I'll defend the Vienna Circle just a little further because I believe that they have been misunderstood and mistreated by lesser men in the twentieth century and that there is some correction going on now. Quine stands alone, and as Clark said, he has his own problems. He's also responsible to ignoring the Peirce contributions explicitly, that does not endear him to me.
I am also less convinced that Peirce was unknown to them, although there is little explicit consideration given. Hilbert certainly had Peirce in mind. Steven On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 at 9:03 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > Quite, Clark. We have some people who still believe meaning is fully > determined and that one can determine truth or falsity thereby. This is a > view that does not understand how language works. Peirce recognized that > making meanings clear was a process, not an endpoint. This is an endpoint > that at present does not exist, and I think there is little reason to think > it will exist in the near future. In the meantime we have to keep out > options open. To do other is to close down creativity (see my Informal > Pragmatics and Linguistic Creativity > <http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Informal%20pragmatics%20and%20Linguistic%20Creativity%20version2.pdf>, > South African Journal of Philosophy, 2014 for my most recent statement) > and, as I argued in a recent post, just push the problem further back. The > article uses Peirce, of course. > > Best, > > John > > > > *From:* Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] > *Sent:* April 2, 2015 7:22 PM > *To:* Peirce List > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Article on origin of the universe relevant to > some recent discussions on these lists > > > > > > On Apr 2, 2015, at 11:00 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > > > > An empirical proposition is falsifiable if a counterexample is logically > possible. When we go for a long enough time without observing a > counterexample, which may involve creating experimental conditions under > which a counterexample should occur, then we begin to believe that there is > some natural constraint ruling against it and we act on that belief as if > it were true. And it may well be — time will tell. > > > > One of Popper's problems was that he did not always distinguish the > logical status of an unfalsifiable proposition from the psychological > status of a proposition that some people do not wish to disbelieve. > > > > Just coming back and *way* behind in posts. > > > > But I agree that the problem with logical positivism and in particular > Popper’s purported refutation was confusing logical status with the more > complicated issues. Popper notes that logical positivism treats laws in a > logical form like “All X is Y” so a single counter-example refutes it but a > slew of positive examples don’t confirm it. > > > > This seems really insightful until you move from the logical form to the > question of doing the reduction to the logical form. Then you find that > everything is so theory laden that a falsification is no better than a > confirmation. So for instance if you had a measurement that the Newton’s > law was wrong (ignoring relativity for now) do you say you’re refuted > Newton or do you assume there’s an other body out there or something else > you’ve missed? Quine gets at this. While Quine has his own problems he does > avoid a lot of the oversimplifications of the logical positivists or most > of their first generation of critics. > > > > Honestly I’ve long thought the Vienna Circle just took a series of > missteps by missing several of Peirce’s key insights. (To be fair Peirce > just wasn’t well known and most of pragmatism was seen through the lens of > James who tended not to follow Peirce’s logic) > > > > While the positivists adopt a verification account quite similar to the > pragmatic maxim how they use it goes very much against the spirit of it. > Albeit in a different direction from how James used it. > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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