I agree. The "Next prime number after three" is a real object with real properties. But it doesn't exist in the sense of physical and causal interaction between properties and object the way my lamp appears yellow when I turn it on. BUT, Peirce says somewhere, paraphrasing, "you can say that it exists....." or "there is an X such that....." if you need the formal logical machinery to carry on. Jim W From: jawb...@att.net Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 16:32:24 -0500 CC: hpat...@roadrunner.com; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu To: tabor...@primus.ca Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
But seriously, Folks, I think it's fairly clear that Howard is using “real” in the sense of physical reality, as Peirce did when he wrote “real world”, and as all of us do when that's what we mean. But I can assure you that mathematicians as a rule, including Peirce, regard mathematical objects as “having properties”, which makes them “real” according to the technical Scholastic definition of “real” that Peirce always uses and often mentions when he's being precise. Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Jan 17, 2015, at 4:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: Very funny. No, that's not it. It's not Alice in Wonderland. I think it's objective vs subjective but I simply can't remember how Howard uses the terms. I just remember that at one time, it dawned on me that he uses them in a particular way and I then understood what he was talking about. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Jon Awbrey To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Howard Pattee ; <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> ; Peirce-L Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:54 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRe: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 Edwina, For instance, “Real men don't eat quiche” and “Real mathematicians don't each Bourbaquiche”. Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Jan 17, 2015, at 3:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: Howard, I think that possibly, you are using your own definition of 'realism' rather than the one many of us use; we've been through this difference before. The one many of us use is that 'realism' refers to universals or generals or 'common rules' being objectively real. Not existent as particular instances but objectively real. I've forgotten what you mean by this term 'realism' but it's quite different. Could you remind us of your meaning? Thanks. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Howard Pattee To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:28 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions: Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say, then, that in thinking about formal mathematics Peirce was to some extent nominalistic, which of course leaves him free to be realistic about diagrams and physics. The basis for considering logic to be realistic is still mysterious to me. Of course there is still a great epistemic variety among today's mathematicians and physicists, largely because of great mysteries. Natural selection has made sure we begin life as naive realists which is necessary for immediate survival. However, as physics has had to rely more and more on creative imagination for models of events, which are way beyond natural senses and common sense, it is only reasonable that the models become more nominalistic. Howard At 12:59 PM 1/17/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote: Howard, lists, My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals are real. His discussions of math and reality tend to involve a variation of sense of word 'real' into the concretely real, the actual, the existent, etc. He says that mathematicians (of whom he of course was one) don't care about the real and that their ideal forms are the truly real to them a la Plato. I do recall Peirce somewhere saying that the question of whether mathematicals are real is a question for the metaphysician, not the mathematician, and I recall him not answering the question at that point. Peirce always says that mathematical objects are purely hypothetical. Here's an example, from _Writings_ 6:255: The reasonings and conclusions of the mathematician do not in the least depend upon there being in the real world any such objects as those which he supposes. The devoted mathematician cares little for the real world. He lives in a world of ideas; and his heart vibrates to the saying of his brother Plato that actuality is the roof of a dark and sordid cave which shuts out from our direct view the splendors and beauties of the vast and more truly real world,—the world of forms beyond. A great mathematician of our day said with gustful emphasis: "A great satisfaction in the study of the theory of numbers is that it never has been, and never can be, prostituted to any practical application whatever." [End quote] Peirce positively rejects the reality of generals proposed by false propositions. Such generals are figments, e.g., bat that evolved from bird. Best, Ben ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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