So, for example, these "over simplifications" by the Circle that Clark mentions really need to be seen as an exploration of rigor and are not rightly a source of criticism in my view.
Steven On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 at 10:55 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith <ste...@iase.us> wrote: > I'll defend the Vienna Circle just a little further because I believe that > they have been misunderstood and mistreated by lesser men in the twentieth > century and that there is some correction going on now. Quine stands alone, > and as Clark said, he has his own problems. He's also responsible to > ignoring the Peirce contributions explicitly, that does not endear him to > me. > > I am also less convinced that Peirce was unknown to them, although there > is little explicit consideration given. Hilbert certainly had Peirce in > mind. > > Steven > > > On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 at 9:03 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > >> Quite, Clark. We have some people who still believe meaning is fully >> determined and that one can determine truth or falsity thereby. This is a >> view that does not understand how language works. Peirce recognized that >> making meanings clear was a process, not an endpoint. This is an endpoint >> that at present does not exist, and I think there is little reason to think >> it will exist in the near future. In the meantime we have to keep out >> options open. To do other is to close down creativity (see my Informal >> Pragmatics and Linguistic Creativity >> <http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Informal%20pragmatics%20and%20Linguistic%20Creativity%20version2.pdf>, >> South African Journal of Philosophy, 2014 for my most recent statement) >> and, as I argued in a recent post, just push the problem further back. The >> article uses Peirce, of course. >> >> Best, >> >> John >> >> >> >> *From:* Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] >> *Sent:* April 2, 2015 7:22 PM >> *To:* Peirce List >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Article on origin of the universe relevant to >> some recent discussions on these lists >> >> >> >> >> >> On Apr 2, 2015, at 11:00 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: >> >> >> >> An empirical proposition is falsifiable if a counterexample is logically >> possible. When we go for a long enough time without observing a >> counterexample, which may involve creating experimental conditions under >> which a counterexample should occur, then we begin to believe that there is >> some natural constraint ruling against it and we act on that belief as if >> it were true. And it may well be — time will tell. >> >> >> >> One of Popper's problems was that he did not always distinguish the >> logical status of an unfalsifiable proposition from the psychological >> status of a proposition that some people do not wish to disbelieve. >> >> >> >> Just coming back and *way* behind in posts. >> >> >> >> But I agree that the problem with logical positivism and in particular >> Popper’s purported refutation was confusing logical status with the more >> complicated issues. Popper notes that logical positivism treats laws in a >> logical form like “All X is Y” so a single counter-example refutes it but a >> slew of positive examples don’t confirm it. >> >> >> >> This seems really insightful until you move from the logical form to the >> question of doing the reduction to the logical form. Then you find that >> everything is so theory laden that a falsification is no better than a >> confirmation. So for instance if you had a measurement that the Newton’s >> law was wrong (ignoring relativity for now) do you say you’re refuted >> Newton or do you assume there’s an other body out there or something else >> you’ve missed? Quine gets at this. While Quine has his own problems he does >> avoid a lot of the oversimplifications of the logical positivists or most >> of their first generation of critics. >> >> >> >> Honestly I’ve long thought the Vienna Circle just took a series of >> missteps by missing several of Peirce’s key insights. (To be fair Peirce >> just wasn’t well known and most of pragmatism was seen through the lens of >> James who tended not to follow Peirce’s logic) >> >> >> >> While the positivists adopt a verification account quite similar to the >> pragmatic maxim how they use it goes very much against the spirit of it. >> Albeit in a different direction from how James used it. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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