Gary R - I think we've been through this discussion before as well.
As I said, I consider that the triadic Sign (capital S) is a complex and
irreducible triad of three Relations. I've listed them: Repre-Obj; Rep in
itself; Rep-Interpretant. Notice the pivotal role of the Representamen! It's
the foundation of all three Relations - but- neither the Object nor the
Interpretant are reducible to the Reprsentamen. The reason for the three
Relations is that each one can be in a different categorical mode. (I'm
repeating myself)
The quote that you provide, Gary, is interpreted differently by you and me. You
understand the term 'First' to mean in the categorical mode of Firstness,
whereas I understand it to mean that the existential unit (let's say, a cell)
which is already a triadic Sign, picks up incoming stimuli via its
Representamen-Object Relation. That's what FIRST happens. Then, SECOND, it
mediates this input data of the Object within the habits of the
Representamen...and passes that for further 'fine-tuning' via the various
Interpretants (Third step).
Obviously, none of this triadic process operates within dyads. Where do you
come up with any sense that I support dyadic relations? I've consistently
rejected such - and it's weird, but people keep saying that I support dyads!
Weird.
And I fully agree with the last sentence - Peirce says it perfectly - "That is
the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation
to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen
itself does. 2.274"
After all - a dyadic relation of the Interpretant to the Object - is Saussurian
and mechanical and utterly ignores the vital mediative and evolutionary role of
the Representamen, or the 'habits of formation'.
I note that you, in this post, refer to 'three relation' (singular) while in
other posts, you have referred to relationS (plural). Ah well.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 12:38 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7750] Re: Peirce categories
Edwina, John, lists,
I have tended to strongly agree with John in this matter, principally because
of this and similar passages.
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is
genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object,
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does. 2.274
As I see it, the 'three relation' (to the sign itself, its object, its
interpretent) are for the purposes of analysis only because "the triadic
relation is genuine" such that "its three members are bound together by it in a
way that does not consist of any complexus of dyadic relations."
So my question is, Edwina, how do you interpretent 2.274?
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
We've been through this before, John D, and I can only say that we'll have
to 'agree to disagree'. The Sign (capital letter), in my view, is composed of
three Relations: the Object-Representamen; the Representamen in itself; and the
Representamen-Interpretant.
You seem to call these Relations as 'terms'. I have a problem with that; I
think they are more than 'terms' - and may not understand what YOU mean be that.
And the reason for acknowledging that there are THREE Relations, is to
acknowledge that each one of them can operate in a different categorical mode:
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. That leads to the ten basic Sign (capital
letter) classes.
Agreed, the Sign (capital letter) - which is NOT the same as the
Representamen/sign (lower case)..is 'irreducibly triadic. It MUST have three
Relations. Not one; not two; but three.
Have a great Christmas.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Deely, John N.
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 10:45 AM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7748] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce categories
The relation which constitutes a sign (representamen) as sign is
"irreducibly triadic", i.e., it is one relation unifying three terms
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 8:50
To: Peirce-L; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce categories
Gary R - agreed; the categories are modes of organization and are not, in
themselves, signs. A Sign is a triad of Relations. And I note further, Gary R's
statement:
"As with the categories, all three relations (to the sign itself, to its
object, to its interpretent) are always involved in any semiosis: they are
aspects of the sign (as Frederik phrases it) and not independent entities."
And agree that there are three relations (and I've been chastized on this
list both for using the term 'relation' and for making it plural!). Agreed -
they are certainly not independent entities but are 'aspects' of the Sign.
Therefore, to disagree with Sung, there is no such thing as
'Signlessness' - and Peirce himself has said as such, in rejecting the
existence of nothing. Indeterminacy is not the same as zero (see 1.412).
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Sungchul Ji
Cc: Peirce-L ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Monday, December 15, 2014 10:30 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7596] Re: Peirce categories
Sung, lists,
Sung quoted my snippet of Peirce, then my comment:
CSP: Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it
and, it is clear to me, that
GR: ". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to
(121514-1)
it' as well."
then wrote:
SJ: Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of
Firstness",
"Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote
a
post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically
led
to conclude that
"There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics
(121514-2)
analog of mathematical 'Zero'".
I certainly don't see it that way at all.
1. As Edwina and others have pointed out, the Peircean categories are
not themselves signs.
2. None of the categories appear independently of each other (except
extracted for the purposes of analysis).
3. 1ns in consideration of (or 'applied' to) sign analysis: as the sign
is in itself, qualisign; as the sign resembles its object in some way, icon; as
the sign expresses itself as a rheme, or term, or ordinary name or noun, etc.
(apart from its involvement in an proposition or an argument) for its
interpretent sign.
4. As with the categories, all three relations (to the sign itself, to
its object, to its interpretent) are always involved in any semiosis: they are
aspects of the sign (as Frederik phrases it) and not independent entities.
5. The pure icon is a "limit case" (which I'll remark on when we begin
the discussion of Chapter 8 of NS next week) and all other signs involving
icons, the vast majority of such signs, are iconic in their relation to the
object.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 8:19 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
wrote:
Gary R wrote:
Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it
and, it is clear to me, that
". . . any abstract definition of it 'must be false to
(121514-1)
it' as well."
Since Statement (121514-1) is also an abstract definition of Firstness",
"Firstness" must be Un-representable, and hence "Signless". I wrote a
post a while ago (which I may dig up later) in which I was logically led
to conclude that
"There must be 'Signlessness' which may be the semiotics
(121514-2)
analog of mathematical 'Zero'".
With all the best.
Sung
__________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
>
> GR
> :
> The Peirce quotation
> [Howard]
> offered concerns only an "absolute" first and *that*, no doubt, is an
> abstraction and, as such, cannot be experienced.
>
> HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is
more
> than an artifact of language?
>
> H
> oward, the thrust of my post was exactly that firstness *can be* and
> *is* experienced.
> Peirce offers an abstract definition of firstness in the passage you
> earlier quoted in the interest of clarifying the kind of phenomenon
it is
> "
> Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it
> " and, it is clear to me, that any abstract definition of it "must be
> false to it" as well.
>
>
> Were there such a phenomenon as absolute firstness which could stand
apart
> from its participation in a reality which involves all three
categories,
> it
> might look like Peirce's abstract definition. There is no such
abstract
> firstness in reality--there are only the embodied firstnesses such as
> those
> I described.
>
> Peirce concluded the passage you quoted by saying that what is first
is "
> present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous,
free,
> vivid, conscious, and evanescent.
> "
>
> My personal example was meant to suggest just that presentness,
immediacy,
> freshness, newness, spontaneity, vividness, consciousness, and
> evanescence.
>
> B
> est,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Howard Pattee
<hpat...@roadrunner.com>
> wrote:
>
>> At 09:54 PM 11/29/2014, Gary Richmond wrote:
>>
>> The Peirce quotation you offered concerns only an "absolute" first
and
>> that, no doubt, is an abstraction and, as such, cannot be
experienced.
>>
>>
>> HP: If it cannot be experienced how do you know this abstraction is
more
>> than an artifact of language?
>> I would say that Firstness now belongs to the ongoing *qualia*
>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> problem
>> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia>.
>>
>> The question arises for any abstract verbal distinctions. For
example,
>> Edwina's "three 'pure' or 'genuine' modes, 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, or
Firstness
>> as
>> Firstness, Secondness as Secondness; Thirdness as Thirdness."
>>
>> Just as confusing are the converse failures to make distinctions that
>> have
>> empirical content. For example, Peirce's lumping abduction with
logic.
>>
>> Qualia problems will require more than philosophical and linguistic
>> distinctions to clarify. We will need to know more about what is
going
>> on
>> in brains.
>>
>> Howard
>>
>>
>>
>
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