Very nice outline, Clark. I agree with the 'middle voice' where the the subject
is both the actor and receiver of the action. The interactive relations that
are thus set up via the mediative Representamen, between Object and
Interpretant, are basic to the Peircean semiosic triad.
I think this also relates to Frederik Stjernfelt's analysis of the dicisign,
which "in its interpretant, is represented as having two parts, one referring
to the object, and the other -the predicate " p 68 and "the Interpretant
represents a real existential relation, or genuine Secondness, as subsisting
between the Dicisign and the Dicisign's real object" (Peirce, CP 2.310). And '
"The Dicisign in so far as it is the related of the existential relation which
is the Secondary Object of the Dicisign*, can evidently not be the entire
Dicisign [my emphasis. It is at once a part of the Object and a part of the
Interpretant of the Dicisign" CP 2.311.
* Secondary Object = Immediate Object.....
And further..."The part which is represented to represent a part of the
Dicisign is represented as at once part of the Interpretant and part of the
Object" 2.311.
And this removes the linearity of actor-acted upon, since instead, we have a
complex interactive network where such simple unilinear direction can't be
assumed.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, November 30, 2015 1:40 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations
On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:11 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
Interestingly relative to Scotus the middle voice argument usually is made
by the proponents of analogy against Scotus. Heidegger sees this voice as key
to understanding the pre-socratics (since he’s caught up on Plato being the
source of philosophical error as much if not more than Descartes). So his
examples of “to arise” (middle voice) and “to give birth to” (active voice)
arise both out of medieval but also these early Greek ways of speaking. The key
to the middle voice is that things happen without necessarily someone or
something making them happen. The actor is just missing.
Just to expand on that a little since I suspect those not familiar with
middle voice might be a tad confused. Middle voice didn’t exist in Latin. It
did in Greek. Usually it relates to a subject being both the actor and receiver
of the action. So it a double move of passive and active. Ockham thought this
was necessary for logic, although it’s not quite clear why. It comes up
relative to Scotus over analogy which in practice is the debate over univocal
or equivocative terms. For Scouts Being is univocal. Ockham who wants things to
be more mental than Scouts uses middle voice to get around certain arguments
because the middle voice enables both active and passive.
Later starting at least with Nietzsche and perhaps earlier idealists (I don’t
know the history that well) it pops up in German idealism. With Heidegger it’s
important for his phenomenology because it enables a happening that isn’t
controlled by either the object or the “subject" (Daesin). So this middle place
and middle voice is a great way to get at what he’s after. I think his notion
of poles (strife) ends up being tied to it as well.
In Peirce the sign-token is this middle ground between active determination
from the object and a certain passivity in the interpretant. As a sign (as
opposed to sign-token) it thus is both active and passive in itself. Further
there’s a certain sense of equivocation since the move back from the
interpretant or sign-token to the object is only available via a guess.
Peirce gets at the issue of analogy more formally too in his writings on
metaphor and analogy. While he’s a bit brief in his comments leading to various
debates over his intentions, it seems like he uses the notion of icon here. A
metaphor is an icon in what could be multiple ways. An analogy is an icon in
terms of a single property. I think this gets around some of Ockham’s arguments
against Scotus but leaves a certain openness to metaphor and analogy which of
course gives them their power. Unlike say the 20th century Continental
philosophers though Peirce never focuses in on metaphor as a key for
understanding signs. However the gap between object and the rest of the sign
ends up having a similar function. (See for instance his letters to Lady Webly
on signs in his mature period)
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