Edwina, John, lists, I have tended to strongly agree with John in this matter, principally because of this and similar passages.
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does. 2.274 As I see it, the 'three relation' (to the sign itself, its object, its interpretent) are for the purposes of analysis only because "*the triadic relation* is genuine" such that "its three members are bound together by it in a way that* does not consist of any complexus of dyadic relations*." So my question is, Edwina, how do you interpretent 2.274? Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > We've been through this before, John D, and I can only say that we'll > have to 'agree to disagree'. The Sign (capital letter), in my view, is > composed of three Relations: the Object-Representamen; the Representamen in > itself; and the Representamen-Interpretant. > > You seem to call these Relations as 'terms'. I have a problem with that; I > think they are more than 'terms' - and may not understand what YOU mean be > that. > > And the reason for acknowledging that there are THREE Relations, is to > acknowledge that each one of them can operate in a different categorical > mode: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. That leads to the ten basic Sign > (capital letter) classes. > > Agreed, the Sign (capital letter) - which is NOT the same as the > Representamen/sign (lower case)..is 'irreducibly triadic. It MUST have > three Relations. Not one; not two; but three. > > Have a great Christmas. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Deely, John N. <jnde...@stthom.edu> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> ; Peirce-L > <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > *Sent:* Tuesday, December 16, 2014 10:45 AM > *Subject:* [biosemiotics:7748] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce categories > > The relation which constitutes a sign (representamen) as sign is > "irreducibly triadic", i.e., it is *one* relation unifying *three terms* > > > > *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > *Sent:* Tuesday, December 16, 2014 8:50 > *To:* Peirce-L; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce categories > > > > Gary R - agreed; the categories are modes of organization and are not, in > themselves, signs. A Sign is a triad of Relations. And I note further, Gary > R's statement: > > > > "As with the categories, all three relations (to the sign itself, to its > object, to its interpretent) are always involved in any semiosis: they are > *aspects* of the sign (as Frederik phrases it) and not independent > entities." > > > > And agree that there are three relations (and I've been chastized on this > list both for using the term 'relation' and for making it plural!). Agreed > - they are certainly not independent entities but are 'aspects' of the > Sign. > > > > Therefore, to disagree with Sung, there is no such thing as 'Signlessness' > - and Peirce himself has said as such, in rejecting the existence of > nothing. Indeterminacy is not the same as zero (see 1.412). > > > > Edwina > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > > *To:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > > *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > > *Sent:* Monday, December 15, 2014 10:30 PM > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7596] Re: Peirce categories > > > > Sung, lists, > > > > Sung quoted my snippet of Peirce, then my comment: > > > > CSP: Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it > > and, it is clear to me, that > > > > GR: ". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to > (121514-1) > > it' as well." > > > > then wrote: > > > > SJ: Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of > Firstness", > > "Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote a > > post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically led > > to conclude that > > > > "There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics (121514-2) > > analog of mathematical 'Zero'". > > > > I certainly don't see it that way at all. > > > > 1. As Edwina and others have pointed out, the Peircean categories are not > themselves signs. > > 2. None of the categories appear independently of each other (except > extracted for the purposes of analysis). > > 3. 1ns in consideration of (or 'applied' to) sign analysis: as the sign is > in itself, *qualisign*; as the sign resembles its object in some way, > *icon*; as the sign expresses itself as a rheme, or term, or ordinary > name or noun, etc. (apart from its involvement in an proposition or an > argument) for its *interpretent* sign. > > 4. As with the categories, all three relations (to the sign itself, to its > object, to its interpretent) are always involved in any semiosis: they are > *aspects* of the sign (as Frederik phrases it) and not independent > entities. > > 5. The pure icon is a "limit case" (which I'll remark on when we begin the > discussion of Chapter 8 of NS next week) and all other signs involving > icons, the vast majority of such signs, are iconic in their relation to the > object. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > [image: Image removed by sender. Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690* > > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 8:19 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > > Gary R wrote: > > Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it > and, it is clear to me, that > > ". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to (121514-1) > it' as well." > > Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of Firstness", > "Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote a > post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically led > to conclude that > > "There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics (121514-2) > analog of mathematical 'Zero'". > > With all the best. > > Sung > __________________________________________________ > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > > > > GR > > : > > The Peirce quotation > > [Howard] > > offered concerns only an "absolute" first and *that*, no doubt, is an > > abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. > > > > HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more > > than an artifact of language? > > > > H > > oward, the thrust of my post was exactly that firstness *can be* and > > *is* experienced. > > Peirce offers an abstract definition of firstness in the passage you > > earlier quoted in the interest of clarifying the kind of phenomenon it is > > " > > Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it > > " and, it is clear to me, that any abstract definition of it "must be > > false to it" as well. > > > > > > Were there such a phenomenon as absolute firstness which could stand > apart > > from its participation in a reality which involves all three categories, > > it > > might look like Peirce's abstract definition. There is no such abstract > > firstness in reality--there are only the embodied firstnesses such as > > those > > I described. > > > > Peirce concluded the passage you quoted by saying that what is first is " > > present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, > > vivid, conscious, and evanescent. > > " > > > > My personal example was meant to suggest just that presentness, > immediacy, > > freshness, newness, spontaneity, vividness, consciousness, and > > evanescence. > > > > B > > est, > > > > Gary R > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > > > On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Howard Pattee <hpat...@roadrunner.com> > > wrote: > > > >> At 09:54 PM 11/29/2014, Gary Richmond wrote: > >> > >> The Peirce quotation you offered concerns only an "absolute" first and > >> that, no doubt, is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced. > >> > >> > >> HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is more > >> than an artifact of language? > >> I would say that Firstness now belongs to the ongoing *qualia* > >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> problem > >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia>. > > >> > >> The question arises for any abstract verbal distinctions. For example, > >> Edwina's "three 'pure' or 'genuine' modes, 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, or Firstness > >> as > >> Firstness, Secondness as Secondness; Thirdness as Thirdness." > >> > >> Just as confusing are the converse failures to make distinctions that > >> have > >> empirical content. For example, Peirce's lumping abduction with logic. > >> > >> Qualia problems will require more than philosophical and linguistic > >> distinctions to clarify. We will need to know more about what is going > >> on > >> in brains. > >> > >> Howard > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > >
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