We've been through this before, John D, and I can only say that we'll have to 'agree to disagree'. The Sign (capital letter), in my view, is composed of three Relations: the Object-Representamen; the Representamen in itself; and the Representamen-Interpretant.
You seem to call these Relations as 'terms'. I have a problem with that; I think they are more than 'terms' - and may not understand what YOU mean be that. And the reason for acknowledging that there are THREE Relations, is to acknowledge that each one of them can operate in a different categorical mode: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. That leads to the ten basic Sign (capital letter) classes. Agreed, the Sign (capital letter) - which is NOT the same as the Representamen/sign (lower case)..is 'irreducibly triadic. It MUST have three Relations. Not one; not two; but three. Have a great Christmas. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Deely, John N. To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 10:45 AM Subject: [biosemiotics:7748] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce categories The relation which constitutes a sign (representamen) as sign is "irreducibly triadic", i.e., it is one relation unifying three terms From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 8:50 To: Peirce-L; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce categories Gary R - agreed; the categories are modes of organization and are not, in themselves, signs. A Sign is a triad of Relations. And I note further, Gary R's statement: "As with the categories, all three relations (to the sign itself, to its object, to its interpretent) are always involved in any semiosis: they are aspects of the sign (as Frederik phrases it) and not independent entities." And agree that there are three relations (and I've been chastized on this list both for using the term 'relation' and for making it plural!). Agreed - they are certainly not independent entities but are 'aspects' of the Sign. Therefore, to disagree with Sung, there is no such thing as 'Signlessness' - and Peirce himself has said as such, in rejecting the existence of nothing. Indeterminacy is not the same as zero (see 1.412). Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Richmond To: Sungchul Ji Cc: Peirce-L ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Monday, December 15, 2014 10:30 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7596] Re: Peirce categories Sung, lists, Sung quoted my snippet of Peirce, then my comment: CSP: Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it and, it is clear to me, that GR: ". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to (121514-1) it' as well." then wrote: SJ: Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of Firstness", "Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote a post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically led to conclude that "There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics (121514-2) analog of mathematical 'Zero'". I certainly don't see it that way at all. 1. As Edwina and others have pointed out, the Peircean categories are not themselves signs. 2. None of the categories appear independently of each other (except extracted for the purposes of analysis). 3. 1ns in consideration of (or 'applied' to) sign analysis: as the sign is in itself, qualisign; as the sign resembles its object in some way, icon; as the sign expresses itself as a rheme, or term, or ordinary name or noun, etc. (apart from its involvement in an proposition or an argument) for its interpretent sign. 4. As with the categories, all three relations (to the sign itself, to its object, to its interpretent) are always involved in any semiosis: they are aspects of the sign (as Frederik phrases it) and not independent entities. 5. The pure icon is a "limit case" (which I'll remark on when we begin the discussion of Chapter 8 of NS next week) and all other signs involving icons, the vast majority of such signs, are iconic in their relation to the object. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 8:19 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: Gary R wrote: Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it and, it is clear to me, that ". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to (121514-1) it' as well." Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of Firstness", "Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote a post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically led to conclude that "There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics (121514-2) analog of mathematical 'Zero'". With all the best. Sung __________________________________________________ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net > > GR > : > The Peirce quotation > [Howard] > offered concerns only an "absolute" first and *that*, no doubt, is an > abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. > > HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more > than an artifact of language? > > H > oward, the thrust of my post was exactly that firstness *can be* and > *is* experienced. > Peirce offers an abstract definition of firstness in the passage you > earlier quoted in the interest of clarifying the kind of phenomenon it is > " > Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it > " and, it is clear to me, that any abstract definition of it "must be > false to it" as well. > > > Were there such a phenomenon as absolute firstness which could stand apart > from its participation in a reality which involves all three categories, > it > might look like Peirce's abstract definition. There is no such abstract > firstness in reality--there are only the embodied firstnesses such as > those > I described. > > Peirce concluded the passage you quoted by saying that what is first is " > present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, > vivid, conscious, and evanescent. > " > > My personal example was meant to suggest just that presentness, immediacy, > freshness, newness, spontaneity, vividness, consciousness, and > evanescence. > > B > est, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690* > > On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Howard Pattee <hpat...@roadrunner.com> > wrote: > >> At 09:54 PM 11/29/2014, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >> The Peirce quotation you offered concerns only an "absolute" first and >> that, no doubt, is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. >> >> >> HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more >> than an artifact of language? >> I would say that Firstness now belongs to the ongoing *qualia* >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> problem >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia>. >> >> The question arises for any abstract verbal distinctions. For example, >> Edwina's "three 'pure' or 'genuine' modes, 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, or Firstness >> as >> Firstness, Secondness as Secondness; Thirdness as Thirdness." >> >> Just as confusing are the converse failures to make distinctions that >> have >> empirical content. For example, Peirce's lumping abduction with logic. >> >> Qualia problems will require more than philosophical and linguistic >> distinctions to clarify. We will need to know more about what is going >> on >> in brains. >> >> Howard >> >> >> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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