Well I am with Jon I think. Having literally no practical facility with science or math having flunked the latter and never pursued the former, I believe I benefit immensely from Peirce and from such mathematics as I have read and such science as I have independently pursued. I think Peirce is relevant to the non-scientist and the non-mathematician and can be helpful to us as they seek to develop our own thoughts. There are many sorts of mind and what I know of Einstein suggests to me that he did a good deal with with inference and abduction from images in his head. That to me is encouraging somehow.
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 12:22 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > Jeff, List, > > Still traveling, limited wifi in this bar and burger joint, and don't know > how much time I'll have, so just a few off-hand remarks. > > I am by temperament and training a cross-disciplinary, non-hierarchical > thinker and my mix of math and programming work left me quite conversant > with strange loops and mutual recursions among quasi-mental operations. So > I quit having much use in practice for the brand of classification mania > that Peirce occasionally exhibits and some of his readers enjoy almost > perversely. If we are talking about fully developed sciences then of course > they all draw on and rest on and sleep with each other to a promiscuous > degree. > > All that said, I still see something of critical importance in Peirce's > barest statement of the sciences' dependencies, just shy of their > co-dependencies. > > Will try to say more on that score when I get time. > > Regards, > > Jon > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > > > On Nov 2, 2015, at 10:28 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > > > > Hi Jon, Ben, Lists, > > > > Jon seems to be suggesting that the relations of dependence between math > and the parts of philosophy that he sketches in a diagram (he provides a > link to a blog entry) helps to show where I might be heading down the wrong > track as I explore the relations between math, phenomenology and the > normative sciences for the sake of trying to clarifying what phenomenology > is and how we might use it for the sake of doing math or philosophy. Quite > a lot has been written on Peirce's classification of the sciences. I won't > try to review the literature. > > > > Let me point out, however, that Jon's sketch is at odds with a number of > things Peirce says. Let me draw on some points that Beverley Kent develops > in her monograph on these classificatory matters. Here are a few points to > consider: > > > > Phenomenology draws on mathematics. The relations between the sciences > are not simple. Rather, they are relatively complex. In order to > understand Peirce's classification, we have to consider the different kinds > of relations that obtain. Ben shared a table drawn from Peirce's > classification that can be used to help sort out a number of the different > kinds of relations. For the sake of brevity, let's narrow things down to a > relatively small number of questions: > > > > a) Does one science appeal to another for its principles? If so, then > which? > > b) Does one science appeal to another for its questions and problems? > If so, then how? > > c) Does one science draw on the subject matter of another science for > some of its data? > > d) Does one science depend upon another for assistance in analyzing the > data, identifying possible sources of observational error, or correcting > for such observational errors. > > e) Does one science depend upon another for assistance in refining its > methods, or for ins truction in how to draw its inferences? If so, then > what kind of assistance is needed? > > f) Does one science provide some of the tests needed to help confirm > the results arrived at in another science. If so, then what kinds of tests > are needed? > > > > If Jon were to correct his diagram by showing that phenomenology draws > on math for its conceptions and principles, and then make the lines of > connections arrows that are going up, then he would have a simple but > helpful picture that we could use to help answer question (a). Having said > that, the diagram doesn't capture the relations needed to answer questions > b-f. In order to answer those questions, we'd need to examine the > following distinction that Peirce emphasizes. As science can be thought of > as a body of results. It can also be thought of as a living community > engaged in inquiry. The answers we give to a-f will depend upon which of > these two aspects of a science we're talking about. > > > > So, let me ask, what does phenomenology "draw" from the other > sciences--especially from math and the normative sciences? What does > phenomenology offer to the other sciences--especially math and the > normative sciences? Let us consider what phenomenology draws from math. > Mathematics studies the formal relations that obtain between hypotheses > concerning idealized states of affairs. Theorematic reasoning in math > relies, crucially, on the construction of diagrams and experiments that we > conduct by manipulating the parts of the diagrams. Phenomenology can and > should draw on conceptions from math for the purposes of clarifying the > kinds of formal relations that might possibly obtain between the elements > in our experience. This shouldn’t be too surprising given the fact that > the elementary relations that comprise the hypotheses for mathematics are, > of course, drawn from experience. > > > > Peirce points out that inquiry in phenomenology is different in a number > of respects from inquiry in the other parts of philosophy. He says: It > can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a > conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in > Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; > and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be > described. CP 2.197 Having said that, he makes a very interesting remark: > “Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what > he shall see.” This remark makes me think that one of the tasks of > phenomenology might be to articulate precepts that can guide us in making > and analyzing our observations. As such, I have a hunch that we might > learn something by drawing a more detailed comparison between the precepts > that guide us in doing math and the “precepts” that might guide our > observational activities. > > > > Peirce concludes by adding this rejoinder: “The question of how far > Phenomenology does reason will receive special attention.” Any suggestions > for where in the text we might look to see where Peirce gave the matter > special attention? This passage is from the Minute Logic, which is from > 1902. I'm guessing that Peirce was intending to take up that question more > directly in another part of that work. In chapter 3 of the Minute Logic > (CP 4.227 following), Peirce is developing the simplest parts of > mathematics, which consist in the dichotomic and trichotomic systems of > mathematical logic. He is drawing on a number of other areas of > mathematics in the development of these systems, including graph theory, > various parts of algebra, and some interesting analysis of different ways > of putting things into relations of correspondence that bear a striking > similarity to what has come, in the 20th century, to be called the functor > relation in category theory. Most of the discussion is just about math and > mathematical logic. Late in the chapter, however, he steps back at 4.318 > and asks "What is experience?" This question of phenomenology has, I > believe, been bubbling beneath the surface of the discussion throughout the > entire chapter. What might this chapter teach us about the kind of > reasoning that that is needed in phenomenology? > > > > --Jeff > > > > > > Jeff Downard > > Associate Professor > > Department of Philosophy > > NAU > > (o) 523-8354 > > ________________________________________ > > From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net] > > Sent: Sunday, November 01, 2015 7:12 AM > > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L > > Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories > > > > Jeff, List, > > > > I have to be traveling again and won't be able to get back to this, > > except in mobile bits and snatches, until the middle of next week. > > I collected a few links and thoughts pertinent to this part of > > the discussion in the following blog post: > > > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/10/31/peirces-categories-%E2%80%A2-2/ > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > >> On 10/31/2015 3:47 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > >> Hi Jon, Lists, > >> > >> In the previous post, I start by trying to frame some of the questions > that I take Peirce to addressing in his work on phenomenology. It is quite > possible that I am framing the questions poorly. Feel free to point out > who the questions might be framed better. By way of supporting the > suggestions I'm offering for how we might frame the questions, I'm then > doing a bit of scholarship by taking a closer look at a part of a chapter > in the Grand Logic (1893). As a scholarly matter, it would be helpful if > you (or anyone else on the lists) might point out where I am going wrong in > interpreting this passage. Like Peirce, I am keen to point out that we are > trying to answer a question pertaining to the normative theory of logic. > As such, in looking more closely at how we might formulate an account of > the fundamental law of mind, we are not trying to address a question of > empirical psychology. My aim in looking at this passage was to let Peirce > speak for himself as much as possible. A > > s such, I've only separated some points that are in the text, and then > I've tried to provide some simple comments about what he is saying. As far > as I can see, I haven't (yet) said anything that goes very far beyond the > letter of text in offering this interpretation. > >> > >> Peirce is bringing two things together--phenomenology and the normative > theory of logic--so we shouldn't be surprised to seem him moving relatively > quickly from one kind of consideration to the next. This shouldn't be > surprising. After all, there are specific aims we have that are guiding > the development of the theory of phenomenology. As the text itself makes > quite clear, he is using an account of the elements in the phenomena we > observe to analyze the observations drawn from common sense--and then to > identify and correct for sources of error. The whole point of identifying > the possible sources of error in our experience is to put ourselves in a > better position to articulate an account of the fundamental law of mind. > As such, we are doing a bit of phenomenological analysis of a part of some > phenomena that is in common experience, and then we say a bit more about > the conceptions we need to refine in order to provide a better articulation > of the conceptions that are needed for > > the sake of formulating a logical hypothesis concerning the law of > mind. He does this repeatedly in his passage: a little bit of > phenomenological analysis, and then a little bit more logical reflection > about what we've learned that might help us clarify out conceptions--such > as our conception of continuity. > >> > >> I hear you saying that I've gone wrong somewhere, but it isn't much > help to me unless you are willing to take a stab at pointing out where I've > gone wrong in interpreting the passage. When it comes to the larger > question of how we should frame the guiding questions for a > phenomenological theory, it will be more difficult for you or anyone else > to identify the sources of any mistakes that I might be making. After all, > I've moved some distance from any particular text and and making bigger > kinds of points. Having said that, it shouldn't be difficult to point out > where I have gone wrong in the interpretation of this passage. It is quite > short, and Peirce is saying a lot more than I am. > >> > >> --Jeff > >> > >> > >> Jeff Downard > >> Associate Professor > >> Department of Philosophy > >> NAU > >> (o) 523-8354 > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] > >> Sent: Saturday, October 31, 2015 9:10 AM > >> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L > >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Peirce's Categories > >> > >> Hello Jon, Ben, Lists, > >> > >> Does phenomenology need hypotheses? Let's take one of Peirce's many > formulations of what we are doing when we engage in the kind of > phenomenological inquiry that he is recommending to us. Here is a > description of this science: "Phenomenology ascertains and studies the > kinds of elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the > phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way." So, > in doing phenomenology, we are asking the following kind of question: are > there some elements that are universally present in the phenomena? Here > are a series of hypotheses: > >> > >> 1) Yes, there are such universal elements. > >> 2) There are three fundamental elements that are universal and > necessary for all possible experience. > >> 3) The matter of these elements can be understood to consist in three > categories: quality, brute fact, thought (pick your favorite term for the > last of the three) > >> 4) The form of these elements can be understood to consists in three > basic kinds of relationships: monadic, dyadic and triadic; or firstness, > secondness and thirdness (pick your favorite list) > >> 5) The material categories correspond, in some sense, to the formal > categories. > >> > >> What is the purpose of examining these elements more carefully and > trying to generate a theory about the character of each and how experience > might be composed of relations between these formal relationships? Well, > there are several related purposes. Let me point to a few that are > prominent in my mind. In a long discussion of the character of the > observations we should use for the sake of engaging in philosophical > inquiry, where Peirce is trying to explain how we should go about analyzing > the phenomena that we need to draw on for the sake of developing better > explanations in the normative science of logic, he makes the following > point about the method he is using: > >> > >> Our object is to formulate the law of mind. We have to consider all > mental action whatsoever and, generalizing it, to say not what all the > elements of it are, but what that element of it is which is legislative. > "Generalization," is the old answer.... A feeling is an element of > consciousness just as it immediately is in the moment when it is there for > itself and not as delegate of some other feeling not present. Such a > feeling is not a psychological datum. The data are highly complex. That > there is a cream colored surface with black characters on it is as near as > I can readily describe the datum of my consciousness at this minute, -- but > in truth the moment I pick it to pieces, as I must do to describe it, it > ceases to be a datum. CP 7.464-5. > >> > >> Let me now emphasize the following points that he makes: "As for the > pure feeling, that is a hypothetical entity, and is as completely veiled > from me by its own immediacy as a material particle, as it exists in > itself, is veiled by the somewhat absurd requirement that it shall be > considered in itself. The truth is there are no data. We have a lot of > inferences from data, liable to error, and these we have to correct as best > we can by putting them together." Having made this point, Peirce draws an > analogy between inquiry in the cenoscopic sciences and inquiry in the > ideoscopic sciencs: "The state of the case is quite similar to that of a > physical science, say astronomy. All we have to go upon in astronomy is > observations, and all those observations are erroneous. But we collect them > and take their means and find a general description of the path of the > observed object; and from this we can calculate an ephemeris, and finally, > if there is any interest in doing so, ascertain what > > those observations ought to have been. We can no more start with > immediate feelings in psychology than we can start with accurate places of > the planets, as affected by parallax, aberration, refraction, etc. in > astronomy. We start with mediate data, subject to error, and requiring > correction." > >> > >> This is think, articulates some of the main purposes of phenomenology. > The data we are working with in philosophy are mediate and highly subject > to error. Our aim is to build a theory of the phenomena we observe in > common experience for the sake of learning to: 1) analyze the data more > carefully, 2) identify possible sources of error, and then 3) correct for > the observational errors we might have made. > >> > >> Does phenomenology need hypotheses? Yes. The point of the hypotheses > is to show us how to do 1-3 above better. If you have time, I recommend > taking a look at what Peirce says next about how he is refining the logical > account of the law of mind. Starting from the old answer, which is that > the fundamental law is one of generalization, Peirce goes on to analyze the > experience of how something, such as a line that is being drawn on a piece > of paper, is experienced as something that changes in a continuous manner > over time. Without going into the details of the analysis, I think that > Peirce is really onto to something about how we might build explanations in > the normative science of logic in a better manner than it has been done by > the likes of Descartes, Hume, Kant and Mill—and the other philosophers who > have tried to answer the same question. One key part of the strategy, I > take it, is to develop the logical theory with an improved understanding of > how we should work with the > > data (i.e., the observations) that we're trying to explain. > >> > >> --Jeff > >> > >> Here is what Peirce says next, in case anyone who does not have volume > 7 of the CP handy would like to take a look. > >> > >> > >> 466. The mind pronounces that what I see now resembles something I saw > yesterday. The whole aspect of things as flowing in time is, it is plain, > virtually a theory of the mind's creation. But, for the present, we take > that theory as true, that is, as a stable one. Taking it as true, it seems > to provide no possible means by which the mind could compare what is > present to it now with what is past and gone and done with. This compels us > to say that the time idea, -- at least, in its first crude shape, -- needs > correction, like an erroneous observation in astronomy. Examining it more > carefully, we observe that the idea is that the series of instants of time > is continuous. Analyzing this idea of continuity, as we shall do in a > future chapter with the most minute accuracy which an improved art of logic > puts at our disposition,†30 we find that it implies that there are instants > infinitesimally close together; that is that there are durations of time so > short, that every one such start > > ing with a given date has a character exactly like the one before it in > some respect, without any limitation to this rule, while yet a time a > little later does not possess that character. This enables us to suppose > that the consciousness is not limited to a single instant but that it > immediately and objectively extends over a lapse of time, without thereby > extending over any sensible lapse of time. We are thus able to suppose that > consciousness is carried along from one time to another, and is able to > compare what is present to it at different times. Such we may suppose to be > the process of memory; and this is the account of it which best squares > with those natural beliefs which are all the data the psychologist can > possibly have upon which to found his science, corresponding, as they do, > to the observations of the astronomer. > >> > >> 467. But granting that memory is thus justified, -- while errors may, > of course, creep in during the process, -- it still remains that when the > mind declares that what it sees now, or remembers to have seen yesterday, I > seen last week, the likeness, which though accompanied like all mental > processess like what it remembers to have with a peculiar and > characteristic sensation, is mainly a fact, a mental fact, and the > sensation of it is of no consequence except as an advertisement of that > fact. That fact is that by virtue of the occult working of the depths > within us, those two feelings coalesce into one notion. For the sake of > calling this by a familiar name, I call this association by similarity. But > the ideas united by virtue of an occult inward power, are not always > regarded as similar. Contraries are also so joined. Ideas and feelings are > so joined which are neither merely declared by the mind to be similar nor > to be contrary. Such, for instance, are length, breadth, and thickn > > ess. The mind delights in triads. In general, what the mind pronounces > is that the feeling or idea of yesterday and that of today belong to one > system, of which it forms a conception. A concept is not a mere jumble of > particulars, -- that is only its crudest species. A concept is the living > influence upon us of a diagram, or icon, with whose several parts are > connected in thought an equal number of feelings or ideas. The law of mind > is that feelings and ideas attach themselves in thought so as to form > systems. But the icon is not always clearly apprehended. We may not know at > all what it is; or we may have learned it by the observation of nature. > >> > >> > >> Jeff Downard > >> Associate Professor > >> Department of Philosophy > >> NAU > >> (o) 523-8354 > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net] > >> Sent: Saturday, October 31, 2015 7:36 AM > >> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L > >> Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories > >> > >> Jeff, List, > >> > >> It seems to me there is something slightly off about looking for > >> the hypotheses that underlie phenomenology. I do not think any > >> number of verbal evasions will fix the problem. The whole point > >> of anyone's version of phenomenology is to “bracket away” all such > >> hypotheses and to “cleanse the doors of perception”, etc. We may > >> be convinced by subsequent reflections: “the myth of the given”, > >> “data are really capta”, all of Peirce's many analyses, and the > >> results of experimental cognitive psychology, to name just a few, > >> that such levels of purity are not really possible for the complex, > >> concrete creatures we appear to be, but that is the project anyway. > >> > >> On the other hand, as far as Peirce's distinctive perspective > >> on mathematics ‘per se’ goes, there is a tempting but unhappy > >> tendency to adulterate it with all the notions of logicism, > >> syntacticism, and other species of nominalism that I think > >> we really ought to try and cleanse from the pons thereto. > >> > >> Regards, > >> > >> Jon > >> > >>> On 10/31/2015 4:52 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > >>> Hello Ben, List, > >>> > >>> I was particularly interested in the prospect of making a comparison > between the hypotheses that we are working with > >> in mathematics and the hypotheses that we are working with > phenomenology. There are good reasons to point out, as you > >> have, that the hypotheses in phenomenology are based on something that > is, in some sense prior. Call them, if you will, > >> particular ?discernments. > >>> > >>> Having searched around a bit, I don't see a large number of places > where Peirce uses this kind of language when > >> talking about phenomenology. Having said that, here is one: > "Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is > >> Phenomenology, which ?simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and > discerns its ubiquitous elements...." (CP 5.121) > >>> > >>> There are interesting differences between the ways that we arrive at > the hypotheses that serve as "starting points" > >> for mathematical deduction, and ways that we arrive at the hypotheses > that are being formulated in phenomenology. One > >> reason I retained the language of "starting points" that was in the > original questions that Peirce asked about > >> mathematics is that hypotheses are, at heart, quite closely related to > the questions that are guiding inquiry. We > >> normally think of hypotheses as explanations that can serve as possible > answers to some questions. In some cases, I > >> think it might be better to think of the formulation of the questions > were trying to answer as itself a kind of hypotheses.. > >>> > >>> We can ask the following kinds of questions about hypotheses in math, > phenomenology, normative science and the like. > >> What are we drawing on when we formulate these hypotheses? How > should we develop the hypotheses from the "stuff" that > >> we are drawing on so that the hypotheses we form will offer the > greatest promise as we proceed in our inquiries. > >>> > >>> With these kinds of issues in mind, let me rephrase the questions > about phenomenology so as to respond to the concern > >> you've raised: > >>> > >>> 1. What are the different kinds of hypotheses that might be fruitful > for phenomenological inquiry? > >>> 2. What are the general characters of these phenomenological > hypotheses? > >>> 3. Why are not other phenomenological hypotheses possible, and the > like? > >>> > >>> --Jeff > >>> > >>> Jeff Downard > >>> Associate Professor > >>> Department of Philosophy > >>> NAU > >>> (o) 523-8354 > > > > -- > > > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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