Gary R., lists,
Thanks, Gary.
The discussion of semiotic determination at the Wikipedia Peirce article
were originally written by others including Jon Awbrey and then edited
by me. I've shown the URLs in the links in the footnotes so that they'll
be accessible in the I.U. archive.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Sign_relation
/Determination./ A sign depends on its object in such a way as to
represent its object — the object enables and, in a sense,
determines the sign. A physically causal sense of this stands out
when a sign consists in an indicative reaction. The interpretant
depends likewise on both the sign and the object — an object
determines a sign to determine an interpretant. But this
determination is not a succession of dyadic events, like a row of
toppling dominoes; sign determination is triadic. For example, an
interpretant does not merely represent something which represented
an object; instead an interpretant represents something /as/ a sign
representing the object. The object (be it a quality or fact or law
or even fictional) determines the sign to an interpretant through
one's collateral experience^[125] with the object, in which the
object is found or from which it is recalled, as when a sign
consists in a chance semblance of an absent object. Peirce used the
word "determine" not in a strictly deterministic sense, but in a
sense of "specializes," /bestimmt/,^[126] involving variable amount,
like an influence.^[127] Peirce came to define representation and
interpretation in terms of (triadic) determination.^[128] The object
determines the sign to determine another sign — the interpretant —
to be related to the object /as the sign is related to the object/ ,
hence the interpretant, fulfilling its function as sign of the
object, determines a further interpretant sign. The process is
logically structured to perpetuate itself, and is definitive of
sign, object, and interpretant in general.^[127]
125 ^ /a b/ See pp. 404–9 in "Pragmatism" in EP 2. Ten quotes on
collateral experience from Peirce provided by Joseph Ransdell can be
viewed here <http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=57101>
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=57101 at peirce-l's Lyris
archive. Note: Ransdell's quotes from CP 8.178–9 are also in EP
2:493–4, which gives their date as 1909; and his quote from CP 8.183
is also in EP 2:495–6, which gives its date as 1909.
126 ^ Peirce, letter to William James, dated 1909, see EP 2:492.
127 ^ /a b c/ See "76 definitions of the sign by C.S.Peirce
<http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm> "
http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm ,
collected by Robert Marty (U. of Perpignan, France).
128 ^ Peirce, A Letter to Lady Welby (1908), /Semiotic and Significs
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#SS> /
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#SS , pp. 80–1:
I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something
else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a
person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is
thereby mediately determined by the former. My insertion of
"upon a person" is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of
making my own broader conception understood.
End quote.
Somewhat longer version here. Additional lines at end were originally in
the Peirce article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs#Sign_relation
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs#Sign_relation>
Also some discussion in the third paragraph of the linked section in:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representation_%28arts%29#Semiotics_and_logic
Also in the third paragraph of the linked section in:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign_%28semiotics%29#Triadic_signs
this paragraph's final line was by somebody else.
Best, Ben
On 1/28/2015 5:40 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben, lists,
Ben wrote:
In the case of object, sign, interpretant, insofar as the object
determines the sign to determine the interpretant to be determined
by the object as the sign is determined by the object, the order
of semiotic determination is 'object, sign, interpretant',
although object, sign, interpretant are not to be understood as
acting like successive falling dominoes.
Well, and succinctly stated.
One also, I suppose, ought in this connection rehearse Peirce's use of
the concept of determination, which is, of course, not physical
determination. It's a topic which has been discussed on peirce-l on a
number of occasions, but I don't recall if you've written about
semiotic determination in any of your Wikipedia articles, Ben. If so,
would you
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*
On Wed, Jan 28, 2015 at 12:07 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jeff, Jon, lists,
I think that all that is required for an ordered triple, or an
ordering of any length, is a rough notion of 'more' or 'less', for
example an ordering of personal preferences, and this is enough for
theorems, for example
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem . Exact
quantities are not required. In the case of object, sign,
interpretant, insofar as the object determines the sign to determine
the interpretant to be determined by the object as the sign is
determined by the object, the order of semiotic determination is
'object, sign, interpretant', although object, sign, interpretant are
not to be understood as acting like successive falling dominoes.
Best, Ben
On 1/27/2015 2:08 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
[....]
Here is the starting question: Doesn't the notion of an ordered
triple require that we already have things sorted out in such a way
that we are able to ascribe quantitative values to each subject that
is a correlate of the triadic relation?
[....]
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