Hi Jerry, Steven, Gary F., List, I have no doubt that that the distinction between formal and material has, as Jerry says, "deep metaphysical and semantic interpretations." In this discussion, however, I'm only trying to draw on Peirce's use of formal and material as it bears on the phenomenological categories.
I've pointed to a particular place in Peirce's papers that matters much to the way I want to reconstruct Peirce's explanations of this distinction. (CP 6.353-63) What is more, I've suggested that my approach to understanding his account of the phenomenological categories--both formal and material--is based on the idea that Peirce's early writings in 1865-7 contain the kernel from which the later phenomenological theory has grown. That is, I don't think Peirce has changed his mind in the later writings in a way that involves a discontinuity in the development of his account. Rather, from quite early on he was already thinking about things at three levels: the phenomenological analysis of the elementary categories of experience, the logical analysis of the semiotic categories, and the metaphysical account of the categories concerning what is real. What he seems to have done in 1890-1900 is to realize--for methodological reasons--the importance of keeping the three levels of the account more distinct. Later on, in 1900-3, he feels a need to give the phenomenological theory its own place within the architectonic plan. So, as a beginning of an answer your question, let me try to be more specific about what I think Peirce is doing in the CP at 6.353-63--at least insofar as this discussion has a bearing on his account of the phenomenological categories. Let us note that this was written in 1902 as an entry for Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. As such, it happens to be written at the very time that Peirce is thinking hard about the point of a phenomenological account of the categories. Let me start with a few general remarks. Peirce's early lectures in 1865 and 1866 were both on the logic of science. I want to stress the fact that he is particularly interested in the task of developing a logical theory of synthetic reasoning. In these early lectures, he reviews the accounts of logical inference given by other philosophers, including Whewell, Mill, Compte and Boole. In the next lecture on Kant, there is a sustained discussion of the distinction between matter and form. (W, vol. 1, 240-56) In this discussion, he refers back to the “old” way of thinking about the distinction. Then, in lecture VIII, he turns to a set of questions about the logical forms of inference by induction and hypothesis. Here, he says that “the first distinction we found it necessary to draw—the first conceptions we have to signalize—forms a triad: Thing Representation Form (colon added for clarity). Kant you remember distinguishes in all mental representations the matter and the form. The distinction here is slightly different.” (W, vol. 1, 257). The basic point he goes on to make is that the triad he has introduced includes a distinction between thing and form, and that this distinction is being introduced as a hypothesis in the context of his theory of logic. He is taking pains to point out that the distinction should not be taken to apply to things as they really are (i.e., in a theory of metaphysics), but only in a theory of how we represent them to be (i.e., in a theory of cognition, or what he will later call a theory of semiotics). On Peirce’s account, at least at this stage of his thinking, we “only know forms and things through representations.” A little while later, he adds the following to his early definition of form and thing: “We come now to an objection to the division of propositions which I have just given . . . . In order to answer this objection we must revert to that distinction between thing, image, and form established in the lecture upon the definition of logic. A representation is anything which may be regarded as standing for something else. Matter or thing is that for which a representation might stand prescinded from all that could constitute a relation with any representation. A form is the relation between representation and thing prescinded from both representation and thing. An image is a representation prescinded from thing and form.” This, I think, is a particularly important explanation of the distinction between matter and form—at least insofar as we are working in the context of a theory of logic. Let’s see what he says in 1865 just after delivering these lectures about form and matter as applied to the phenomena of experience: “Every phenomena has three aspects which may be called its elements. In the first place it may be differentiated from other phenomena and considered in its qualities; the phenomena considered as having qualities may be called its phenomenal form. In the second place the phenomenal form may be objectified that is thought of—reproduced in the imagination; until this is done we do not make it the subject of a thought, we do not say it is. Considered as a subject of thought the phenomenon may be called the phenomenal matter.” (“Unpsychological View of Logic”; W, vol. 1, 313) In this short passage, he has said quite a lot. I won’t try to unpack it all, but I would like to note that the points he makes are explicitly framed in terms of Kant’s discussion of the three-fold synthesis of the imagination in the first Critique. That is, the movement in thought from phenomenal form to phenomenal matter is explained in terms of Kant’s account of the transition from the synthesis of apprehension in intuition to the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. Ignoring all of the details here (the details matter much), we can shorten a very long story by saying that Peirce is examining Kant’s account of how we first unify the manifold of appearance and then later turn this unified presentation into a re-presentation that is the subject of further thought. Peirce is already at this early stage in his development as a philosopher noting the problems Kant is struggling with in the deduction of the categories in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant tells us in the Preface that the problems were so great that he simply removed the discussion from the second edition of the first Critique. Some decades later, he took them up again in the third Critique and tried to deal with those problems by coming at them from a rather different angle (and a somewhat revised understanding of how we might understand the division between the a priori and a posteriori elements in cognition). What is more, Peirce is ready to introduce a hypothesis as to where Kant has gone wrong in this discussion and what is needed to give a better explanation. Peirce is working out this hypothesis in the Lowell Lectures, and he states his main conclusions in “On A New List.” There, he starts with the Kantian way of framing the question: “This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it.” There have been a number of attempts to understand what Peirce is doing in the lectures leading up to this essay—and to reconstruct the argument in the essay itself. I happen to be fond to Manley Thompson’s introductory book on Peirce, and there are a number of dissertations on the subject, including those by Ransdell, Lohkamp, and Buzelli. There is another, by Masato Ishida, that has been especially helpful to me in explaining how the arguments in the essay are supposed to work. (see A Philosophical Commentary on C.S. Peirce’s “On a New List of Categories” which is available online in pdf). Without going any further, let me just say that Ishida’s dissertation is worth a close read for those who want to have a better understanding of the way Peirce is developing the Kantian conception of the categories in this essay. With this preamble in hand, let us consider a few things that Peirce says in his discussion of form and matter in the Baldwin definition. What we see Peirce doing is to work his way through some remarks about Aristotle’s use of the distinction, and then to consider the way that Kant has reformulated a number of key aspects of the distinction. One place you will find Kant doing this is in the “Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection” in the first Critique. If you think about what Peirce is really doing in this definition, I think there is a strategy at work. In addition to considering the way Kant has reformulated Aristotle’s distinction, he is also trying to infuse Kant’s distinction with some Aristotelian ideas that Peirce seems to suggest have largely been ignored by Kant and his followers. In particular, the Aristotelian conceptions that are connected with the notions of life and growth seem to be much on Peirce’s mind. That is the reason, I believe, that Peirce spends time talking about Aristotle’s experience as a practicing anatomist and biologist. As such, my strategy in making sense of what Peirce seems to be up to in this definition is to start at the end with the remarks he makes about the peculiar way logicians have used the distinction, and then to examine the things he says about Kant’s use of the distinction in his theory of cognition. From there, I would continue to work backwards and add pieces to this Kantian way of thinking about the distinction until we arrive at a richer Aristotelian revision of Kant’s conceptions. That, at least, is my suggestion. I’ll try to apply some of the remarks he makes in this definition of matter and form to his account of the formal and material categories as they are developed in the context of a phenomenological theory, but that will have to wait until a later date when I have more time. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Jerry LR Chandler [[email protected]] Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2014 2:25 PM To: Peirce List Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category theory Jeffery: I cannot make any sense out of your response to Steven, The concept of “formal" has deep metaphysical and semantic interpretations; your response (by reference) is inadequate to distinguish among the potential forms, at least for me within this context. Can you find the spare the time to clarify your meaning? Cheers Jerry On Aug 17, 2014, at 4:39 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Steven, List, > > See the later post where I refer to Peirce's discussion of Aristotle's and > Kant's uses of this distinction between formal and material (CP 6.353-63). > For my part, I'm trying to follow Peirce's lead in the use of these > conceptions--especially when I'm engaged in the project of reconstructing his > arguments. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: [email protected] [[email protected]] on behalf of Steven > Ericsson-Zenith [[email protected]] > Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2014 1:24 PM > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard > Cc: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L; Gary Fuhrman; André De Tienne > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category > theory > > Entertaining, except for one ambiguity: what, exactly, do you mean by the > term "formal?" > > Steven > > > On Saturday, August 16, 2014, Jeffrey Brian Downard > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Gary R., Gary F., André, List, > > Peirce makes two suggestions for doing phenomenology, and both are reflected > in the place he gives this kind of science in his architectonic. > > 1) We should ask: what formal categories must be in experience in order to > make valid synthetic inferences from the things we've observed? Or, putting > the question in a more particular form: what formal elements must be in the > observations we made of some surprising phenomenon in order to draw a valid > adductive inference to an explanatory hypothesis? The same kind of question > could be asked about inductive inferences from a set of data. > > 2) In order to answer this question, we should look to math and see what > kinds of mathematical conceptions and principles might be borrowed from this > science so as to give us insight into those formal features of the phenomena > we observe. > > These suggestions are reflected in Peirce's placement of phenomenology > between math and the normative theory of logic. > > In order to see why these suggestions might be helpful for understanding > Peirce's theory of phenomenology (i.e., phaneroscopy), I'd suggest that we > take up a sample problem. Here is a question that mattered much to Peirce. > What kinds of observations can we draw on in formulating hypotheses in the > theory of logic about the rules of valid inference? Peirce's answer to this > question is that we are able to make a distinction between valid and invalid > inferences in our ordinary reasoning, and that we can classify different > kinds of inferences as deductive, inductive and adductive. The process of > drawing on our logica utens in making arguments and reflecting on the > validity of those arguments supplies us with the observations that are needed > to get a theory of critical logic off the ground. > > As we all know, any kind of scientific observation we make might contain one > or another kind of observational error. As such, we have to ask the > following questions. Once we have a set of observations in hand, how should > we analyze them? What is more, how can we correct for the observational > errors we might have made? We could frame the same kinds of questions about > the study of speculative grammar as I've stated for a critical logic. For my > part, I'm working on the assumption that Peirce's analysis of the elements of > experience is designed to help us give better answers to these kinds of > questions than we are able to get from other philosophical methods--including > those of Kant, Hamilton, Mill, Boole, etc. > > The study of icons, I take it, is part of a general strategy of thinking more > carefully about question (1) listed above. Gary R., are you thinking about > "iconoscopy" or "imagoscopy" differently? I think that the careful study of > icons can be especially helpful in setting up a theory of logic because of > the essential role that icons have in the process of making of valid > inferences. > > With this much said, let me ask a question that I think is really basic for > understanding Peirce's phenomenology: is there any kind of formal relation > between the parts of a figure, image, diagram (i.e., any hypoicon) that does > not have the form of a monad, dyad or triad? That is, take the space in > which a diagram or other figure might be drawn, and take the relations > between the parts of any diagram (both actual and possible), and ask > yourself: how are the actual parts of the token diagram connected to each > other and to all of the possible transformations that might be made under the > rules that are used to construct and interpret the diagram? Is there any > formal relation between the parts of the diagram and the space in which it is > constructed that does not have the character of a monadic, dyadic or triadic > relation? > > We see that Peirce makes much of the role of icons in necessary reasoning, > including the necessary reasoning by which mathematicians deduce theorems > from the hypotheses that lie at the foundations of any given area of > mathematics. The suggestion I'm making is based on the idea that icons have > a similarly essential role in the framing of a hypothesis and the drawing of > an inductive inference. Do you know of a place where Peirce argues this kind > of point? One sort of place that comes to my mind is the discussions he > provides of the process of formulating hypotheses in mathematics. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2014 11:15 AM > To: Peirce-L; Gary Fuhrman; André De Tienne > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category theory > > Gary, list, > > I suppose I expected--or at least, hoped--that Gary F. would respond to my > post on some of the issues we'd been discussing recently regarding > phenomenology, a topic of some considerable interest to both of us and, > hopefully, to others on the list as well. So, in an off-list email to him I > expressed this hope, and Gary wrote back in a message he said I could > reproduce here. (I've interleaved my own comments within the substantive > parts of that message) > > I’ve already agreed that iconoscopy is probably the only way to make > phaneroscopy scientific, if its formulations themselves are scientific. > > I would concur, especially if your qualification is met. But, for now, > iconoscopy is the subject of but a single, as far as I can tell, unpublished > article by Andre de Tienne (who, as I earlier suggested, thought the term > 'iconoscopy' didn't exactly catch his meaning, that something like > 'imagoscopy' might come closer). There were also several discussions of de > Tienne's ideas in 2009 (as interest was shown in then by Martin Lefebvre, > myself, and others) and again in 2011 when both Gary F. and I discussed them > in the slow read of Joe's paper, "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?" See: > https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00043.html > > Still, the idea of this second phenomenological science seems sound to me, > and even necessary. Continuing: > > But I don’t have a proper response to this: > So what exactly are "the elements of the phaneron" once one's stated the > obvious, that is, the three universal categories? > I don’t think that’s obvious at all, or maybe I don’t get what you mean by > “obvious” here. It’s not even obvious to many list members what it means that > the three “categories” are “universal”. So I’m stumped for an answer to that > question. > > Hm. I guess I'm stumped by your being stumped. It may be that some, perhaps > many, list members don't 'get' Peirce's categories at all, let alone see them > as 'universal'. But some people do observe "the elements of the phaneron" and > do see them as universal. I would even suggest, by way of personal example, > that I saw them before I was even exposed to Peirce's writings, and before I > could give them names (certainly not firstness, secondness, and thirdness, > but, perhaps, something vaguely approaching something, other, medium). This > is merely to say that, if Peirce is correct and that the elements of the > phaneron are truly universal, then there's no reason why anyone attuned to > that kind of observation shouldn't and couldn't have touched upon them before > having Peirce's precise and helpful names for them. > > Phenomenology is admittedly a difficult science to grasp and even more > difficult to 'do', so I can imagine that many folk, including many > philosophers, haven't developed, or fully developed, the kinds of > sensibilities and abilities which Peirce thought were essential in doing this > science--that is, they haven't developed them any more than, for example, > I've developed some of the mental skills necessary for taking up certain > maths. But, as to our interests and talents, vive la difference! > > Also it’s still not clear to me how “category theory” or “trichotomic” is > related to phaneroscopy and iconoscopy, or why it’s part of Peircean > “phenomenology” (rather than logic or semiotic, or even methodeutic). It > seems to take the results of phaneroscopy (as articulated by iconoscopy, I > suppose) and apply them to the analysis and classification of more complex > phenomena such as semiotic processes. If so, then it should be subordinate to > phenomenology in the classification of sciences, not part of it. > > Here I must completely disagree. While it is true that trichotomic can and > will be applied in principle to semiotic, it is my opinion--well, more > precisely, my experience--that trichotomies are discovered in > phenomenological observation. And I personally have no doubt that Peirce > observed them in this way. It may be that one needs a kind of logica utens to > sort out some of these structures after the fact of the observation of them, > but, for example, it is possible in observing many phenomena, to 'see' that > firstness, secondness, and thirdness form a necessary trichotomy within > them,so to speak; and that 'something', 'other', 'medium' requires a > vectorial progression from 1ns, through 2ns, to 3ns, and in precisely that > (categorial, in this case, dialectical) order.These are, of course, two of > the most basic expressions of (a) trichotomic and (b) vectorial progression. > At the moment I can see no other place for the observation of such > trichotomic structure and the establishing of this as a principle for the use > by sciences which follow phenomenology except at the end (the putative third > division) of it. > > In logic, of course, Peirce considers diagrams more essential than language; > but I don’t see how diagrams can be used in phenomenology to avoid language, > so I don’t have a useful suggestion for doing that either, although I > wouldn’t want to say that it can’t be done. I was hoping somebody else would > have a better response. > > But certainly very many, perhaps most, diagrams of considerable value to and > use in science necessarily require language, or use language as an adjunct. > This, for example, is the case for some of the trichotomic diagrams Peirce > offers in certain letters to Lady Welby. The diagrams I use in trikonic are > meant, first, to show the categorial associations of the terms of a genuine > trichotomic relationship (those icons/images identified in what might be > called an iconoscopic observation, then given names) and, second, to show the > possible vectors (or paths) that are possible--and, some times, evident-- in > some of them. A logica utens allows one to extrapolate rather far in this > vectorial direction, in my opinion. But such a use of logica utens is the > case in theoretical esthetics and ethics as well. Ordinary logic (logica > utens) need not and probably cannot be avoided in the pre-logical (i.e., > pre-semiotic, pre-logica docens) sciences. > > If any of the above is useful as a prompt for a further explanation of > “category theory”, feel free to quote it and reply with a correction! > Meanwhile, yes, I am busy with a number of things these days … > > Yes, your remarks have been at least personally useful, especially in seeing > that until the first two branches of phenomenology, phaneroscopy and, > especially, iconoscopy, are much further developed, trichotomic category > theory will lack a solid basis. Still, important science has been > accomplished in all the post-phenomenological sciences without this grounding > and I expect this to happen in trichotomic as well. > > Peirce clearly saw the categories as a kind of heuristic leading him to a > vast array of discoveries along the way. It is not surprising, then, that > late in life he settled on an essentially trichotomic classification of the > sciences. It seems to me that if one allows for a second phenomenological > science, iconoscopy, that it makes sense to at least look for yet a third > one--perhaps especially in this science which discovers three universes of > experience. > > And further, it seems to me that the first of the semiotic sciences, > theoretical or semiotic grammar, gets one of its most important principles, > namely, trichotomic structure (cf. object/sign/interpretent; > qualisign/sinsign/legisign; icon/index/symbol; rheme, dicent, argument; the > trichotomic structure of the 10-adic classification of signs; etc.) not out > of thin air, but from some science preceding it according to Comte's > principle of the ordering of the sciences, that those lower on the list drawn > principles from those above them. > > Suffice it to say for now that in my opinion trichotomic category theory > ought be placed in phenomenology, not further down in the classification of > the sciences (Gary, you suggested methodology, which makes no sense to me at > all), And, rather than being "subordinate to phenomenology," it seems to me > that, within phenomenology, and at the conclusion of it, that it provides > exactly the bridge leading to the normative sciences, but especially to > semiotic grammar. > > Best, > > Gary > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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