Sung, List, "Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - and neither, (120215-1) in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories."
If Statement (120215-1) is right, then Peirce (as represneted by E. Taborsky) would have nothing to do with modern natural sciences (as represented by Popper and Penrose) or with information science (as represented by Burgin), which is hard to believe. Sung, I think you need to study logic a bit more deeply, including logical fallacies. To say that because Burgin's and Popper's three worlds have little if anything to do with the Peircean categories (and I agree with Edwina, although you'll note my slight modification to "little if anything"), is not to say that they lack any value in and of themselves (which possible value I won't comment on now). There is one, perhaps two fallacies involved in your response to Edwina, and I think it's up to you to up your logical studies to identify them. Perhaps that will help prevent you from committing them in the future. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 8:35 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > Edwina, Clark, John, lists > > You wrote: > > "Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - > and neither, (120215-1) > in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories." > > If Statement (120215-1) is right, then Peirce (as represneted by E. > Taborsky) would have nothing to do with modern natural sciences (as > represented by Popper and Penrose) or with information science (as > represented by Burgin), which is hard to believe. > > All the best. > > Sung > > On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> I guess I must be 'nobody', since I don't see any way at all to >> 'distribute the Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness >> over the three worlds of Burgin". >> >> Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - >> and neither, in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories. >> It takes a huge stretch to make such a claim, and if one does so, the >> essential identity of the Peircean categories and their full semiosic >> interactive operation, is totally lost and one is reduced to such >> psychological nominals as 'subjective, objective and general' - and these >> are not valid outlines of the three categories. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> >> *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, December 02, 2015 5:29 PM >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and >> triadic relations >> >> Hi Clark, lists, >> >> You wrote: >> >> "I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where >> structures (120215-1) >> are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself >> without relations." >> >> (*1*) It seems that everybody, including you, John (and myself until >> recently), assumes that *there is only one way to distribute the >> Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three >> worlds of Burgin, denoted as S (World of Structures), P (Physical >> world),and M (Mental world). * Let me designate such a view as the *1-to-1 >> view, *according to which only one of the 6 possibilities shown in *Table >> 1* is true and the rest are not. The alternative view would be that >> more than one of the 6 possibilities listed in Table 1 can be true, >> depending on context. I will refer to this view as the "*1-to-many*" >> view. >> >> >> *Table 1*. Non-deterministic relation between triadic model of the >> worlds and Peircean categories. >> >> Possibilities >> >> *Firstness* >> >> *Secondness* >> >> *Thirdness* >> >> Context or Field of Studies >> >> *1* >> >> S* >> >> P >> >> M >> >> ? >> >> *2* >> >> S >> >> M >> >> P >> >> ? >> >> *3* >> >> P >> >> S >> >> M >> >> ? >> >> *4* >> >> P >> >> M >> >> S >> >> ? >> >> *5* >> >> M >> >> S >> >> P >> >> ? >> >> *6* >> >> M >> >> P >> >> S >> >> ? >> >> *S = World of structures >> P = Physical world >> M = Mental world >> >> (*2*) It may be necessary to invoke at least two kinds of "structures" >> -- (i) "mental structures", i.e, those structures in the world whose >> existence depends on the human mind (through discovery, creativity, and >> production), and (ii) "real structures" that can exist independent of human >> mind. The S in Possibility 1 and 2 above are of the first kind (i.e., real >> structures) and the S in Possibilities 4 and 6 are of the second kind >> (i.e., mental structures). >> >> (*3*) Even with my very limited reading of Peirce, I can recognize that >> Table 1 is consistent with the basic tenet of the Peircean semiotics that >> all signs (including S, P and M in Table 1) have in each the three basic >> aspects of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, although each of the 6 >> possibilites shown in Table 1 PRESCINDS different aspect of each sign. For >> example, Possibility 1 rescinds the Firstness aspect of S, the Secondness >> aspect of P, and the Thirdness aspect of M. In contrast, Possibility >> 6 prescinds the Firstness aspect of M, the Secondness aspect of P and the >> Thirdness aspect of S, etc. >> >> >> If (*2*) and (*3*) are right, the *1-to-many view* described in (*1*) >> would be validated. >> >> >> All the best. >> >> Sung >> >> >> >> On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> On Dec 1, 2015, at 7:16 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >>> >>> (*1*) I agree with you on the definition of these categories of >>> Peirce. >>> We seem to disagree on how to assign these categories to the three >>> worlds of Burgin and the three roses of Scotus. >>> >>> >>> I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where >>> structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in >>> itself without relations. >>> >>> You seem to be using firstness due to invariant and thus structures. But >>> I don’t see how that works. Being invariant is not the same as being >>> unrelated. >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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