This was bugging me, so I went searching. The first place I saw 'sign'
denoting a triad was not by Peirce, but by Cornelis de Waal, pg. 79 of
Peirce, A Guide for the Perplexed, in the first paragraph: "The sign is
a genuine triad--one that cannot be reduced to a combination of dyads."
In the Collected Papers Peirce's use of a triadic sign is rare, but here
are two examples:
CP 8.305: "I shall show that a Concept is a Sign and shall define a Sign
and show its triadic form."
6.344: "Signs, the only things with which a human being can, without
derogation, consent to have any transaction, being a sign himself, are
triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact,
which latter it brings into connexion with the former."
Matt
On 11/26/15 12:49 AM, John Collier wrote:
I don’t have quotes handy, but I am pretty sure that Peirce uses
“sign” in both ways. This caused me some problems in the past in
applying his ideas to biosemiotics and other non-mental phenomena
until I realized he was using the term in more than one way. I think
if one is careful about the context it is possible to select which
usage Peirce makes in each case.
John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
*From:*g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
*Sent:* Thursday, 26 November 2015 4:14 AM
*To:* 'PEIRCE-L'
*Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations
Yes, Peirce says that “meaning is a triadic relation.” But /meaning/
is not /a sign/. Edwina, you say that a */sign/* is a triadic
relation, or a “triad,” while Peirce says that a sign is “a
/correlate/ of a triadic relation.” Do you really not see the difference?
Likewise with reference to CP 1.540, you don’t acknowledge the
difference between /representation/ and a /representamen/. It might
help if you quoted Peirce’s whole sentence, and the one following it:
[[ In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word
/representation/ to the operation of a sign or its /relation/ to the
object /for/ the interpreter of the representation. The concrete
subject that represents I call a /sign/ or a /representamen/. ]]
Once again, Peirce says that /representation/ is a triadic relation –
and that a sign, or representamen, is the /correlate/ of the relation
that represents the object for the interpretant.
You still have not cited a single quote where Peirce says that a
*sign* is either a “triadic relation” or a “triad.” No amount of
repeated recapitulation on your part can conceal that fact, or the
obvious inference from it, that Peirce simply does not use the word
“sign” that way.
Gary f.
*From:*Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
*Sent:* 25-Nov-15 13:51
Gary F - the triad is a basic component of Peircean semiosis. If you
know of any place where he rejects the triad as this basic component,
please inform us.
Please see his diagramme, 1.347 (The Categories in Detail) and his
insistence on this triad (1.345) where 'meaning is obviously a triadic
relation' - which means, that it is not mechanical (which is dyadic).
You can also read his discussion of the triad in 'A Guess at the
Riddle'. And of course, since his semiosis is triadic, then, you can
read this perspective all through his work.
You can read his definition of the Representamen, which is the_mediate
part of the triad_, in various parts of his work as well: "I confine
the word representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to
the object for the interpreter of the representation" 1.540.
Note that this necessarily is a RELATIONAL process and not singular;
the Representamen does not exist 'per se'.
" A Representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to a second,
called its object, for a third, called its Interpretant, this triadic
relation being such that the Representamen determines its interpretant
to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some
interpretant" 1.541.
Note again: This is a RELATIONAL PROCESS in A TRIADIC SEMIOSIS. Again,
the Representamen does not exist 'per se'.
Kindly remember that Peirce often used the term 'sign' to stand for
the Representamen in itself. Not for the whole triad. Again,
"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
triadic relation to a Second, called its Object as to be capable of
determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same
triadic relation to its Object in which stands itself to the same
Object". 2.274.
Again- it's in a triadic relation. The Representamen does not stand
on its own.
Thirdness, by the way, is the same as mediation (5.104) which of
course implies relations..and the Representamen is in a mode of
Thirdness in 6 of the ten Signs.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:*g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
*To:*'PEIRCE-L' <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:*Wednesday, November 25, 2015 9:33 AM
*Subject:*RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Edwina,
Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the
Representamen is a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances
is saying, but what *Peirce* is saying in these quotes is that “A
/Sign/ is a representamen,” which is “a correlate of a triadic
relation.” Peirce does *not* say that a Sign is a “triad” or a
“triadic relation”: it is a /correlate/ of a triadic relation, and
a Representamen (though perhaps not the only kind). If you know of
any Peirce quote saying that a sign is a “triad”, please post it
here. Otherwise please stop claiming that your peculiar use of the
word “Sign” is the same as Peirce’s.
Gary f.
*From:*Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Gary F - Again, the Representamen does not exist, as Frances is
using it, on its own; it's an integral part of the triad. The
2.274 reference is analyzing the Sign (the triad) which includes
the mediate Representamen _without_ a 'mental process'. …
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:*g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
Frances, Edwina, list,
Just to straighten out the terminology here …
For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic
relation, and a “sign” is a kind of representamen. By this
definition, there can be representamens that are not signs;
but empirically, Peirce has very little to say about them. Two
passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this clear:
CP 2.242, EP2:290: A /Representamen/ is the First Correlate
of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its
/Object,/ and the possible Third Correlate being termed its
/Interpretant,/ by which triadic relation the possible
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the
same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some
possible Interpretant. A /Sign/ is a representamen of which
some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only
representamens that have been much studied.
CP2:274, EP2:273: A /Sign/ is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are
not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun,
becomes by that very act fully capable, without further
condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely
corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the
same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a
Representamen of the sun. But /thought/ is the chief, if not
the only, mode of representation.
Gary f.
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