Ben, Thanks for providing this and the other materials in your previous message on Peirce's use of determination in semiotic contexts. While I'm familiar with much of it, it's all worth a fresh re-reading, and having it in an (almost) single place is most helpful.
By the way, Nattiez is a French semiologist of music (I wouldn't call him a semiotician), and the one book of his I tried--a couple of decades ago--to work my way through (unsuccessfully) was given the title *Music and Discourse* in its English translation. I'm going to see if I can hunt it up in my library. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 11:59 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Gary R., lists, > > I just noticed further discussion of semiotic determination in the fifth > or so paragraph in the linked section in > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign_%28semiotics%29#Triadic_signs > > This paragraph was my rewrite of a paragraph that explained signs in terms > of Peirce's article "What Is a Sign?" in which Peirce included an account > of the categories in terms of states of mind. > > The various quotes from Nattiez in the article's Peirce section were > already there. I'm unfamiliar with Nattiez. > > Best, Ben > > On 1/29/2015 11:40 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Gary R., lists, > > Thanks, Gary. > > The discussion of semiotic determination at the Wikipedia Peirce article > were originally written by others including Jon Awbrey and then edited by > me. I've shown the URLs in the links in the footnotes so that they'll be > accessible in the I.U. archive. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Sign_relation > > *Determination.* A sign depends on its object in such a way as to > represent its object -- the object enables and, in a sense, determines the > sign. A physically causal sense of this stands out when a sign consists in > an indicative reaction. The interpretant depends likewise on both the sign > and the object -- an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant. > But this determination is not a succession of dyadic events, like a row of > toppling dominoes; sign determination is triadic. For example, an > interpretant does not merely represent something which represented an > object; instead an interpretant represents something *as* a sign > representing the object. The object (be it a quality or fact or law or even > fictional) determines the sign to an interpretant through one's collateral > experience[125] with the object, in which the object is found or from > which it is recalled, as when a sign consists in a chance semblance of an > absent object. Peirce used the word "determine" not in a strictly > deterministic sense, but in a sense of "specializes," *bestimmt * ,[126] > involving > variable amount, like an influence.[127] Peirce came to define > representation and interpretation in terms of (triadic) determination.[128] > The object determines the sign to determine another sign -- the > interpretant -- to be related to the object *as the sign is related to the > object* , hence the interpretant, fulfilling its function as sign of the > object, determines a further interpretant sign. The process is logically > structured to perpetuate itself, and is definitive of sign, object, and > interpretant in general.[127] > 125 ^ *a b* See pp. 404-9 in "Pragmatism" in EP 2. Ten quotes on > collateral experience from Peirce provided by Joseph Ransdell can be viewed > here <http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=57101> > http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=57101 at peirce-l's Lyris archive. > Note: Ransdell's quotes from CP 8.178-9 are also in EP 2:493-4, which gives > their date as 1909; and his quote from CP 8.183 is also in EP 2:495-6, > which gives its date as 1909. > > 126 ^ Peirce, letter to William James, dated 1909, see EP 2:492. > > 127 ^ *a b c* See "76 definitions of the sign by C.S.Peirce > <http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm> " > http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm , > collected by Robert Marty (U. of Perpignan, France). > > 128 ^ Peirce, A Letter to Lady Welby (1908), *Semiotic and Significs > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#SS> * > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#SS , pp. 80-1: > > I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, > called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect > I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by > the former. My insertion of "upon a person" is a sop to Cerberus, because I > despair of making my own broader conception understood. > > End quote. > > Somewhat longer version here. Additional lines at end were originally in > the Peirce article: > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs#Sign_relation > > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs#Sign_relation> > > Also some discussion in the third paragraph of the linked section in: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representation_%28arts%29#Semiotics_and_logic > > Also in the third paragraph of the linked section in: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign_%28semiotics%29#Triadic_signs > this paragraph's final line was by somebody else. > > Best, Ben > > On 1/28/2015 5:40 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Ben, lists, > > Ben wrote: > > In the case of object, sign, interpretant, insofar as the object > determines the sign to determine the interpretant to be determined by the > object as the sign is determined by the object, the order of semiotic > determination is 'object, sign, interpretant', although object, sign, > interpretant are not to be understood as acting like successive falling > dominoes. > > Well, and succinctly stated. > > One also, I suppose, ought in this connection rehearse Peirce's use of the > concept of determination, which is, of course, not physical determination. > It's a topic which has been discussed on peirce-l on a number of > occasions, but I don't recall if you've written about semiotic > determination in any of your Wikipedia articles, Ben. If so, would you > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > > > *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 > <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Jan 28, 2015 at 12:07 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Jeff, Jon, lists, > > I think that all that is required for an ordered triple, or an ordering of > any length, is a rough notion of 'more' or 'less', for example an ordering > of personal preferences, and this is enough for theorems, for example > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem . Exact > quantities are not required. In the case of object, sign, interpretant, > insofar as the object determines the sign to determine the interpretant to > be determined by the object as the sign is determined by the object, the > order of semiotic determination is 'object, sign, interpretant', although > object, sign, interpretant are not to be understood as acting like > successive falling dominoes. > > Best, Ben > > On 1/27/2015 2:08 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > > [....] > Here is the starting question: Doesn't the notion of an ordered triple > require that we already have things sorted out in such a way that we are > able to ascribe quantitative values to each subject that is a correlate of > the triadic relation? > [....] > > >
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