1) As Peirce himself notes, "I use these two words, sign and representamen,
differently. By a sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an
object in any way, as such conveyors of thought are familiarly known to
us....and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to"
1.540. ..."In particular, all signs convey notions to human minds; but I know
no reason why every representamen should do so". 1.540.
That is, the full triad, the sign, will 'convey notions to human minds', but
not every representamen-as-sign, will do so (i.e., does the representamen in
the triad of cellular interaction convey anything to the human mind'? The
representamen is only a PART of the full triad-as-sign...and it operates in the
physico-chemical and biological realms..and not only in the human conceptual
realm.
2) And as he says, "A Representamen is the subject of a triadic relation to a
second, called its object, for a third, called its Interpretant' 1.541.
The Representamen is only part of the full triad-as-sign.
3) And, "every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only
be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a
sign or thought"...1.538.
Here, we have that the OBJECT is a sign. Does that mean that the Object is a
Representamen? No, it means that the object is itself existent within a
triad-as-sign. The Representamen can't exist 'per se' on its own but only
within a triad.
4) And, 'In consequence of every sign determining an Interpretant, which is
itself a sign, we have sign overlying sign" 2.94.
Here, we have the INTERPRETANT as a sign. Does that mean it is a Representamen?
No, but it too operates within a triadic set of relations.
Again, Peirce uses the term of 'sign' to refer to both the Representamen and
the full triadic set of relations. You have to be careful of the context to
figure out which one he is referring to. Whether it's 8.305, 6.344...with the
Sign having a triadic form, or the Sign as Representamen.
See also 5.314, where Peirce writes of 'the word or sign which man uses is the
man himself" - and obviously, the 'word' or 'man' are not simply the mediate
term in the triad, the Representamen, but the FULL triad. ...and 'every thought
is a sign...man is a sign' (5.314)
----- Original Message -----
From: g...@gnusystems.ca
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2015 7:33 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations
Thanks very much for this, Matt.
I think the quotes you found are about as close as Peirce ever gets to
defining a “sign” as a “triad” (though even here, he doesn’t exactly do that).
And as you mentioned in your later message, that usage of “sign” is rare and
peculiar in Peirce. I guess I shouldn’t have insisted on the terminological
point so strongly, but as I get older I get more impatient with sloppy
terminology (as Peirce also did, for instance in his late letters to James).
I’ve been studying Peirce’s “Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations”
(from the 1903 Syllabus) very closely of late, and it’s in this essay (which is
all about triadic relations!) that Peirce defines the sign as a kind of
representamen, as a correlate of a triadic relation, and NOT as a triad or
triadic relation itself. Yet Edwina persistently cites that very text, where
the famous ten sign types are defined, in support of her peculiar usage! That’s
why I lost my patience. (By the way, I’m not using the word “peculiar” as a
pejorative here, but rather as Peirce used it in that essay, several times, in
describing relations between the sign types). It also bothered me that Edwina
was taking Frances to task for saying that there may be representamens that are
not signs, when Peirce quite clearly says that himself. The point is that for
Peirce in 1903, “representamen” is a broader term than “sign”, because a “sign”
is necessarily a representamen, while a representamen is not necessarily a sign.
OK, I’ll let it go now. The bottom line is that understanding Peircean
semiotic requires reading Peirce’s exact words, not Edwina’s translation of
them – and reading them as carefully as Peirce wrote them.
Gary f.
} If one does not expect the unexpected one will not find it out, since it is
not to be searched out, and is difficult to compass. [Heraclitus] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Matt Faunce [mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com]
Sent: 26-Nov-15 01:38
This was bugging me, so I went searching. The first place I saw 'sign'
denoting a triad was not by Peirce, but by Cornelis de Waal, pg. 79 of Peirce,
A Guide for the Perplexed, in the first paragraph: "The sign is a genuine
triad--one that cannot be reduced to a combination of dyads."
In the Collected Papers Peirce's use of a triadic sign is rare, but here are
two examples:
CP 8.305: "I shall show that a Concept is a Sign and shall define a Sign and
show its triadic form."
6.344: "Signs, the only things with which a human being can, without
derogation, consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself, are triadic;
since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which latter it
brings into connexion with the former."
Matt
On 11/26/15 12:49 AM, John Collier wrote:
I don’t have quotes handy, but I am pretty sure that Peirce uses “sign” in
both ways. This caused me some problems in the past in applying his ideas to
biosemiotics and other non-mental phenomena until I realized he was using the
term in more than one way. I think if one is careful about the context it is
possible to select which usage Peirce makes in each case.
John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Thursday, 26 November 2015 4:14 AM
To: 'PEIRCE-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations
Yes, Peirce says that “meaning is a triadic relation.” But meaning is not a
sign. Edwina, you say that a sign is a triadic relation, or a “triad,” while
Peirce says that a sign is “a correlate of a triadic relation.” Do you really
not see the difference?
Likewise with reference to CP 1.540, you don’t acknowledge the difference
between representation and a representamen. It might help if you quoted
Peirce’s whole sentence, and the one following it:
[[ In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word
representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the
interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call
a sign or a representamen. ]]
Once again, Peirce says that representation is a triadic relation – and
that a sign, or representamen, is the correlate of the relation that represents
the object for the interpretant.
You still have not cited a single quote where Peirce says that a sign is
either a “triadic relation” or a “triad.” No amount of repeated recapitulation
on your part can conceal that fact, or the obvious inference from it, that
Peirce simply does not use the word “sign” that way.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 25-Nov-15 13:51
Gary F - the triad is a basic component of Peircean semiosis. If you know
of any place where he rejects the triad as this basic component, please inform
us.
Please see his diagramme, 1.347 (The Categories in Detail) and his
insistence on this triad (1.345) where 'meaning is obviously a triadic
relation' - which means, that it is not mechanical (which is dyadic). You can
also read his discussion of the triad in 'A Guess at the Riddle'. And of
course, since his semiosis is triadic, then, you can read this perspective all
through his work.
You can read his definition of the Representamen, which is the mediate part
of the triad, in various parts of his work as well: "I confine the word
representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the
interpreter of the representation" 1.540.
Note that this necessarily is a RELATIONAL process and not singular; the
Representamen does not exist 'per se'.
" A Representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to a second, called
its object, for a third, called its Interpretant, this triadic relation being
such that the Representamen determines its interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" 1.541.
Note again: This is a RELATIONAL PROCESS in A TRIADIC SEMIOSIS. Again, the
Representamen does not exist 'per se'.
Kindly remember that Peirce often used the term 'sign' to stand for the
Representamen in itself. Not for the whole triad. Again,
"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
triadic relation to a Second, called its Object as to be capable of determining
a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its
Object in which stands itself to the same Object". 2.274.
Again- it's in a triadic relation. The Representamen does not stand on its
own.
Thirdness, by the way, is the same as mediation (5.104) which of course
implies relations..and the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness in 6 of the
ten Signs.
Edwina
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