> On Dec 8, 2015, at 12:58 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Are you saying that we should judge music like we judge medicine—e.g., just >> because certain music works for me doesn't mean music that doesn't work for >> me is bad? Similarly, should we judge music like we judge mathematics >> relative to their applications?
I don’t think I’m saying that. (Sorry for the delay) It’s not entirely clear what Peirce means by aesthetics and ethics. (I know there’s a lot written about the topic but they’re drawing on a fair paucity of writings) The good is wrapped up with his summum bonum which seems tied to both ethics and aesthetics. Peirce seems to see it as a kind of destiny evolution will tend to. Again this seems a bit problematic as a metaphysical theory although I understand why he’d embrace it. (It’s not clear to me why we should assume evolution will converge, even if we embrace certain sorts of infinities in our conception) However clearly Peirce thinks that some things converge and that convergence into a type of stability determines what is reasonable. This set of reasonableness will give answers for both what is good for a particular individual as well as what’s good in various other types of generalities. > On Dec 8, 2015, at 12:30 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > I don't agree. First, and again, "in the long run" is a normative idea of > science. Peirce argues that whole societies, whole eras may get aspects of > science wrong, but that eventually science will-be self-correcting. Indeed, > powerful sub-societies of very well-educated (for their time) scientists can > be wrong for a very long time on some matter, but in the long run a > scientific method which is open, honest, and self-correcting, that is, a > pragmatic method, will at least asymptotically approach "the truth" of each > matter under consideration. This is not the case for aesthetic artifacts. But the decision about whether an aesthetic artifact is really aesthetic in the sense of the summum bonum does for Peirce appear to be a scientific question as I understand him. > I do not see how any cultural artifact can be "universally aesthetical" > except in Peirce's sense that everything has its own esthetic character > (Peirce substitutes 'e' for 'ae' when discussing the normative science of > esthetics), and even if, say, that character is a kind of ugliness, etc. A cultural artifact can be universally aesthetically to the degree it partakes of such universals. I don’t think it follows that they are entirely such or only such or necessarily such. I think the distinction we’re drawing is simply between universals and those applicable to a more narrow context. Which is fine. There are lots of laws like that and I don’t have a problem with that. > As for the fine arts, by way of example, among my aesthetic peers in music, > by which in this case I mean people I know personally who love music, have > listened to a great deal of it for many years, have studied it, read up on > it, etc. there is a tremendous amount of difference of opinion as to the > aesthetic quality of given works of art. I’d assume that for human beings aesthetics will be a mix of universal aesthetically values (if there are any) and those indexed to our particular biology and the physics of the world in which we live. Beyond that knowing aesthetic rules seems difficult much as for ethical. I’d suggest that if we can’t agree upon ethics it’s hardly surprising we agree even less upon aesthetics. I’m not sure that entails there are no truths regarding such merely that we’re not at the stage where we can conclusively know much yet. Saying we disagree at this stage is probably akin to talking psychology in the 17th century. Pointing to disagreement says nothing about whether there are known psychological truths in the 21st century. > There is no such self-correcting in art. Each work is more of less sui > generis, and while a given work may have a very large appreciative audience > in some culture(s) at some time(s), it is my already stated opinion that this > will not be sustained in the long run. It’s not clear to me why. It seems to me you’re position more or less is just adopting a strong anti-realist position towards aesthetics (and perhaps ethics). That’s fine of course. It’s probably the majority view among philosophers. There are compelling reasons to recommend that view. I just don’t think we can say it’s Peirce’s view.
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