Hi Clark, lists,

You wrote:

"I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where
structures                             (120215-1)
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself
without relations."

(*1*)  It seems that everybody, including you, John (and myself until
recently), assumes that *there is only one way to distribute the Peircean
categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three worlds of
Burgin, denoted as S (World of Structures), P (Physical world),and M
(Mental world). * Let me designate such a view as the *1-to-1 view, *according
to which only one of the 6 possibilities shown in *Table 1* is true and the
rest are not.  The alternative view would be that more than one of the 6
possibilities listed in Table 1 can be true, depending on context. I will
refer to this view as the "*1-to-many*" view.


*Table 1*.  Non-deterministic relation between triadic model of the worlds
and Peircean categories.

Possibilities

*Firstness*

*Secondness*

*Thirdness*

 Context or Field of Studies

*1*

S*

P

M

?

*2*

S

M

P

?

*3*

P

S

M

?

*4*

P

M

S

?

*5*

M

S

P

?

*6*

M

P

S

?

*S = World of structures
  P = Physical world
  M = Mental world

(*2*)  It may be necessary to invoke at least two kinds of "structures" --
(i) "mental structures", i.e, those structures in the world whose existence
depends on the human mind (through discovery, creativity, and production),
and (ii) "real structures" that can exist independent of human mind.  The S
in Possibility 1 and 2 above are of the first kind (i.e., real structures)
and the S  in Possibilities 4 and 6 are of the second kind (i.e., mental
structures).

(*3*)  Even with my very limited reading of Peirce, I can recognize that
Table 1 is consistent with the basic tenet of the Peircean semiotics that
all signs (including S, P and M in Table 1) have in each the three basic
aspects of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, although each of the 6
possibilites shown in Table 1 PRESCINDS different aspect of each sign.  For
example, Possibility 1 rescinds the Firstness aspect of S, the Secondness
aspect of P, and the Thirdness aspect of M.  In contrast, Possibility
6 prescinds the Firstness aspect of M, the Secondness aspect of P and the
Thirdness aspect of S, etc.


If (*2*) and (*3*) are right, the *1-to-many view* described in (*1*) would
be validated.


All the best.

Sung



On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:

>
> On Dec 1, 2015, at 7:16 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
> (*1*)  I agree with you on the definition of these categories of Peirce.
> We seem to disagree on how to assign these categories to the three worlds
> of Burgin and the three roses of Scotus.
>
>
> I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where
> structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in
> itself without relations.
>
> You seem to be using firstness due to invariant and thus structures. But I
> don’t see how that works. Being invariant is not the same as being
> unrelated.
>
>
> -----------------------------
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to