Clark, list,
Yes, absolute theoretical certainty would seem to require an infinite
run of experience.
Best, Ben
On 9/22/2014 10:01 AM, Clark Goble wrote:
On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:44 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@libertypages.com
<mailto:cl...@libertypages.com>> wrote:
On Sep 20, 2014, at 12:31 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com
<mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com>> wrote:
The main idea is not that of a long run. Instead the idea is that of
sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently long' or
'sufficiently far-reaching' or 'sufficiently deep' or 'sufficiently
good' or 'sufficiently good for long enough', or the like, it's stlll
the same basic idea.
Not to be pedantic (and I know conversation has gone on without me).
This is something I’ve thought long and hard about and have shifted
views on several times through the years.
On the one hand it’s true that inquiry only has to go long enough so
as to arrive at a stable truth. The idea about the long run (and I
think it’s tied to infinities and Peirce’s conception of continuity)
is that there’s no real way to know if we’re at a local stability
point that isn’t the long run stability point or not. So we use the
idea of a long run long enough to give us a “like compared to like”
comparison. That is we’re at truth when the selection of forces during
our inquiry stabilizes us in the same way an ideal community of
inquirers would given sufficient time.
To me the analogy is to calculus the way it’s usually taught. (i.e.
not in the idealized way most 20th century mathematicians like, but
the way more lenient 20th century physicists like) You can always keep
dividing your rectangles when doing calculus but at a certain point
you’ve gone far enough to get your answer. You say it’s right simply
because /you could/ keep going on for infinity even if there’s no need.
It’s a very pragmatic approach but which also gets at Peirce’s
conception of not having direct control over ones beliefs. The inquiry
is to open you up to sufficient experiences as to get you to truth.
We’re fallibilists but at a certain point we’re skeptical we’ll be
proven wrong.
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