Sadly this does not solve the problem, For example, "formal," in terms that I understand, means the syntactic form of mathematics (e;g;, ZF/C or FOL) with a set of semantic rules of transformation. While "material" refers to simple cause and effect.
Steven On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 4:30 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > Jerry and Steven, > > > > Jeff cited CP 6.353-63, which is from *Baldwin’s Dictionary:* > > http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter and Form > > > > In the specific context of phaneroscopy, Peirce says “So far as I have > developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal > elements of the phaneron. I know that there is another series of elements > imperfectly represented by Hegel's Categories. But I have been unable to > give any satisfactory account of them” (CP 1.284, 1905). > > > > The distinction between “formal” and “material” elements (or “categories”) > in this context is sketched in CP 8.213: > > [[ My three categories are nothing but Hegel's three grades of thinking. I > know very well that there are other categories, those which Hegel calls by > that name. But I never succeeded in satisfying myself with any list of > *them.* We may classify objects according to their matter; as wooden > things, iron things, silver things, ivory things, etc. But classification > according to structure is generally more important. And it is the same with > ideas. Much as I would like to see Hegel's list of categories reformed, I > hold that a classification of the elements of thought and consciousness > according to their formal structure is more important. ]] > > > > CP 1.289 follows up on this distinction: > > [[ I invite you to consider, not everything in the phaneron, but only its > indecomposable elements, that is, those that are logically indecomposable, > or indecomposable to direct inspection. I wish to make out a > classification, or division, of these indecomposable elements; that is, I > want to sort them into their different kinds according to their real > characters. I have some acquaintance with two different such > classifications, both quite true; and there may be others. Of these two I > know of, one is a division according to the form or structure of the > elements, the other according to their matter. The two most passionately > laborious years of my life were exclusively devoted to trying to ascertain > something for certain about the latter; but I abandoned the attempt as > beyond my powers, or, at any rate, unsuited to my genius. I had not > neglected to examine what others had done but could not persuade myself > that they had been more successful than I. Fortunately, however, all > taxonomists of every department have found classifications according to > structure to be the most important. ]] > > > > All of these are from the 1905-6. That should clarify what Peirce means by > “formal” in this context. > > > > gary f. > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] *On Behalf > Of *Steven Ericsson-Zenith > *Sent:* 17-Aug-14 5:50 PM > *To:* Jerry LR Chandler > *Cc:* Peirce List; Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Jeffrey Brian Downard > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic > category theory > > > > I concur with Jerry. A proper clarification will be most helpful. > > > > Steven > > > > On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 2:25 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > > Jeffery: > > I cannot make any sense out of your response to Steven, > > The concept of “formal" has deep metaphysical and semantic > interpretations; your response (by reference) is inadequate to distinguish > among the potential forms, at least for me within this context. > > Can you find the spare the time to clarify your meaning? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > On Aug 17, 2014, at 4:39 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > > > Hi Steven, List, > > > > See the later post where I refer to Peirce's discussion of Aristotle's > and Kant's uses of this distinction between formal and material (CP > 6.353-63). For my part, I'm trying to follow Peirce's lead in the use of > these conceptions--especially when I'm engaged in the project of > reconstructing his arguments. > > > > --Jeff > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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