Sungchul, lists,As regards the copula as index, I was referring back to Gary Richmond's remarks on Peirce and Stjernfelt,
[Quote]In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact being represented, the index being the /necessary/ sign for joining the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition.
[End quote] Scroll down in this message to find the rest of Gary R.'s message.As regards the copula's thirdness, I was pointing out that Peirce as late as 1908 thought of the copula as a third as shown by his placing the 'copulant' or 'distributive sign' third in one of the trichotomies in the Dec. 25, 1908 version (I think I said "Dec. 24" by a typo) of his ten trichotomies, for which I posted a link http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/2204107/2/10ad5.GIF in a recent message.
Here's Peirce's discussion: [CP 8.350. EP 2:484. From a draft letter to Lady Welby, dated Dec. 25, 1908) Adopting this enumeration as a basis of a division of Signs, I obtain A. _/Descriptives/_, which determine their Objects by stating the characters of the latter. B. _/Designatives/_ (or _/Denotatives/_), or Indicatives, _/Denominatives/_, which like a Demonstrative pronoun, or a pointing finger, brutely direct the mental eyeballs of the interpreter to the object in question, which in this case cannot be given by independent reasoning. C. _/Copulants/_, which neither describe nor denote their Objects, but merely express the logical relations of these latter to something otherwise referred to. Such, among linguistic signs, as "If — then — ," " — is — ," " — causes — ," " — would be — ," " — is relative to — for — " "Whatever" etc. I think you need to get a copy of EP 2.Regarding 'natural computing' - I don't see what that adds to the idea of natural arguing; if anything it seems unneedfully to narrow the idea of arguing, which can be deductive, inductive, abductive, or whatever combination, while 'computing' is usually taken to mean deducing.
Best, Ben On 10/7/2014 6:49 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
Ben wrote: (100714-1) "Peirce did not complete the ten-trichotomy system to his own satisfaction but his effort indicates that he regarded the copula basically as a Third, not as a Second, although it works as a Second at the syntactical level." Can you explain, preferably with some examples, what you mean by "the copula is basically a THIRD but can work as a SECOND at the syntactical level" ? Also what do you think about distinguishing Dicisign (a Second, according to the 10 classes of signs) and Argument (a Third) as follows ? "Dicisign = Second = Natural proposition; (100714-2) Argument = Third = Natural computing" With all the best. Sung __________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.netGary R., Gary F., Frederik, Jeff D., lists, I don't have the quotes handy at this late (for me) time of day, but: The predicate does denote the subject. "Jack is blue": blue denotes Jack, not _/only/_ Jack, but still _/also/_ Jack. Jack, in turn, 'comprehends' blue. You may remember Peirce's discussion of the copula as a relation of 'if-then' or 'is included in'. Jack —< blue. Jack is included in blue. If Jack, then blue. Jack materially implies blue. Comprehension is implication. Somewhere Peirce also says that a proposition comprehends the further propositions that it implies, and denotes the propositions that imply it. I wonder whether that applies only in deductive implication (i.e., 'entailment' as it is nowadays called) or in all inference modes of implication (I'm not sure how to say that, but I hope readers understand me). I also have wondered whether an icon may properly be said to have a comprehension. This depends on whether an icon 'comprehends' the character that it presents. I once searched CP, W, & CN for discussion of comprehension in relation to icons and found nothing. Peirce speaks of index, icon, and symbol alike as 'denoting.' The icon denotes by virtue of a character of its own. While, as Gary F. recently said, an icon denotes a possible range of objects, some of that range may also be actual. An icon may have actual denotation. The copula as index is index in a 'meta' sense. In a 1908 effort at the ten sign-trichotomies, Peirce classified 'copulants', or 'distributive signs', as Thirds in the trichotomy of (1) descriptive (2) designative/denominative, and (3) copulant / distributive. Peirce did not complete the ten-trichotomy system to his own satisfaction but his effort indicates that he regarded the copula basically as a Third, not as a Second, although it works as a Second at the syntactical level. Best, Ben On 10/6/2014 7:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists, I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such as /denote/, /designate, indicate/, etc). and on the other to the *predicate*, (such as /signify, comprehend, connote, etc.)/ It seems to me that Frederik here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the /dicisign concept /in, especially, the/ Syllabus/ and /Kaina Stoicheia/ ca.1903/./ I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying: /In considering the proposition (dicisign)/: *[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) * And, further, for Peirce these two are joined /not/, as they've traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an /*index */of a peculiar kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, the formulation/ breadth x depth = information (/i.e,, the sum of these two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that _true information represents a real fact in some world of experience_. In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact being represented, the index being the /necessary /sign for joining the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in this case, exactly the//juxtaposition//of the two, that is, their*/co-localization/*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it. /The/ / co-localization of the elements of the dicisign/: *[Subject](Predicate)* (Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive and pre-linguistic.) This syntax claims that the dicisign "is/ really indexically connected/ to the /real fact/ to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt, 66), and /how/ this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the/ two objects/ of the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7? Understanding that there are in this syntax /two objects /helps explain how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica (Secondary Object) that the /existentia/l relation especially applies, while the /reality/ (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a bit unnerving to me for/ both/ Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change in terminology from the Syllabus to KS) Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization synta*x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks! Best, Gary * * *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 8:01 AM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: Lists, We have now arrived (slightly behind schedule) at NP 3.7, which is considerably longer and more difficult than the previous sections of Chapter 3. Readers who have taken in those previous sections should be prepared to take on 3.7, but instead of adding any commentary of mine to it, I’m going to simply direct your attention to it and wait a few days for questions about it, before we move on to 3.8. According to the schedule (attached), we have another two weeks to ‘cover’ Chapter 3. I’d encourage those who haven’t yet posted questions about NP to do so now. Don’t worry if you feel that your command of the terminology is imperfect; I doubt that anyone, including me, has it ‘down pat’, with the possible exception of Frederik! As you’ve probably seen by now, the Dicisign is a complex and difficult concept, but an important one, so we need whatever questions can make it a little easier. gary f. } { www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm <http://www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm> }{ gnoxics
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