invalid inferences in our ordinary reasoning, and that we > can classify different kinds of inferences as deductive, inductive and > adductive. The process of drawing on our logica utens in making arguments > and reflecting on the validity of those arguments supplies us with the > observations that are needed to get a theory of critical logic off the > ground. > > > > As we all know, any kind of scientific observation we make might contain > one or another kind of observational error. As such, we have to ask the > following questions. Once we have a set of observations in hand, how should > we analyze them? What is more, how can we correct for the observational > errors we might have made? We could frame the same kinds of questions > about the study of speculative grammar as I've stated for a critical > logic. For my part, I'm working on the assumption that Peirce's analysis > of the elements of experience is designed to help us give better answers to > these kinds of questions than we are able to get from other philosophical > methods--including those of Kant, Hamilton, Mill, Boole, etc. > > > > The study of icons, I take it, is part of a general strategy of thinking > more carefully about question (1) listed above. Gary R., are you thinking > about "iconoscopy" or "imagoscopy" differently? I think that the careful > study of icons can be especially helpful in setting up a theory of logic > because of the essential role that icons have in the process of making of > valid inferences. > > > > With this much said, let me ask a question that I think is really basic > for understanding Peirce's phenomenology: is there any kind of formal > relation between the parts of a figure, image, diagram (i.e., any hypoicon) > that does not have the form of a monad, dyad or triad? That is, take the > space in which a diagram or other figure might be drawn, and take the > relations between the parts of any diagram (both actual and possible), and > ask yourself: how are the actual parts of the token diagram connected to > each other and to all of the possible transformations that might be made > under the rules that are used to construct and interpret the diagram? Is > there any formal relation between the parts of the diagram and the space in > which it is constructed that does not have the character of a monadic, > dyadic or triadic relation? > > > > We see that Peirce makes much of the role of icons in necessary > reasoning, including the necessary reasoning by which mathematicians deduce > theorems from the hypotheses that lie at the foundations of any given area > of mathematics. The suggestion I'm making is based on the idea that icons > have a similarly essential role in the framing of a hypothesis and the > drawing of an inductive inference. Do you know of a place where Peirce > argues this kind of point? One sort of place that comes to my mind is the > discussions he provides of the process of formulating hypotheses in > mathematics. > > > > --Jeff > > > > Jeff Downard > > Associate Professor > > Department of Philosophy > > NAU > > (o) 523-8354 > > ________________________________________ > > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > > Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2014 11:15 AM > > To: Peirce-L; Gary Fuhrman; André De Tienne > > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category > theory > > > > Gary, list, > > > > I suppose I expected--or at least, hoped--that Gary F. would respond to > my post on some of the issues we'd been discussing recently regarding > phenomenology, a topic of some considerable interest to both of us and, > hopefully, to others on the list as well. So, in an off-list email to him I > expressed this hope, and Gary wrote back in a message he said I could > reproduce here. (I've interleaved my own comments within the substantive > parts of that message) > > > > I’ve already agreed that iconoscopy is probably the only way to make > phaneroscopy scientific, if its formulations themselves are scientific. > > > > I would concur, especially if your qualification is met. But, for now, > iconoscopy is the subject of but a single, as far as I can tell, > unpublished article by Andre de Tienne (who, as I earlier suggested, > thought the term 'iconoscopy' didn't exactly catch his meaning, that > something like 'imagoscopy' might come closer). There were also several > discussions of de Tienne's ideas in 2009 (as interest was shown in then by > Martin Lefebvre, myself, and others) and again in 2011 when both Gary F. > and I discussed them in the slow read of Joe's paper, "Is Peirce a > Phenomenologist?" See: > https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00043.html > > > > Still, the idea of this second phenomenological science seems sound to > me, and even necessary. Continuing: > > > > But I don’t have a proper response to this: > > So what exactly are "the elements of the phaneron" once one's stated the > obvious, that is, the three universal categories? > > I don’t think that’s obvious at all, or maybe I don’t get what you mean > by “obvious” here. It’s not even obvious to many list members what it means > that the three “categories” are “universal”. So I’m stumped for an answer > to that question. > > > > Hm. I guess I'm stumped by your being stumped. It may be that some, > perhaps many, list members don't 'get' Peirce's categories at all, let > alone see them as 'universal'. But some people do observe "the elements of > the phaneron" and do see them as universal. I would even suggest, by way of > personal example, that I saw them before I was even exposed to Peirce's > writings, and before I could give them names (certainly not firstness, > secondness, and thirdness, but, perhaps, something vaguely approaching > something, other, medium). This is merely to say that, if Peirce is correct > and that the elements of the phaneron are truly universal, then there's no > reason why anyone attuned to that kind of observation shouldn't and > couldn't have touched upon them before having Peirce's precise and helpful > names for them. > > > > Phenomenology is admittedly a difficult science to grasp and even more > difficult to 'do', so I can imagine that many folk, including many > philosophers, haven't developed, or fully developed, the kinds of > sensibilities and abilities which Peirce thought were essential in doing > this science--that is, they haven't developed them any more than, for > example, I've developed some of the mental skills necessary for taking up > certain maths. But, as to our interests and talents, vive la difference! > > > > Also it’s still not clear to me how “category theory” or “trichotomic” > is related to phaneroscopy and iconoscopy, or why it’s part of Peircean > “phenomenology” (rather than logic or semiotic, or even methodeutic). It > seems to take the results of phaneroscopy (as articulated by iconoscopy, I > suppose) and apply them to the analysis and classification of more complex > phenomena such as semiotic processes. If so, then it should be subordinate > to phenomenology in the classification of sciences, not part of it. > > > > Here I must completely disagree. While it is true that trichotomic can > and will be applied in principle to semiotic, it is my opinion--well, more > precisely, my experience--that trichotomies are discovered in > phenomenological observation. And I personally have no doubt that Peirce > observed them in this way. It may be that one needs a kind of logica utens > to sort out some of these structures after the fact of the observation of > them, but, for example, it is possible in observing many phenomena, to > 'see' that firstness, secondness, and thirdness form a necessary trichotomy > within them,so to speak; and that 'something', 'other', 'medium' requires a > vectorial progression from 1ns, through 2ns, to 3ns, and in precisely that > (categorial, in this case, dialectical) order.These are, of course, two of > the most basic expressions of (a) trichotomic and (b) vectorial > progression. At the moment I can see no other place for the observation of > such trichotomic structure and the establishing of this as a principle for > the use by sciences which follow phenomenology except at the end (the > putative third division) of it. > > > > In logic, of course, Peirce considers diagrams more essential than > language; but I don’t see how diagrams can be used in phenomenology to > avoid language, so I don’t have a useful suggestion for doing that either, > although I wouldn’t want to say that it can’t be done. I was hoping > somebody else would have a better response. > > > > But certainly very many, perhaps most, diagrams of considerable value to > and use in science necessarily require language, or use language as an > adjunct. This, for example, is the case for some of the trichotomic > diagrams Peirce offers in certain letters to Lady Welby. The diagrams I use > in trikonic are meant, first, to show the categorial associations of the > terms of a genuine trichotomic relationship (those icons/images identified > in what might be called an iconoscopic observation, then given names) and, > second, to show the possible vectors (or paths) that are possible--and, > some times, evident-- in some of them. A logica utens allows one to > extrapolate rather far in this vectorial direction, in my opinion. But such > a use of logica utens is the case in theoretical esthetics and ethics as > well. Ordinary logic (logica utens) need not and probably cannot be avoided > in the pre-logical (i.e., pre-semiotic, pre-logica docens) sciences. > > > > If any of the above is useful as a prompt for a further explanation of > “category theory”, feel free to quote it and reply with a correction! > Meanwhile, yes, I am busy with a number of things these days … > > > > Yes, your remarks have been at least personally useful, especially in > seeing that until the first two branches of phenomenology, phaneroscopy > and, especially, iconoscopy, are much further developed, trichotomic > category theory will lack a solid basis. Still, important science has been > accomplished in all the post-phenomenological sciences without this > grounding and I expect this to happen in trichotomic as well. > > > > Peirce clearly saw the categories as a kind of heuristic leading him to > a vast array of discoveries along the way. It is not surprising, then, that > late in life he settled on an essentially trichotomic classification of the > sciences. It seems to me that if one allows for a second phenomenological > science, iconoscopy, that it makes sense to at least look for yet a third > one--perhaps especially in this science which discovers three universes of > experience. > > > > And further, it seems to me that the first of the semiotic sciences, > theoretical or semiotic grammar, gets one of its most important principles, > namely, trichotomic structure (cf. object/sign/interpretent; > qualisign/sinsign/legisign; icon/index/symbol; rheme, dicent, argument; the > trichotomic structure of the 10-adic classification of signs; etc.) not out > of thin air, but from some science preceding it according to Comte's > principle of the ordering of the sciences, that those lower on the list > drawn principles from those above them. > > > > Suffice it to say for now that in my opinion trichotomic category theory > ought be placed in phenomenology, not further down in the classification of > the sciences (Gary, you suggested methodology, which makes no sense to me > at all), And, rather than being "subordinate to phenomenology," it seems to > me that, within phenomenology, and at the conclusion of it, that it > provides exactly the bridge leading to the normative sciences, but > especially to semiotic grammar. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > > Gary Richmond > > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > > Communication Studies > > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > C 745 > > 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
