Howard, lists,

For my part, your question is difficult for two reasons: 1. I don't know much about biology, and 2. Peirce gets complicated when he considers the semiotics of commands.

One could consider the protein as a dynamic interpretant from the viewpoint of the protein. From the viewpoint of the genetic instructions as commands, one could consider, as the determinative object, the potential proteins, the protein possibilities (feasible, optimal, probable, plausible, likely), what the instructions regard (or "quasi-regard") as what _/should be/_.

   [From CP 8.178, from an undated manuscript (excerpted in CP
   8.177-185), apparently related to Lady Welby, which places it in the
   1900s.]
   [....] The Object of a Sign may be something to be created by the
   sign. For the Object of "Napoleon" is the Universe of Existence so
   far as it is determined by the fact of Napoleon being a Member of
   it. The Object of the sentence "Hamlet was insane" is the Universe
   of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet being
   a part of it. The Object of the Command "Ground arms!" is the
   immediately subsequent action of the soldiers so far as it is
   affected by the molition expressed in the command. It cannot be
   understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker's
   relation to the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the
   Object is in the Universe of things desired by the Commanding
   Captain at that moment. Or since the obedience is fully expected, it
   is in the Universe of his expectation. At any rate, it determines
   the Sign although it is to be created by the Sign by the
   circumstance that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of
   mind of the officer.
   [End quote]

   [From CP 8.315, EP 2:499, to William James, April 1, 1909]
   [....] When the captain of infantry gives the word "Ground arms!"
   the dynamic Interpretant is in the thump of the muskets on the
   ground, or rather it is the Act of their Minds. In its more {active
   / passive} forms, the Dynamical Interpretant indefinitely approaches
   the character of the {Final / Immediate} Interpretant; and yet the
   distinction is absolute. The Final Interpretant does not consist in
   the way in which any mind does act but in the way in which every
   mind would act. That is, it consists in a truth which might be
   expressed in a conditional proposition of this type: "If so and so
   were to happen to any mind this sign would determine that mind to
   such and such _/conduct/_." By "conduct" I mean _/action/_ under an
   intention of self-control. No event that occurs to any mind, no
   action of any mind can constitute the truth of that conditional
   proposition. The Immediate Interpretant consists in the _/Quality/_
   of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual
   reaction. Thus the Immediate and Final Interpretants seem to me
   absolutely distinct from the Dynamical Interpretant and from each
   other. And if there be any fourth kind of Interpretant on the same
   footing as those three, there must be a dreadful rupture of my
   mental retina, for I can't see it at all.
   [End quote.
   In the text, "{active / passive}" is shown with the word "active"
   above the word "passive" and without the forward slash. Likewise
   with "{Final / Immediate}".]

Best, Ben

On 1/28/2015 8:30 PM, Howard Pattee wrote:

At 05:40 PM 1/28/2015, Gary Richmond wrote:

Ben wrote:

     In the case of object, sign, interpretant, insofar as the object
    determines the sign to determine the interpretant to be
    determined by the object as the sign is determined by the object,
    the order of semiotic determination is 'object, sign,
    interpretant', although object, sign, interpretant are not to be
    understood as acting like successive falling dominoes.


HP: I don't think I can assimilate this kind of abstract description without some specific examples. I would like to understand how these /general/ concepts can be used in an actual description of a /realistic/ case of biosemiosis?

For example, a molecular biologist or a biosemiotician would briefly describe a case in normal language like this: The base triplets in the gene are /symbols/ that are /interpreted/ (/pace/ Barbieri who uses "/coded/") by the cell (a very complex process that is itself coded in the genes) so as to /determine/ (construct) the protein /object/.

Of course I agree with Ben that this triadic semiotic closure <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=%22semiotic%20closure%22&itool=QuerySuggestion> of /symbol, interpreter, object,/ "is not to be understood as acting like successive falling dominoes."

Gary R: One also, I suppose, ought in this connection rehearse Peirce's use of the concept of determination, which is, of course, not physical determination.

HP: In normal language one does say that the genetic /symbols/ in an essential way /physically determine/ the protein /objects/ (along with many epigenetic modulations).

Howard


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