Gary R - yes, that's a very difficult passage. First, in my view, the triadic Sign (R-O, R-R, R-I) IS an 'instance of semiosis'. It can be a molecule, a bird, a song, a word, a cloud, a..... Of course, no existential instance exists per se, alone and isolate; all are semiosically networked with other 'instances' and with other Relations.
And, the Relations are not dyads, understanding a dyadic interaction as between two existential 'things'; The 'nodes' of Object, Representamen, Interpretant don't exist as such except within the semiosic interaction. Now, that passage of Peirce's - A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stand itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does. The way I see it, is that the Interpretant must relate to its Object.. It can't simply be the 'end production' of a linear communication line. What is the nature of this relation? My view of the Representamen is not that it is a 'mover-of-data/information' from one site to another, from the Object to the Interpretant. It mediates, and this isn't a 'shove-it-along' action; it transforms that input data from the Object and 'outputs' it as the Interpretant. There is some change between the O and I. This suggests as well that this Interpretant is in interaction with its Object in a transformative mode...because the Representamen's nature is to mediate, to transform...not to simply mechanically 'shove the data along from one site to another site'. How much of a transformation is done, depends on the modal category of the Representamen. This then leads to the question: Does the Interpretant 'transform' the Object? If the Representamen mediates between the Object and the Interpretant, then, the Interpretant must do so, within the force of the Representamen (laws, habits). So, an object (a shrub) is transformed by the Representamen into an Interpretant as (a medically useful shrub)..and this information then affects how one interacts with that shrub as an Object in the future. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce-L Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 6:55 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations Edwina, Gary F, list, Edwina, you wrote: The ten classes, as triads, are on the other hand - embodied, while the 9 Relations are not embodied. Instead, they are three Relations (R-O, R-R, R-I) and function in each of the three categorical modes). The Sign, the full triad, on the other hand, is embodied, in both breadth and depth. I'd suggest that the table of 10 classes does not itself offer embodied sgins, but that this is yet another analysis within semiotic grammar, differing from the list of 9 parameters in representing classes of signs which may be embodied in an actual semiosis, each such real semiosis being so complex (or involving so many complexities) that any attempt to completely analyze its putative 'elements' would necessarily be incomplete, not to mention, de post facto. And I think complexity exists even at the level of the analysis of each of the ten classes, so that to emphasize, as you do, the three Relations (R-O, R-R, R-I) separately, so to speak, seems to me to deemphasize what I think is a quintessential character of the Sign, as expressed in many of Peirce's definitions, namely that the Interpretant stands in the same (not even 'similar', but "the same triadic relation") to the Object as the Representamen stands to its Object. I do not see that your "three Relations" shows this. See, for example, this oft quoted defintion, no. 13, in Robert Marty's "76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce" http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM which begins: A sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stand itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does. I think this additional factor is of the greatest importance, indeed cannot be over-emphasized. Thus, the 'three relations' are seen to be no "complexus of dyadic relations" but a single Sign when embodied, as you have always insisted. But note well that in def. 13 above, as in a number of other places, Peirce writes "A sign, or Representamen," as I see it, thus equating the 'sign itself' with the entire "genuine" triadic relation, which in an important sense it is, In other words, the three relations are one in semiosis. So, at the moment, I am thinking that both you and Gary are partially right and partially wrong. The triadic 'Sign' should not, in my opinion, be considered an instance of semiosis itself, but an abstract tricategorial analysis of it. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 4:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: Gary R - thanks for this clarification. I agree; the table of 9 are NOT embodiments. I consider them the terms for the Relations; eg, in the letters to Lady Welby, where he writes: "Now signs may be divided as to their own material nature, as to their relations to their objects, and as to their relations to their interpretants" (8.333). And "In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. [Gary F and I differ strongly on certain aspects of this, as he considers the term 'sign' to refer to and only to the Representamen, whereas i consider the term to refer to either the Represenamen OR the full triad of relations]. And, "in regard to its relation to its signified Interperpretant, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent or an Argument" 8.337. These are the two Relations that offer 'breadth' to the semiosic Sign (the triad) - ie the R-O and the R-I. The Representamen relates to itself 'As it is in itself" (8.224) and this, in my view, offers DEPTH, offering the generalized history of this Representamen in its other two Relations - that between the R and the O, and that between the R and the I. The ten classes, as triads, are on the other hand - embodied, while the 9 Relations are not embodied. Instead, they are three Relations (R-O, R-R, R-I) and function in each of the three categorical modes). The Sign, the full triad, on the other hand, is embodied, in both breadth and depth. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce-L Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2015 4:26 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations List, Although I don't see the point or relevance of Sung's (2) and (3), in my opinion a great deal of semiotic confusion has been generated by confusing and conflating (1) sign types with sign classes. No doubt Peirce himself contributed to this confusion, although in some cases and in context it seems quite logical (and Peirce offers legitimate reasons) to refer to one of the classes by less than its full triadic name, for example, 'Qualisign' to refer to the 1st of the 10 classes, the rhematic iconic qualisign. But, again, even this sort of abbreviation has wreaked a kind of semiotic havoc. (Btw, this is not the only way Peirce contributes to this confusion.) Following a suggestion made by Ben Udell many years ago when I was writing a paper which, in part, meant to distinguish between these sign types and classes, I sometimes refer to sign 'types' as 'parameters' as being closer to Peirce's meaning. This is also why I reject Sung's 'quark model' of semiotics, because the 9 classes are not analogous to elementary particles in being 'thing-like' and quasi-individual, but, again, are the mere parameters of the 10 possible signs which might be embodied, that is, the 10 classes. There remain a number of scholars who still treat the table of 9 as if they represented embodied sign classes. They simply do not. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 3:39 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: Clark, Jeff, Gary F, lists, You wrote: " . . . On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types defined in NDTR, (120815-1) including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; . . . " (1) Shouldn't we distinguish between "sign types" and "sign classes"? Peirce defines (A) 9 sign types (analogous to quarks in particle physics) 1. qualisign, 2. sinsign, 3. legisign, 4. icon, 5. index, 6. symbol, 7. rheme, 8. dicisign, and 9. arguement) , and (B) 10 sign classes (analogous to baryons composed of 3 quarks) 1. rhematic iconic qualisign, 2. rhematic iconic sinsign, 3. rhematic iconic legisign, 4. rhematic indexical sinsign, 5. rhematic indexical legisign, 6. rhematic symbolic legisign, 7 decent indexical sinsign, 8. decent indexical legisign, 9. decent symbolic legisign 10. argument symbolic legisign. Not distinguishing between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs may be akin to physicists not distinguishing between quarks (u, d, c, s, t and b quarks) and baryons (protons and neutrons). (2) According to the quark model of the Peircean sign discussed in earlier posts, the 9 types of signs (referred to as the "elementary signs") cannot exist without being parts of the 10 classes of signs (referred to as the "composite signs"), just as quarks cannot exist outside of baryons. (3) What holds quarks together within a baryon (e.g., u, u and d quarks in a proton, or u, d and d quarks in a neutron) is the "strong force", so perhaps there exists a 'force' that holds three elementary signs together within a composite sign, and such a postulated 'force' in semiotics may be referred to as the "semantic force" or "semiotic force", in analogy to the "strong force". All the best. Sung On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > On Dec 3, 2015, at 9:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph I think this gets at exactly the ambiguity that is confusing me in many of these discussions of late. It’s also why I ask people to define their terms since I think we’re often using Peirce’s terminology or terminology that seems obvious but which obscure these subtle ambiguities. While I may be wrong, my sense is that it’s precisely upon these subtle issues that our various disagreements are located. All too often I find myself suspicious that we disagree in these more fundamental considerations but unsure due to the way the discussions proceed. I’ve been unable to read the list for about a week and am just catching up. I see that the discussion of the above, or at least the terminology of sign, continues. I just wanted to point out that in addition to these subtle points it seems much of the debate is largely a semantic one over the applicability of certain terms. It’s not clear to me yet that we have a substantial difference in content. ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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