Hi Kirsti, I haven't yet said what I think Peirce's view is with respect to the form/matter distinction. For the most part, I've offered some comments on a small number of his definitions and explanations--and I've tried to follow a bit of his historical tracing of the different uses of the distinction.
Having said that, I must admit that some years ago, a group of friends was taking part in an online conversation of some arguments in Peirce's texts, and I realized that he was using form and matter in a way that didn't make much sense to me. My frustration grew to the point that I eventually had to throw my hands in the air and say: "I don't know what he means in using this distinction." Since then, I've spent a bit of time trying to tease out what he does mean--and how the distinction might apply to his account of the phenomenological categories. If you think I'm heading down the wrong track in any place in my comments, please explain why. I'd like to save myself from further confusion if possible, but a comment that I'm mistaken without any explanation as to why doesn't (yet) offer me much help. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Kirsti Määttänen [[email protected]] Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 5:28 AM To: André De Tienne; Gary Fuhrman; Gary Richmond; Jeffrey Brian Downard; Peirce-L Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and tric hotomic category theory Jeffrey, Is quality material? - You write interesting mails to the list, but the formal/material distinction does not do the job you seem to think it does. Kirsti Jeffrey Brian Downard [[email protected]] kirjoitti: > Gary R., Gary F., André, List, > > In what follows, Im respondingat least in partto some suggestions that > Richard Atkins makes in his 2010 Transactions article An Entirely Different > Set of Categories: Peirce's Material Categories about how we might > understand Peirce's phenomenological account of the material aspects of the > categories. > > Two quick points: for my part, I dont think it is all that difficult to > make out the general ideas behind Peirce's formal and material > categories--and the relationship between the two. The formal categories are > articulated in response to the kinds of questions I tried to set out in the > last email. I'm practically quoting from Peirce in "The Logic of > Mathematics; an attempt to develop my categories from within." He makes the > same kinds of points in the 1903 lecture on phenomenology, but in less > straightforward terms. > > What then, is the general idea behind the material categories? The line of > argument for the formal categories that I've tried to point to is conditional > in form. What formal properties would have to be in experience in order for > us to draw valid synthetic inferences from what we've observed? Once the > formal analysis is complete, he has not yet shown that the three formal > elements are actually a part of our ordinary experience. Much of the burden > of a phenomenological theory is to make this out, and to show that all three > formal elements are found in virtually every part of our experience--both > actual and possible. The methods used in phenomenology teach us how to > identify the elemental categories in the complex systems of qualities, > objects and interpretants that flow in our experience in the process of > semiosis. When we try to move beyond this general idea, things get a bit > more difficult. Peirce says a number of things about the material categories > (or as I would put it, the categories viewed in their more material aspects), > and it is hard to see how all of the things he says are supposed to cohere. > As a starting point, I would try to clarify his distinction between what is > formal and what is material. He makes some really interesting points about > the history of this distinction--and he points out that Kant turns > Aristotle's way of thinking about this distinction on its head. I wonder > what Peirce is doing with Kant's way of looking at this basic distinction? > (see CP 6.353-63) > > With that much said about the distinction between what is formal and > material, I think any reconstruction of Peirce's account of the material > aspects of the categories should start from the points that he first made in > the lectures leading up to "On a New List of the Categories." His initial > remarks are about the character of the categories considered formally. The > category that is first is reference to a ground. The category that is second > is reference to an object. The category that is third is reference to an > interpretant. Then he turns to the categories considered materially. The > category of quality is single reference to a ground. The category of > relation (later brute fact) is double reference to ground and object. The > category of representation (later mediation) is triple reference to ground, > object and interpretant. On my reading of Peirce' account of the categories, > this early idea of single, double and triple reference is at the root of all > of the later developments and refinements of his account of the > categories--both formal and material--in phenomenology (i.e., and > phaeneroscopy). > > Now, for the second quick point. Gary F. says: "Jeff, Im interested in > your question, 'is there any kind of formal relation between the parts of a > figure, image, diagram (i.e., any hypoicon) that does not have the form of a > monad, dyad or triad?' That certainly sounds like iconoscopy, but I confess > that I have no idea how we would go about investigating that question." The > answer to the question involves the whole of Peirce's semiotic--and not just > his account of the iconic function of signs. So Peirce is bringing quite a > lot to bear on the question. For starters, however, I think we should > consider the examples he thinks are most important in formulating an answer. > What Peirce sees is that, in mathematics, the examples we need are as "plenty > as blackberries" in the late summer. (CP 5.483) What do you know, it is > late August. Let's go picking. > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jeffrey Brian Downard > Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2014 4:09 PM > To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L; Gary Fuhrman; André De Tienne > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category > theory > > Gary R., Gary F., André, List, > > Peirce makes two suggestions for doing phenomenology, and both are reflected > in the place he gives this kind of science in his architectonic. > > 1) We should ask: what formal categories must be in experience in order to > make valid synthetic inferences from the things we've observed? Or, putting > the question in a more particular form: what formal elements must be in the > observations we made of some surprising phenomenon in order to draw a valid > adductive inference to an explanatory hypothesis? The same kind of question > could be asked about inductive inferences from a set of data. > > 2) In order to answer this question, we should look to math and see what > kinds of mathematical conceptions and principles might be borrowed from this > science so as to give us insight into those formal features of the phenomena > we observe. > > These suggestions are reflected in Peirce's placement of phenomenology > between math and the normative theory of logic. > > In order to see why these suggestions might be helpful for understanding > Peirce's theory of phenomenology (i.e., phaneroscopy), I'd suggest that we > take up a sample problem. Here is a question that mattered much to Peirce. > What kinds of observations can we draw on in formulating hypotheses in the > theory of logic about the rules of valid inference? Peirce's answer to this > question is that we are able to make a distinction between valid and invalid > inferences in our ordinary reasoning, and that we can classify different > kinds of inferences as deductive, inductive and adductive. The process of > drawing on our logica utens in making arguments and reflecting on the > validity of those arguments supplies us with the observations that are needed > to get a theory of critical logic off the ground. > > As we all know, any kind of scientific observation we make might contain one > or another kind of observational error. As such, we have to ask the > following questions. Once we have a set of observations in hand, how should > we analyze them? What is more, how can we correct for the observational > errors we might have made? We could frame the same kinds of questions about > the study of speculative grammar as I've stated for a critical logic. For my > part, I'm working on the assumption that Peirce's analysis of the elements of > experience is designed to help us give better answers to these kinds of > questions than we are able to get from other philosophical methods--including > those of Kant, Hamilton, Mill, Boole, etc. > > The study of icons, I take it, is part of a general strategy of thinking more > carefully about question (1) listed above. Gary R., are you thinking about > "iconoscopy" or "imagoscopy" differently? I think that the careful study of > icons can be especially helpful in setting up a theory of logic because of > the essential role that icons have in the process of making of valid > inferences. > > With this much said, let me ask a question that I think is really basic for > understanding Peirce's phenomenology: is there any kind of formal relation > between the parts of a figure, image, diagram (i.e., any hypoicon) that does > not have the form of a monad, dyad or triad? That is, take the space in > which a diagram or other figure might be drawn, and take the relations > between the parts of any diagram (both actual and possible), and ask > yourself: how are the actual parts of the token diagram connected to each > other and to all of the possible transformations that might be made under the > rules that are used to construct and interpret the diagram? Is there any > formal relation between the parts of the diagram and the space in which it is > constructed that does not have the character of a monadic, dyadic or triadic > relation? > > We see that Peirce makes much of the role of icons in necessary reasoning, > including the necessary reasoning by which mathematicians deduce theorems > from the hypotheses that lie at the foundations of any given area of > mathematics. The suggestion I'm making is based on the idea that icons have > a similarly essential role in the framing of a hypothesis and the drawing of > an inductive inference. Do you know of a place where Peirce argues this kind > of point? One sort of place that comes to my mind is the discussions he > provides of the process of formulating hypotheses in mathematics. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2014 11:15 AM > To: Peirce-L; Gary Fuhrman; André De Tienne > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and trichotomic category theory > > Gary, list, > > I suppose I expected--or at least, hoped--that Gary F. would respond to my > post on some of the issues we'd been discussing recently regarding > phenomenology, a topic of some considerable interest to both of us and, > hopefully, to others on the list as well. So, in an off-list email to him I > expressed this hope, and Gary wrote back in a message he said I could > reproduce here. (I've interleaved my own comments within the substantive > parts of that message) > > Ive already agreed that iconoscopy is probably the only way to make > phaneroscopy scientific, if its formulations themselves are scientific. > > I would concur, especially if your qualification is met. But, for now, > iconoscopy is the subject of but a single, as far as I can tell, unpublished > article by Andre de Tienne (who, as I earlier suggested, thought the term > 'iconoscopy' didn't exactly catch his meaning, that something like > 'imagoscopy' might come closer). There were also several discussions of de > Tienne's ideas in 2009 (as interest was shown in then by Martin Lefebvre, > myself, and others) and again in 2011 when both Gary F. and I discussed them > in the slow read of Joe's paper, "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?" See: > https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00043.html > > Still, the idea of this second phenomenological science seems sound to me, > and even necessary. Continuing: > > But I dont have a proper response to this: > So what exactly are "the elements of the phaneron" once one's stated the > obvious, that is, the three universal categories? > I dont think thats obvious at all, or maybe I dont get what you mean by > obvious here. Its not even obvious to many list members what it means that > the three categories are universal . So Im stumped for an answer to that > question. > > Hm. I guess I'm stumped by your being stumped. It may be that some, perhaps > many, list members don't 'get' Peirce's categories at all, let alone see them > as 'universal'. But some people do observe "the elements of the phaneron" and > do see them as universal. I would even suggest, by way of personal example, > that I saw them before I was even exposed to Peirce's writings, and before I > could give them names (certainly not firstness, secondness, and thirdness, > but, perhaps, something vaguely approaching something, other, medium). This > is merely to say that, if Peirce is correct and that the elements of the > phaneron are truly universal, then there's no reason why anyone attuned to > that kind of observation shouldn't and couldn't have touched upon them before > having Peirce's precise and helpful names for them. > > Phenomenology is admittedly a difficult science to grasp and even more > difficult to 'do', so I can imagine that many folk, including many > philosophers, haven't developed, or fully developed, the kinds of > sensibilities and abilities which Peirce thought were essential in doing this > science--that is, they haven't developed them any more than, for example, > I've developed some of the mental skills necessary for taking up certain > maths. But, as to our interests and talents, vive la difference! > > Also its still not clear to me how category theory or trichotomic is > related to phaneroscopy and iconoscopy, or why its part of Peircean > phenomenology (rather than logic or semiotic, or even methodeutic). It > seems to take the results of phaneroscopy (as articulated by iconoscopy, I > suppose) and apply them to the analysis and classification of more complex > phenomena such as semiotic processes. If so, then it should be subordinate to > phenomenology in the classification of sciences, not part of it > > Here I must completely disagree. While it is true that trichotomic can and > will be applied in principle to semiotic, it is my opinion--well, more > precisely, my experience--that trichotomies are discovered in > phenomenological observation. And I personally have no doubt that Peirce > observed them in this way. It may be that one needs a kind of logica utens to > sort out some of these structures after the fact of the observation of them, > but, for example, it is possible in observing many phenomena, to 'see' that > firstness, secondness, and thirdness form a necessary trichotomy within > them,so to speak; and that 'something', 'other', 'medium' requires a > vectorial progression from 1ns, through 2ns, to 3ns, and in precisely that > (categorial, in this case, dialectical) order.These are, of course, two of > the most basic expressions of (a) trichotomic and (b) vectorial progression. > At the moment I can see no other place for the observation of such > trichotomic structure and the establishing of this as a principle for the use > by sciences which follow phenomenology except at the end (the putative third > division) of it. > > In logic, of course, Peirce considers diagrams more essential than language; > but I dont see how diagrams can be used in phenomenology to avoid language, > so I dont have a useful suggestion for doing that either, although I > wouldnt want to say that it cant be done. I was hoping somebody else would > have a better response. > > But certainly very many, perhaps most, diagrams of considerable value to and > use in science necessarily require language, or use language as an adjunct. > This, for example, is the case for some of the trichotomic diagrams Peirce > offers in certain letters to Lady Welby. The diagrams I use in trikonic are > meant, first, to show the categorial associations of the terms of a genuine > trichotomic relationship (those icons/images identified in what might be > called an iconoscopic observation, then given names) and, second, to show the > possible vectors (or paths) that are possible--and, some times, evident-- in > some of them. A logica utens allows one to extrapolate rather far in this > vectorial direction, in my opinion. But such a use of logica utens is the > case in theoretical esthetics and ethics as well. Ordinary logic (logica > utens) need not and probably cannot be avoided in the pre-logical (i.e., > pre-semiotic, pre-logica docens) sciences. > > If any of the above is useful as a prompt for a further explanation of > category theory , feel free to quote it and reply with a correction! > Meanwhile, yes, I am busy with a number of things these days & > > Yes, your remarks have been at least personally useful, especially in seeing > that until the first two branches of phenomenology, phaneroscopy and, > especially, iconoscopy, are much further developed, trichotomic category > theory will lack a solid basis. Still, important science has been > accomplished in all the post-phenomenological sciences without this grounding > and I expect this to happen in trichotomic as well. > > Peirce clearly saw the categories as a kind of heuristic leading him to a > vast array of discoveries along the way. It is not surprising, then, that > late in life he settled on an essentially trichotomic classification of the > sciences. It seems to me that if one allows for a second phenomenological > science, iconoscopy, that it makes sense to at least look for yet a third > one--perhaps especially in this science which discovers three universes of > experience. > > And further, it seems to me that the first of the semiotic sciences, > theoretical or semiotic grammar, gets one of its most important principles, > namely, trichotomic structure (cf. object/sign/interpretent; > qualisign/sinsign/legisign; icon/index/symbol; rheme, dicent, argument; the > trichotomic structure of the 10-adic classification of signs; etc.) not out > of thin air, but from some science preceding it according to Comte's > principle of the ordering of the sciences, that those lower on the list drawn > principles from those above them. > > Suffice it to say for now that in my opinion trichotomic category theory > ought be placed in phenomenology, not further down in the classification of > the sciences (Gary, you suggested methodology, which makes no sense to me at > all), And, rather than being "subordinate to phenomenology," it seems to me > that, within phenomenology, and at the conclusion of it, that it provides > exactly the bridge leading to the normative sciences, but especially to > semiotic grammar. > > Best, > > Gary > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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