> On Nov 30, 2015, at 12:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> 
>  I certainly didn't mean to imply that I, myself, thought that the 
> Representamen functioned as a kind of 'Sovereign Will 'agent. I was instead 
> suggesting that Gary F's insistence on considering ONLY the Representamen as 
> 'the Sign' [rather than the full triad] does just that - It transforms that 
> mediative process which is the Representamen, into a kind of Sovereign Power. 
> A form of Platonism in that it privileges the 'Mind' as an Agential power 
> over the objective reality, or a even a form of nominalism in that it also 
> rejects the external object's power.  I reject both versions.

I didn’t mean to appear to ascribe that belief to you. And I agree that the 
kind of Platonism that sees forms as determining reality is problematic. I 
certainly don’t believe that and I doubt many do. Whether that’s what Plato and 
the original ancient platonists believed that is of course a different matter. 
(I tend to see this type of Plato as a straw man convenient for philosophers to 
react against - although heaven knows it was a form accepted in the Renaissance 
and modern era)

I just bring up middle voice as a way to deal with this where we don’t really 
have activity in a traditional sense. 

> I see your point about the sign-token [representamen] 'clearing the space' 
> for the unveiling of the object, by which I understand that knowledge 
> increases (within the continuity of commonality of object held by the 
> Representamen) to enable a person to understand the objective reality of the 
> object. 

Yes although a logical implication of this isn’t just an increase in knowledge 
but also error. That is in the sign the interpretant need not (and rarely will) 
fully match the object.

> I think this also relates to Frederik Stjernfelt's analysis of the dicisign, 
> which "in its interpretant, is represented as having two parts, one referring 
> to the object, and the other -the predicate " p 68 and "the Interpretant 
> represents a real existential relation, or genuine Secondness, as subsisting 
> between the Dicisign and the Dicisign's real object" (Peirce, CP 2.310). And 
> ' "The Dicisign in so far as it is the related of the existential relation 
> which is the Secondary Object of the Dicisign*, can evidently not be the 
> entire Dicisign [my emphasis. It is at once a part of the Object and a part 
> of the Interpretant of the Dicisign" CP 2.311.
> * Secondary Object = Immediate Object.....
>  
> And further..."The part which is represented to represent a part of the 
> Dicisign is represented as at once part of the Interpretant and part of the 
> Object" 2.311.
>  
> And this removes the linearity of actor-acted upon, since instead, we have a 
> complex interactive network where such simple unilinear direction can't be 
> assumed.

Yes, although he doesn’t think the Continental connections are there as much as 
I do. But that analysis (as well as his analysis of the copula) was very 
helpful too me. Unfortunately I’ve not had the time to work out all of this 
yet. (I keep meaning to go back through both his main books again)

I think that what we need to figure out is how the gap with the object enables 
us to guess. I’m still thinking through that. (And have been for years) 
Abduction is how we make the leap and then induction and deduction let us test 
our guess. So there’s a feedback.
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