I guess I must be 'nobody', since I don't see any way at all to 'distribute the 
Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three 
worlds of Burgin".

Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - and 
neither, in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories.  It 
takes a huge stretch to make such a claim, and if one does so, the essential 
identity of the Peircean categories and their full semiosic interactive 
operation, is totally lost and one is reduced to such psychological nominals as 
'subjective, objective and general' - and these are not valid outlines of the 
three categories. 

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, December 02, 2015 5:29 PM
  Subject: [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic 
relations


  Hi Clark, lists,


  You wrote:


  "I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where 
structures                             (120215-1)
  are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself 
without relations."


  (1)  It seems that everybody, including you, John (and myself until 
recently), assumes that there is only one way to distribute the Peircean 
categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three worlds of 
Burgin, denoted as S (World of Structures), P (Physical world),and M (Mental 
world).  Let me designate such a view as the 1-to-1 view, according to which 
only one of the 6 possibilities shown in Table 1 is true and the rest are not.  
The alternative view would be that more than one of the 6 possibilities listed 
in Table 1 can be true, depending on context. I will refer to this view as the 
"1-to-many" view.  




        Table 1.  Non-deterministic relation between triadic model of the 
worlds and Peircean categories.
       
        Possibilities
       Firstness
       Secondness
       Thirdness
        Context or Field of Studies
       
        1
       S*
       P
       M
       ?
       
        2
       S
       M
       P
       ?
       
        3
       P
       S
       M
       ?
       
        4
       P
       M
       S
       ?
       
        5
       M
       S
       P
       ?
       
        6
       M
       P
       S
       ?
       



  *S = World of structures
    P = Physical world
    M = Mental world



  (2)  It may be necessary to invoke at least two kinds of "structures" -- (i) 
"mental structures", i.e, those structures in the world whose existence depends 
on the human mind (through discovery, creativity, and production), and (ii) 
"real structures" that can exist independent of human mind.  The S in 
Possibility 1 and 2 above are of the first kind (i.e., real structures) and the 
S  in Possibilities 4 and 6 are of the second kind (i.e., mental structures).  


  (3)  Even with my very limited reading of Peirce, I can recognize that Table 
1 is consistent with the basic tenet of the Peircean semiotics that all signs 
(including S, P and M in Table 1) have in each the three basic aspects of 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, although each of the 6 possibilites shown 
in Table 1 PRESCINDS different aspect of each sign.  For example, Possibility 1 
rescinds the Firstness aspect of S, the Secondness aspect of P, and the 
Thirdness aspect of M.  In contrast, Possibility 6 prescinds the Firstness 
aspect of M, the Secondness aspect of P and the Thirdness aspect of S, etc.    




  If (2) and (3) are right, the 1-to-many view described in (1) would be 
validated.



  All the best.



  Sung 






  On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:



      On Dec 1, 2015, at 7:16 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:


      (1)  I agree with you on the definition of these categories of Peirce. 
      We seem to disagree on how to assign these categories to the three worlds 
of Burgin and the three roses of Scotus.


    I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where 
structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in 
itself without relations.


    You seem to be using firstness due to invariant and thus structures. But I 
don’t see how that works. Being invariant is not the same as being unrelated.


    -----------------------------
    PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with 
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .











  -- 

  Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

  Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
  Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
  Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
  Rutgers University
  Piscataway, N.J. 08855
  732-445-4701

  www.conformon.net
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to