Jeff, List, Still traveling, limited wifi in this bar and burger joint, and don't know how much time I'll have, so just a few off-hand remarks.
I am by temperament and training a cross-disciplinary, non-hierarchical thinker and my mix of math and programming work left me quite conversant with strange loops and mutual recursions among quasi-mental operations. So I quit having much use in practice for the brand of classification mania that Peirce occasionally exhibits and some of his readers enjoy almost perversely. If we are talking about fully developed sciences then of course they all draw on and rest on and sleep with each other to a promiscuous degree. All that said, I still see something of critical importance in Peirce's barest statement of the sciences' dependencies, just shy of their co-dependencies. Will try to say more on that score when I get time. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Nov 2, 2015, at 10:28 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > wrote: > > Hi Jon, Ben, Lists, > > Jon seems to be suggesting that the relations of dependence between math and > the parts of philosophy that he sketches in a diagram (he provides a link to > a blog entry) helps to show where I might be heading down the wrong track as > I explore the relations between math, phenomenology and the normative > sciences for the sake of trying to clarifying what phenomenology is and how > we might use it for the sake of doing math or philosophy. Quite a lot has > been written on Peirce's classification of the sciences. I won't try to > review the literature. > > Let me point out, however, that Jon's sketch is at odds with a number of > things Peirce says. Let me draw on some points that Beverley Kent develops > in her monograph on these classificatory matters. Here are a few points to > consider: > > Phenomenology draws on mathematics. The relations between the sciences are > not simple. Rather, they are relatively complex. In order to understand > Peirce's classification, we have to consider the different kinds of relations > that obtain. Ben shared a table drawn from Peirce's classification that can > be used to help sort out a number of the different kinds of relations. For > the sake of brevity, let's narrow things down to a relatively small number of > questions: > > a) Does one science appeal to another for its principles? If so, then > which? > b) Does one science appeal to another for its questions and problems? If > so, then how? > c) Does one science draw on the subject matter of another science for some > of its data? > d) Does one science depend upon another for assistance in analyzing the > data, identifying possible sources of observational error, or correcting for > such observational errors. > e) Does one science depend upon another for assistance in refining its > methods, or for ins truction in how to draw its inferences? If so, then what > kind of assistance is needed? > f) Does one science provide some of the tests needed to help confirm the > results arrived at in another science. If so, then what kinds of tests are > needed? > > If Jon were to correct his diagram by showing that phenomenology draws on > math for its conceptions and principles, and then make the lines of > connections arrows that are going up, then he would have a simple but helpful > picture that we could use to help answer question (a). Having said that, the > diagram doesn't capture the relations needed to answer questions b-f. In > order to answer those questions, we'd need to examine the following > distinction that Peirce emphasizes. As science can be thought of as a body > of results. It can also be thought of as a living community engaged in > inquiry. The answers we give to a-f will depend upon which of these two > aspects of a science we're talking about. > > So, let me ask, what does phenomenology "draw" from the other > sciences--especially from math and the normative sciences? What does > phenomenology offer to the other sciences--especially math and the normative > sciences? Let us consider what phenomenology draws from math. Mathematics > studies the formal relations that obtain between hypotheses concerning > idealized states of affairs. Theorematic reasoning in math relies, > crucially, on the construction of diagrams and experiments that we conduct by > manipulating the parts of the diagrams. Phenomenology can and should draw on > conceptions from math for the purposes of clarifying the kinds of formal > relations that might possibly obtain between the elements in our experience. > This shouldn’t be too surprising given the fact that the elementary relations > that comprise the hypotheses for mathematics are, of course, drawn from > experience. > > Peirce points out that inquiry in phenomenology is different in a number of > respects from inquiry in the other parts of philosophy. He says: It can > hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, and > asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology there > is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even these are > not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described. CP 2.197 > Having said that, he makes a very interesting remark: “Phenomenology can only > tell the reader which way to look and to see what he shall see.” This remark > makes me think that one of the tasks of phenomenology might be to articulate > precepts that can guide us in making and analyzing our observations. As > such, I have a hunch that we might learn something by drawing a more detailed > comparison between the precepts that guide us in doing math and the > “precepts” that might guide our observational activities. > > Peirce concludes by adding this rejoinder: “The question of how far > Phenomenology does reason will receive special attention.” Any suggestions > for where in the text we might look to see where Peirce gave the matter > special attention? This passage is from the Minute Logic, which is from > 1902. I'm guessing that Peirce was intending to take up that question more > directly in another part of that work. In chapter 3 of the Minute Logic (CP > 4.227 following), Peirce is developing the simplest parts of mathematics, > which consist in the dichotomic and trichotomic systems of mathematical > logic. He is drawing on a number of other areas of mathematics in the > development of these systems, including graph theory, various parts of > algebra, and some interesting analysis of different ways of putting things > into relations of correspondence that bear a striking similarity to what has > come, in the 20th century, to be called the functor relation in category > theory. Most of the discussion is just about math and mathematical logic. > Late in the chapter, however, he steps back at 4.318 and asks "What is > experience?" This question of phenomenology has, I believe, been bubbling > beneath the surface of the discussion throughout the entire chapter. What > might this chapter teach us about the kind of reasoning that that is needed > in phenomenology? > > --Jeff > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net] > Sent: Sunday, November 01, 2015 7:12 AM > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L > Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories > > Jeff, List, > > I have to be traveling again and won't be able to get back to this, > except in mobile bits and snatches, until the middle of next week. > I collected a few links and thoughts pertinent to this part of > the discussion in the following blog post: > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/10/31/peirces-categories-%E2%80%A2-2/ > > Regards, > > Jon > >> On 10/31/2015 3:47 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: >> Hi Jon, Lists, >> >> In the previous post, I start by trying to frame some of the questions that >> I take Peirce to addressing in his work on phenomenology. It is quite >> possible that I am framing the questions poorly. Feel free to point out who >> the questions might be framed better. By way of supporting the suggestions >> I'm offering for how we might frame the questions, I'm then doing a bit of >> scholarship by taking a closer look at a part of a chapter in the Grand >> Logic (1893). As a scholarly matter, it would be helpful if you (or anyone >> else on the lists) might point out where I am going wrong in interpreting >> this passage. Like Peirce, I am keen to point out that we are trying to >> answer a question pertaining to the normative theory of logic. As such, in >> looking more closely at how we might formulate an account of the fundamental >> law of mind, we are not trying to address a question of empirical >> psychology. My aim in looking at this passage was to let Peirce speak for >> himself as much as possible. A > s such, I've only separated some points that are in the text, and then I've > tried to provide some simple comments about what he is saying. As far as I > can see, I haven't (yet) said anything that goes very far beyond the letter > of text in offering this interpretation. >> >> Peirce is bringing two things together--phenomenology and the normative >> theory of logic--so we shouldn't be surprised to seem him moving relatively >> quickly from one kind of consideration to the next. This shouldn't be >> surprising. After all, there are specific aims we have that are guiding the >> development of the theory of phenomenology. As the text itself makes quite >> clear, he is using an account of the elements in the phenomena we observe to >> analyze the observations drawn from common sense--and then to identify and >> correct for sources of error. The whole point of identifying the possible >> sources of error in our experience is to put ourselves in a better position >> to articulate an account of the fundamental law of mind. As such, we are >> doing a bit of phenomenological analysis of a part of some phenomena that is >> in common experience, and then we say a bit more about the conceptions we >> need to refine in order to provide a better articulation of the conceptions >> that are needed for > the sake of formulating a logical hypothesis concerning the law of mind. He > does this repeatedly in his passage: a little bit of phenomenological > analysis, and then a little bit more logical reflection about what we've > learned that might help us clarify out conceptions--such as our conception of > continuity. >> >> I hear you saying that I've gone wrong somewhere, but it isn't much help to >> me unless you are willing to take a stab at pointing out where I've gone >> wrong in interpreting the passage. When it comes to the larger question of >> how we should frame the guiding questions for a phenomenological theory, it >> will be more difficult for you or anyone else to identify the sources of any >> mistakes that I might be making. After all, I've moved some distance from >> any particular text and and making bigger kinds of points. Having said >> that, it shouldn't be difficult to point out where I have gone wrong in the >> interpretation of this passage. It is quite short, and Peirce is saying a >> lot more than I am. >> >> --Jeff >> >> >> Jeff Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> NAU >> (o) 523-8354 >> ________________________________________ >> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] >> Sent: Saturday, October 31, 2015 9:10 AM >> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Peirce's Categories >> >> Hello Jon, Ben, Lists, >> >> Does phenomenology need hypotheses? Let's take one of Peirce's many >> formulations of what we are doing when we engage in the kind of >> phenomenological inquiry that he is recommending to us. Here is a >> description of this science: "Phenomenology ascertains and studies the >> kinds of elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the >> phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way." So, in >> doing phenomenology, we are asking the following kind of question: are >> there some elements that are universally present in the phenomena? Here are >> a series of hypotheses: >> >> 1) Yes, there are such universal elements. >> 2) There are three fundamental elements that are universal and necessary for >> all possible experience. >> 3) The matter of these elements can be understood to consist in three >> categories: quality, brute fact, thought (pick your favorite term for the >> last of the three) >> 4) The form of these elements can be understood to consists in three basic >> kinds of relationships: monadic, dyadic and triadic; or firstness, >> secondness and thirdness (pick your favorite list) >> 5) The material categories correspond, in some sense, to the formal >> categories. >> >> What is the purpose of examining these elements more carefully and trying to >> generate a theory about the character of each and how experience might be >> composed of relations between these formal relationships? Well, there are >> several related purposes. Let me point to a few that are prominent in my >> mind. In a long discussion of the character of the observations we should >> use for the sake of engaging in philosophical inquiry, where Peirce is >> trying to explain how we should go about analyzing the phenomena that we >> need to draw on for the sake of developing better explanations in the >> normative science of logic, he makes the following point about the method he >> is using: >> >> Our object is to formulate the law of mind. We have to consider all mental >> action whatsoever and, generalizing it, to say not what all the elements of >> it are, but what that element of it is which is legislative. >> "Generalization," is the old answer.... A feeling is an element of >> consciousness just as it immediately is in the moment when it is there for >> itself and not as delegate of some other feeling not present. Such a feeling >> is not a psychological datum. The data are highly complex. That there is a >> cream colored surface with black characters on it is as near as I can >> readily describe the datum of my consciousness at this minute, -- but in >> truth the moment I pick it to pieces, as I must do to describe it, it ceases >> to be a datum. CP 7.464-5. >> >> Let me now emphasize the following points that he makes: "As for the pure >> feeling, that is a hypothetical entity, and is as completely veiled from me >> by its own immediacy as a material particle, as it exists in itself, is >> veiled by the somewhat absurd requirement that it shall be considered in >> itself. The truth is there are no data. We have a lot of inferences from >> data, liable to error, and these we have to correct as best we can by >> putting them together." Having made this point, Peirce draws an analogy >> between inquiry in the cenoscopic sciences and inquiry in the ideoscopic >> sciencs: "The state of the case is quite similar to that of a physical >> science, say astronomy. All we have to go upon in astronomy is observations, >> and all those observations are erroneous. But we collect them and take their >> means and find a general description of the path of the observed object; and >> from this we can calculate an ephemeris, and finally, if there is any >> interest in doing so, ascertain what > those observations ought to have been. We can no more start with immediate > feelings in psychology than we can start with accurate places of the planets, > as affected by parallax, aberration, refraction, etc. in astronomy. We start > with mediate data, subject to error, and requiring correction." >> >> This is think, articulates some of the main purposes of phenomenology. The >> data we are working with in philosophy are mediate and highly subject to >> error. Our aim is to build a theory of the phenomena we observe in common >> experience for the sake of learning to: 1) analyze the data more carefully, >> 2) identify possible sources of error, and then 3) correct for the >> observational errors we might have made. >> >> Does phenomenology need hypotheses? Yes. The point of the hypotheses is to >> show us how to do 1-3 above better. If you have time, I recommend taking a >> look at what Peirce says next about how he is refining the logical account >> of the law of mind. Starting from the old answer, which is that the >> fundamental law is one of generalization, Peirce goes on to analyze the >> experience of how something, such as a line that is being drawn on a piece >> of paper, is experienced as something that changes in a continuous manner >> over time. Without going into the details of the analysis, I think that >> Peirce is really onto to something about how we might build explanations in >> the normative science of logic in a better manner than it has been done by >> the likes of Descartes, Hume, Kant and Mill—and the other philosophers who >> have tried to answer the same question. One key part of the strategy, I >> take it, is to develop the logical theory with an improved understanding of >> how we should work with the > data (i.e., the observations) that we're trying to explain. >> >> --Jeff >> >> Here is what Peirce says next, in case anyone who does not have volume 7 of >> the CP handy would like to take a look. >> >> >> 466. The mind pronounces that what I see now resembles something I saw >> yesterday. The whole aspect of things as flowing in time is, it is plain, >> virtually a theory of the mind's creation. But, for the present, we take >> that theory as true, that is, as a stable one. Taking it as true, it seems >> to provide no possible means by which the mind could compare what is present >> to it now with what is past and gone and done with. This compels us to say >> that the time idea, -- at least, in its first crude shape, -- needs >> correction, like an erroneous observation in astronomy. Examining it more >> carefully, we observe that the idea is that the series of instants of time >> is continuous. Analyzing this idea of continuity, as we shall do in a >> future chapter with the most minute accuracy which an improved art of logic >> puts at our disposition,†30 we find that it implies that there are instants >> infinitesimally close together; that is that there are durations of time so >> short, that every one such start > ing with a given date has a character exactly like the one before it in some > respect, without any limitation to this rule, while yet a time a little later > does not possess that character. This enables us to suppose that the > consciousness is not limited to a single instant but that it immediately and > objectively extends over a lapse of time, without thereby extending over any > sensible lapse of time. We are thus able to suppose that consciousness is > carried along from one time to another, and is able to compare what is > present to it at different times. Such we may suppose to be the process of > memory; and this is the account of it which best squares with those natural > beliefs which are all the data the psychologist can possibly have upon which > to found his science, corresponding, as they do, to the observations of the > astronomer. >> >> 467. But granting that memory is thus justified, -- while errors may, of >> course, creep in during the process, -- it still remains that when the mind >> declares that what it sees now, or remembers to have seen yesterday, I seen >> last week, the likeness, which though accompanied like all mental processess >> like what it remembers to have with a peculiar and characteristic sensation, >> is mainly a fact, a mental fact, and the sensation of it is of no >> consequence except as an advertisement of that fact. That fact is that by >> virtue of the occult working of the depths within us, those two feelings >> coalesce into one notion. For the sake of calling this by a familiar name, I >> call this association by similarity. But the ideas united by virtue of an >> occult inward power, are not always regarded as similar. Contraries are also >> so joined. Ideas and feelings are so joined which are neither merely >> declared by the mind to be similar nor to be contrary. Such, for instance, >> are length, breadth, and thickn > ess. The mind delights in triads. In general, what the mind pronounces is > that the feeling or idea of yesterday and that of today belong to one system, > of which it forms a conception. A concept is not a mere jumble of > particulars, -- that is only its crudest species. A concept is the living > influence upon us of a diagram, or icon, with whose several parts are > connected in thought an equal number of feelings or ideas. The law of mind is > that feelings and ideas attach themselves in thought so as to form systems. > But the icon is not always clearly apprehended. We may not know at all what > it is; or we may have learned it by the observation of nature. >> >> >> Jeff Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> NAU >> (o) 523-8354 >> ________________________________________ >> From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net] >> Sent: Saturday, October 31, 2015 7:36 AM >> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L >> Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories >> >> Jeff, List, >> >> It seems to me there is something slightly off about looking for >> the hypotheses that underlie phenomenology. I do not think any >> number of verbal evasions will fix the problem. The whole point >> of anyone's version of phenomenology is to “bracket away” all such >> hypotheses and to “cleanse the doors of perception”, etc. We may >> be convinced by subsequent reflections: “the myth of the given”, >> “data are really capta”, all of Peirce's many analyses, and the >> results of experimental cognitive psychology, to name just a few, >> that such levels of purity are not really possible for the complex, >> concrete creatures we appear to be, but that is the project anyway. >> >> On the other hand, as far as Peirce's distinctive perspective >> on mathematics ‘per se’ goes, there is a tempting but unhappy >> tendency to adulterate it with all the notions of logicism, >> syntacticism, and other species of nominalism that I think >> we really ought to try and cleanse from the pons thereto. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >>> On 10/31/2015 4:52 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: >>> Hello Ben, List, >>> >>> I was particularly interested in the prospect of making a comparison >>> between the hypotheses that we are working with >> in mathematics and the hypotheses that we are working with phenomenology. >> There are good reasons to point out, as you >> have, that the hypotheses in phenomenology are based on something that is, >> in some sense prior. Call them, if you will, >> particular ?discernments. >>> >>> Having searched around a bit, I don't see a large number of places where >>> Peirce uses this kind of language when >> talking about phenomenology. Having said that, here is one: "Philosophy >> has three grand divisions. The first is >> Phenomenology, which ?simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and >> discerns its ubiquitous elements...." (CP 5.121) >>> >>> There are interesting differences between the ways that we arrive at the >>> hypotheses that serve as "starting points" >> for mathematical deduction, and ways that we arrive at the hypotheses that >> are being formulated in phenomenology. One >> reason I retained the language of "starting points" that was in the original >> questions that Peirce asked about >> mathematics is that hypotheses are, at heart, quite closely related to the >> questions that are guiding inquiry. We >> normally think of hypotheses as explanations that can serve as possible >> answers to some questions. In some cases, I >> think it might be better to think of the formulation of the questions were >> trying to answer as itself a kind of hypotheses.. >>> >>> We can ask the following kinds of questions about hypotheses in math, >>> phenomenology, normative science and the like. >> What are we drawing on when we formulate these hypotheses? How should we >> develop the hypotheses from the "stuff" that >> we are drawing on so that the hypotheses we form will offer the greatest >> promise as we proceed in our inquiries. >>> >>> With these kinds of issues in mind, let me rephrase the questions about >>> phenomenology so as to respond to the concern >> you've raised: >>> >>> 1. What are the different kinds of hypotheses that might be fruitful for >>> phenomenological inquiry? >>> 2. What are the general characters of these phenomenological hypotheses? >>> 3. Why are not other phenomenological hypotheses possible, and the like? >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> Jeff Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> NAU >>> (o) 523-8354 > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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