My apologies. I thought “the problem” you were raising had something to do with 
the subject line of this thread. Apparently it has more to do with Jeff’s post 
not conforming to your specific terminological habits, so that your proprietary 
usage of the word has been ‘violated’. But that’s not a problem anyone else can 
solve for you.

 

gary f.

 

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of 
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: 17-Aug-14 8:02 PM
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category 
theory

 

Sadly this does not solve the problem, For example, "formal," in terms that I 
understand, means the syntactic form of mathematics  (e;g;, ZF/C or FOL) with a 
set of semantic rules of transformation. While "material" refers to simple 
cause and effect.  

 

Steven

 

On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 4:30 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote:

Jerry and Steven,

 

Jeff cited CP 6.353-63, which is from Baldwin’s Dictionary:

http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter and Form

 

In the specific context of phaneroscopy, Peirce says “So far as I have 
developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements 
of the phaneron. I know that there is another series of elements imperfectly 
represented by Hegel's Categories. But I have been unable to give any 
satisfactory account of them” (CP 1.284, 1905).

 

The distinction between “formal” and “material” elements (or “categories”) in 
this context is sketched in CP 8.213:

[[ My three categories are nothing but Hegel's three grades of thinking. I know 
very well that there are other categories, those which Hegel calls by that 
name. But I never succeeded in satisfying myself with any list of them. We may 
classify objects according to their matter; as wooden things, iron things, 
silver things, ivory things, etc. But classification according to structure is 
generally more important. And it is the same with ideas. Much as I would like 
to see Hegel's list of categories reformed, I hold that a classification of the 
elements of thought and consciousness according to their formal structure is 
more important. ]]

 

CP 1.289 follows up on this distinction:

[[ I invite you to consider, not everything in the phaneron, but only its 
indecomposable elements, that is, those that are logically indecomposable, or 
indecomposable to direct inspection. I wish to make out a classification, or 
division, of these indecomposable elements; that is, I want to sort them into 
their different kinds according to their real characters. I have some 
acquaintance with two different such classifications, both quite true; and 
there may be others. Of these two I know of, one is a division according to the 
form or structure of the elements, the other according to their matter. The two 
most passionately laborious years of my life were exclusively devoted to trying 
to ascertain something for certain about the latter; but I abandoned the 
attempt as beyond my powers, or, at any rate, unsuited to my genius. I had not 
neglected to examine what others had done but could not persuade myself that 
they had been more successful than I. Fortunately, however, all taxonomists of 
every department have found classifications according to structure to be the 
most important. ]]

 

All of these are from the 1905-6. That should clarify what Peirce means by 
“formal” in this context.

 

gary f.

 

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of 
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: 17-Aug-14 5:50 PM
To: Jerry LR Chandler
Cc: Peirce List; Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Jeffrey Brian Downard


Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category 
theory

 

I concur with Jerry. A proper clarification will be most helpful.

 

Steven

 

On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 2:25 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
<[email protected]> wrote:

Jeffery:

I cannot make any sense out of your response to Steven,

The concept of “formal" has deep metaphysical and semantic interpretations;  
your response (by reference) is inadequate to distinguish among the potential 
forms, at least for me within this context.

Can you find the spare the time to clarify your meaning?

Cheers

Jerry



On Aug 17, 2014, at 4:39 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> 
wrote:

> Hi Steven, List,
>
> See the later post where I refer to Peirce's discussion of Aristotle's and 
> Kant's uses of this distinction between formal and material (CP 6.353-63).  
> For my part, I'm trying to follow Peirce's lead in the use of these 
> conceptions--especially when I'm engaged in the project of reconstructing his 
> arguments.
>
> --Jeff
>

 



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