Hi Steven, Putting the criticism in slightly different terms than the way Gary F. has stated it, your use of the formal/material distinction doesn't line up with any of the positions taken in the history of ideas between, say, Aristotle and Kant. Peirce, like any good philosopher, is thinking about the history of the use of these conceptions, and he's trying to remove confusions in the different uses found in the scholastics, the rationalist and empiricist moderns, the Kantians and neo-Kantians, the 19th century logicians, etc. For those who are working with Peirce's way of framing the distinction, we have two tasks. The first is simply to understand what Peirce means by the distinction in its different uses--including the use he makes of it in distinguishing between the formal and material categories in his phenomenological theory. The second task is to argue for Peirce's particular way of understanding the distinction--at least insofar as we think he is on the right track in offering improvements over the prior accounts in the history of ideas.
I'm more than willing to take up both tasks--but we'll not be able to do that with much thoroughness in an online discussion. Having added that proviso, I do think Peirce's way of making the distinction has considerable advantages over many of the ways the distinction between the formal and the material has been been framed in a number of discussions by 20th century analytic philosophers. Some analytic philosophers seem to feel no need to examine the history of the key conceptions we use in philosophy with any real care and, in acting on such impulses, they have caused a great rift between the arguments that were taking place in the classical, medieval and modern periods--and many of the arguments that took shape in the 20th century. Distinctions such as those between the a priori and a posteriori, the analytic and synthetic, and form and matter all have a rich history. For my part, I'd like to work in a manner that is continuous with that rich history rather than using terms in a way that seems to show little regard for it. I'll leave it up to you to decide whether or not you have adopted attitudes similar to the analytic philosophers I'm criticizing. In a separate post, I'll try to trace a bit of Peirce's discussion of this history. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: [email protected] [[email protected]] on behalf of Steven Ericsson-Zenith [[email protected]] Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2014 6:38 PM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category theory I should point out that no definition or "terminological habit" is absolute - a position that Peirce would have understood. Steven On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 5:29 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: My apologies. I thought “the problem” you were raising had something to do with the subject line of this thread. Apparently it has more to do with Jeff’s post not conforming to your specific terminological habits, so that your proprietary usage of the word has been ‘violated’. But that’s not a problem anyone else can solve for you. gary f. From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: 17-Aug-14 8:02 PM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category theory Sadly this does not solve the problem, For example, "formal," in terms that I understand, means the syntactic form of mathematics (e;g;, ZF/C or FOL) with a set of semantic rules of transformation. While "material" refers to simple cause and effect. Steven On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 4:30 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jerry and Steven, Jeff cited CP 6.353-63, which is from Baldwin’s Dictionary: http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter and Form In the specific context of phaneroscopy, Peirce says “So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron. I know that there is another series of elements imperfectly represented by Hegel's Categories. But I have been unable to give any satisfactory account of them” (CP 1.284, 1905). The distinction between “formal” and “material” elements (or “categories”) in this context is sketched in CP 8.213: [[ My three categories are nothing but Hegel's three grades of thinking. I know very well that there are other categories, those which Hegel calls by that name. But I never succeeded in satisfying myself with any list of them. We may classify objects according to their matter; as wooden things, iron things, silver things, ivory things, etc. But classification according to structure is generally more important. And it is the same with ideas. Much as I would like to see Hegel's list of categories reformed, I hold that a classification of the elements of thought and consciousness according to their formal structure is more important. ]] CP 1.289 follows up on this distinction: [[ I invite you to consider, not everything in the phaneron, but only its indecomposable elements, that is, those that are logically indecomposable, or indecomposable to direct inspection. I wish to make out a classification, or division, of these indecomposable elements; that is, I want to sort them into their different kinds according to their real characters. I have some acquaintance with two different such classifications, both quite true; and there may be others. Of these two I know of, one is a division according to the form or structure of the elements, the other according to their matter. The two most passionately laborious years of my life were exclusively devoted to trying to ascertain something for certain about the latter; but I abandoned the attempt as beyond my powers, or, at any rate, unsuited to my genius. I had not neglected to examine what others had done but could not persuade myself that they had been more successful than I. Fortunately, however, all taxonomists of every department have found classifications according to structure to be the most important. ]] All of these are from the 1905-6. That should clarify what Peirce means by “formal” in this context. gary f. From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: 17-Aug-14 5:50 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler Cc: Peirce List; Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category theory I concur with Jerry. A proper clarification will be most helpful. Steven On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 2:25 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jeffery: I cannot make any sense out of your response to Steven, The concept of “formal" has deep metaphysical and semantic interpretations; your response (by reference) is inadequate to distinguish among the potential forms, at least for me within this context. Can you find the spare the time to clarify your meaning? Cheers Jerry On Aug 17, 2014, at 4:39 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Hi Steven, List, > > See the later post where I refer to Peirce's discussion of Aristotle's and > Kant's uses of this distinction between formal and material (CP 6.353-63). > For my part, I'm trying to follow Peirce's lead in the use of these > conceptions--especially when I'm engaged in the project of reconstructing his > arguments. > > --Jeff > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. 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