Gary R - thanks for this clarification. I agree; the table of 9 are NOT
embodiments.
I consider them the terms for the Relations; eg, in the letters to Lady Welby,
where he writes:
"Now signs may be divided as to their own material nature, as to their
relations to their objects, and as to their relations to their interpretants"
(8.333). And
"In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into
Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. [Gary F and I differ strongly on certain
aspects of this, as he considers the term 'sign' to refer to and only to the
Representamen, whereas i consider the term to refer to either the Represenamen
OR the full triad of relations].
And, "in regard to its relation to its signified Interperpretant, a sign is
either a Rheme, a Dicent or an Argument" 8.337.
These are the two Relations that offer 'breadth' to the semiosic Sign (the
triad) - ie the R-O and the R-I. The Representamen relates to itself 'As it is
in itself" (8.224) and this, in my view, offers DEPTH, offering the generalized
history of this Representamen in its other two Relations - that between the R
and the O, and that between the R and the I.
The ten classes, as triads, are on the other hand - embodied, while the 9
Relations are not embodied. Instead, they are three Relations (R-O, R-R, R-I)
and function in each of the three categorical modes). The Sign, the full triad,
on the other hand, is embodied, in both breadth and depth.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:26 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
List,
Although I don't see the point or relevance of Sung's (2) and (3), in my
opinion a great deal of semiotic confusion has been generated by confusing and
conflating (1) sign types with sign classes. No doubt Peirce himself
contributed to this confusion, although in some cases and in context it seems
quite logical (and Peirce offers legitimate reasons) to refer to one of the
classes by less than its full triadic name, for example, 'Qualisign' to refer
to the 1st of the 10 classes, the rhematic iconic qualisign. But, again, even
this sort of abbreviation has wreaked a kind of semiotic havoc. (Btw, this is
not the only way Peirce contributes to this confusion.)
Following a suggestion made by Ben Udell many years ago when I was writing a
paper which, in part, meant to distinguish between these sign types and
classes, I sometimes refer to sign 'types' as 'parameters' as being closer to
Peirce's meaning.
This is also why I reject Sung's 'quark model' of semiotics, because the 9
classes are not analogous to elementary particles in being 'thing-like' and
quasi-individual, but, again, are the mere parameters of the 10 possible signs
which might be embodied, that is, the 10 classes.
There remain a number of scholars who still treat the table of 9 as if they
represented embodied sign classes. They simply do not.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 3:39 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
Clark, Jeff, Gary F, lists,
You wrote:
" . . . On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign
types defined in NDTR, (120815-1)
including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible ambiguity
in the concepts of
genuine and degenerate; . . . "
(1) Shouldn't we distinguish between "sign types" and "sign classes"?
Peirce defines
(A) 9 sign types (analogous to quarks in particle physics)
1. qualisign,
2. sinsign,
3. legisign,
4. icon,
5. index,
6. symbol,
7. rheme,
8. dicisign, and
9. arguement) , and
(B) 10 sign classes (analogous to baryons composed of 3 quarks)
1. rhematic iconic qualisign,
2. rhematic iconic sinsign,
3. rhematic iconic legisign,
4. rhematic indexical sinsign,
5. rhematic indexical legisign,
6. rhematic symbolic legisign,
7 decent indexical sinsign,
8. decent indexical legisign,
9. decent symbolic legisign
10. argument symbolic legisign.
Not distinguishing between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs
may be akin to physicists not distinguishing between quarks (u, d, c, s, t and
b quarks) and baryons (protons and neutrons).
(2) According to the quark model of the Peircean sign discussed in earlier
posts, the 9 types of signs (referred to as the "elementary signs") cannot
exist without being parts of the 10 classes of signs (referred to as the
"composite signs"), just as quarks cannot exist outside of baryons.
(3) What holds quarks together within a baryon (e.g., u, u and d quarks in
a proton, or u, d and d quarks in a neutron) is the "strong force", so perhaps
there exists a 'force' that holds three elementary signs together within a
composite sign, and such a postulated 'force' in semiotics may be referred to
as the "semantic force" or "semiotic force", in analogy to the "strong force".
All the best.
Sung
On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
> On Dec 3, 2015, at 9:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types
defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a
possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly this
problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and of
involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph
I think this gets at exactly the ambiguity that is confusing me in many
of these discussions of late. It’s also why I ask people to define their terms
since I think we’re often using Peirce’s terminology or terminology that seems
obvious but which obscure these subtle ambiguities. While I may be wrong, my
sense is that it’s precisely upon these subtle issues that our various
disagreements are located.
All too often I find myself suspicious that we disagree in these more
fundamental considerations but unsure due to the way the discussions proceed.
I’ve been unable to read the list for about a week and am just catching
up. I see that the discussion of the above, or at least the terminology of
sign, continues. I just wanted to point out that in addition to these subtle
points it seems much of the debate is largely a semantic one over the
applicability of certain terms. It’s not clear to me yet that we have a
substantial difference in content.
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--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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