Yes, Peirce says that “meaning is a triadic relation.” But meaning is not a sign. Edwina, you say that a sign is a triadic relation, or a “triad,” while Peirce says that a sign is “a correlate of a triadic relation.” Do you really not see the difference?
Likewise with reference to CP 1.540, you don’t acknowledge the difference between representation and a representamen. It might help if you quoted Peirce’s whole sentence, and the one following it: [[ In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or a representamen. ]] Once again, Peirce says that representation is a triadic relation – and that a sign, or representamen, is the correlate of the relation that represents the object for the interpretant. You still have not cited a single quote where Peirce says that a sign is either a “triadic relation” or a “triad.” No amount of repeated recapitulation on your part can conceal that fact, or the obvious inference from it, that Peirce simply does not use the word “sign” that way. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 25-Nov-15 13:51 Gary F - the triad is a basic component of Peircean semiosis. If you know of any place where he rejects the triad as this basic component, please inform us. Please see his diagramme, 1.347 (The Categories in Detail) and his insistence on this triad (1.345) where 'meaning is obviously a triadic relation' - which means, that it is not mechanical (which is dyadic). You can also read his discussion of the triad in 'A Guess at the Riddle'. And of course, since his semiosis is triadic, then, you can read this perspective all through his work. You can read his definition of the Representamen, which is the mediate part of the triad, in various parts of his work as well: "I confine the word representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation" 1.540. Note that this necessarily is a RELATIONAL process and not singular; the Representamen does not exist 'per se'. " A Representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called its Interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the Representamen determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" 1.541. Note again: This is a RELATIONAL PROCESS in A TRIADIC SEMIOSIS. Again, the Representamen does not exist 'per se'. Kindly remember that Peirce often used the term 'sign' to stand for the Representamen in itself. Not for the whole triad. Again, "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which stands itself to the same Object". 2.274. Again- it's in a triadic relation. The Representamen does not stand on its own. Thirdness, by the way, is the same as mediation (5.104) which of course implies relations..and the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness in 6 of the ten Signs. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> To: 'PEIRCE-L' <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 9:33 AM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Edwina, Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the Representamen is a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is saying, but what Peirce is saying in these quotes is that “A Sign is a representamen,” which is “a correlate of a triadic relation.” Peirce does not say that a Sign is a “triad” or a “triadic relation”: it is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a Representamen (though perhaps not the only kind). If you know of any Peirce quote saying that a sign is a “triad”, please post it here. Otherwise please stop claiming that your peculiar use of the word “Sign” is the same as Peirce’s. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Gary F - Again, the Representamen does not exist, as Frances is using it, on its own; it's an integral part of the triad. The 2.274 reference is analyzing the Sign (the triad) which includes the mediate Representamen without a 'mental process'. … Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> Frances, Edwina, list, Just to straighten out the terminology here … For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a “sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little to say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this clear: CP 2.242, EP2:290: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. CP2:274, EP2:273: A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation. Gary f. _____ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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