Ben wrote:
(100714-1)
"Peirce did not complete the ten-trichotomy system to his own satisfaction
but his effort indicates that he regarded the copula basically as a Third,
not as a Second, although it works as a Second at the syntactical level."
Can you explain, preferably with some examples, what you mean by "the
copula is basically a THIRD but can work as a SECOND at the syntactical
level" ?
Also what do you think about distinguishing Dicisign (a Second, according
to the 10 classes of signs) and Argument (a Third) as follows ?
"Dicisign = Second = Natural proposition; (100714-2)
Argument = Third = Natural computing"
With all the best.
Sung
__________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
> Gary R., Gary F., Frederik, Jeff D., lists,
>
> I don't have the quotes handy at this late (for me) time of day, but:
>
> The predicate does denote the subject. "Jack is blue": blue denotes
> Jack, not _/only/_ Jack, but still _/also/_ Jack. Jack, in turn,
> 'comprehends' blue. You may remember Peirce's discussion of the copula
> as a relation of 'if-then' or 'is included in'.
>
> Jack â< blue.
> Jack is included in blue.
> If Jack, then blue.
> Jack materially implies blue.
> Comprehension is implication. Somewhere Peirce also says that a
> proposition comprehends the further propositions that it implies, and
> denotes the propositions that imply it. I wonder whether that applies
> only in deductive implication (i.e., 'entailment' as it is nowadays
> called) or in all inference modes of implication (I'm not sure how to
> say that, but I hope readers understand me). I also have wondered
> whether an icon may properly be said to have a comprehension. This
> depends on whether an icon 'comprehends' the character that it presents.
> I once searched CP, W, & CN for discussion of comprehension in relation
> to icons and found nothing.
>
> Peirce speaks of index, icon, and symbol alike as 'denoting.' The icon
> denotes by virtue of a character of its own. While, as Gary F. recently
> said, an icon denotes a possible range of objects, some of that range
> may also be actual. An icon may have actual denotation.
>
> The copula as index is index in a 'meta' sense. In a 1908 effort at the
> ten sign-trichotomies, Peirce classified 'copulants', or 'distributive
> signs', as Thirds in the trichotomy of (1) descriptive (2)
> designative/denominative, and (3) copulant / distributive. Peirce did
> not complete the ten-trichotomy system to his own satisfaction but his
> effort indicates that he regarded the copula basically as a Third, not
> as a Second, although it works as a Second at the syntactical level.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 10/6/2014 7:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
>> Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,
>>
>> I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting
>> terminological discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject
>> (*such as /denote/, /designate, indicate/, etc). and on the other to
>> the *predicate*, (such as /signify, comprehend, connote, etc.)/ It
>> seems to me that Frederik here employs such terms relating to the
>> proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary development and
>> vast expansion of the proposition as the /dicisign concept /in,
>> especially, the/ Syllabus/ and /Kaina Stoicheia/ ca.1903/./
>>
>> I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present
>> analysis that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying:
>>
>> /In considering the proposition (dicisign)/:
>>
>> *[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the
>> Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) *
>>
>>
>> And, further, for Peirce these two are joined /not/, as they've
>> traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an /*index */of a
>> peculiar kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index
>> pointing to the *real fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if
>> I'm getting this right, the formulation/ breadth x depth = information
>> (/i.e,, the sum of these two as equaling some factual information) for
>> the dicisign means that _true information represents a real fact in
>> some world of experience_.
>>
>> In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition,
>> that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to
>> the fact being represented, the index being the /necessary /sign for
>> joining the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a
>> proposition. This syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices
>> do), the icon being, in this case, exactly the//juxtaposition//of the
>> two, that is, their*/co-localization/*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms
>> it.
>>
>> /The/
>> / co-localization of the elements of the dicisign/:
>>
>> *[Subject](Predicate)*
>>
>>
>> (Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive
>> and pre-linguistic.)
>>
>> This syntax claims that the dicisign "is/ really indexically
>> connected/ to the /real fact/ to which the subject and predicate
>> correspond" (Stjernfelt, 66), and /how/ this happens forms the
>> argumentation of the rest of this section and some of the next
>> (centering on the/ two objects/ of the co-localizing index) . But,
>> just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like to ask if the above
>> summary represents a correct understanding of the terminology dthat
>> Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents the argument
>> being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?
>>
>> Understanding that there are in this syntax /two objects /helps
>> explain how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential"
>> relation to the fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is
>> to the replica (Secondary Object) that the /existentia/l relation
>> especially applies, while the /reality/ (Primary Object) could be in
>> any of the Three Worlds of Experience, and in that sense is different
>> and altogether greater than its replica. So the language of existence,
>> of facticity, of secondness, is a bit unnerving to me
>> for/ both/ Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and the Peirce quotes
>> on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language of reality
>> (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus) where
>> both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be
>> making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes
>> simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding
>> I've argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a
>> significant change in terminology from the Syllabus to KS)
>>
>> Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the
>> Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a
>> rather complex point (67), as well as your explication of
>> the co-localization synta*x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>> *
>> *
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690*
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 8:01 AM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca
>> <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
>>
>> Lists,
>>
>> We have now arrived (slightly behind schedule) at NP 3.7, which is
>> considerably longer and more difficult than the previous sections
>> of Chapter 3. Readers who have taken in those previous sections
>> should be prepared to take on 3.7, but instead of adding any
>> commentary of mine to it, Iâm going to simply direct your
>> attention to it and wait a few days for questions about it, before
>> we move on to 3.8. According to the schedule (attached), we have
>> another two weeks to âcoverâ Chapter 3. Iâd encourage those
>> who
>> havenât yet posted questions about NP to do so now. Donât worry
>> if
>> you feel that your command of the terminology is imperfect; I
>> doubt that anyone, including me, has it âdown patâ, with the
>> possible exception of Frederik! As youâve probably seen by now,
>> the Dicisign is a complex and difficult concept, but an important
>> one, so we need whatever questions can make it a little easier.
>>
>> gary f.
>>
>> } {
>>
>> www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm <http://www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm>
>> }{ gnoxics
>>
>
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