Peirce, CP 8.335:

In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into
Icons, Indices, and Symbols (a division I gave in 1867). I define an Icon as
a sign which is determined by its dynamic object by virtue of its own
internal nature. Such is any qualisign, like a vision, - or the sentiment
excited by a piece of music considered as representing what the composer
intended. Such may be a sinsign, like an individual diagram; say a curve of
the distribution of errors. I define an Index as a sign determined by its
dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper
Name (a legisign); such is the occurrence of a symptom of a disease. (The
symptom itself is a legisign, a general type of a definite character. The
occurrence in a particular case is a sinsign.) I define a Symbol as a sign
which is determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be
so interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a
natural disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant
(that of which the interpretant is a determination). Every symbol is
necessarily a legisign; for it is inaccurate to call a replica of a legisign
a symbol.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 16-Dec-14 4:55 PM



 

Gary F, you wrote:

 

 

The reason that "people keep saying you support dyads" is that your three
"relations" have only two "members" each, to use Peirce's term. A triadic
relation has three members, not two; and a complexus of three dyadic
(two-member) relations is not, according to Peirce, "a triadic relation."

 

That's a completely different analytic frame from Peirce's The triadic
relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a
way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations."

 

Peirce is referring, in his use of the term 'member' to the Relations (see
his outline in 8.335) and was declaring that the Sign, as a triad, has three
bound parts, the Relations.  YOU weren't; you were talking about what YOU
see, incorrectly, in my definition of each single Relation as an interaction
between, eg, the Representamen and the Object; those two perimeters are what
you define as two members. That's not how Peirce used the term - and so, I
ask you again, where do you get the sense that the perimeters are 'members'?

 

My response was to point out that the perimeters of the Relation between
the, eg, Representamen and the Object are NOT 'members'. So, when I refer to
three Relations; that between the Representamen-Object; the Representamen in
itself; the Representamen-Object....YOU define these as DYADS, with each
perimeter node a 'member'. That, as I have constantly pointed out, is
absolutelyincorrect.

 

I could say the same about you - 'if you think your version of
semiotics...and..even..if you think you are correct in your interpretation
of Peirce'...for I don't agree that your interpretation is correct. And
that's as far as it should go. You reject debate and discussion and accept
only consensus. Otherwise, you get 'testy'. 

 

Again, kindly speak only for yourself; there is no need to 'appeal to
others' to stand up and cheer for you. Your arguments should stand or fall,
totally on their own merit. I admit, I can never understand why some people
feel the need for a crowd around them tocheer on their arguments. You don't
agree with me. That's fine - you haven't convinced me that my analytic frame
is incorrect, and name-calling or putting me down is not a successful
method. You don't agree with me -; I haven't convinced you of the validity
of my analysis.  and that's as far as it should go. There is no need for
insults.

 

Edwina

 

 

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