Sung, your comment doesn't make any sense. Because Peirce's three categories
don't correlate to the three worlds of Burgin and Popper [both of whom are
excellent scholars] , doesn't mean that Peircean theory doesn't have anything
to do with modern natural sciences or with information science!!!!
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Sungchul Ji
To: PEIRCE-L
Sent: Wednesday, December 02, 2015 8:35 PM
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and
triadic relations
Edwina, Clark, John, lists
You wrote:
"Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - and
neither, (120215-1)
in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories."
If Statement (120215-1) is right, then Peirce (as represneted by E. Taborsky)
would have nothing to do with modern natural sciences (as represented by Popper
and Penrose) or with information science (as represented by Burgin), which is
hard to believe.
All the best.
Sung
On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
I guess I must be 'nobody', since I don't see any way at all to 'distribute
the Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three
worlds of Burgin".
Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds -
and neither, in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories. It
takes a huge stretch to make such a claim, and if one does so, the essential
identity of the Peircean categories and their full semiosic interactive
operation, is totally lost and one is reduced to such psychological nominals as
'subjective, objective and general' - and these are not valid outlines of the
three categories.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Sungchul Ji
To: PEIRCE-L
Sent: Wednesday, December 02, 2015 5:29 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and
triadic relations
Hi Clark, lists,
You wrote:
"I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where
structures (120215-1)
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself
without relations."
(1) It seems that everybody, including you, John (and myself until
recently), assumes that there is only one way to distribute the Peircean
categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three worlds of
Burgin, denoted as S (World of Structures), P (Physical world),and M (Mental
world). Let me designate such a view as the 1-to-1 view, according to which
only one of the 6 possibilities shown in Table 1 is true and the rest are not.
The alternative view would be that more than one of the 6 possibilities listed
in Table 1 can be true, depending on context. I will refer to this view as the
"1-to-many" view.
Table 1. Non-deterministic relation between triadic model of the
worlds and Peircean categories.
Possibilities
Firstness
Secondness
Thirdness
Context or Field of Studies
1
S*
P
M
?
2
S
M
P
?
3
P
S
M
?
4
P
M
S
?
5
M
S
P
?
6
M
P
S
?
*S = World of structures
P = Physical world
M = Mental world
(2) It may be necessary to invoke at least two kinds of "structures" --
(i) "mental structures", i.e, those structures in the world whose existence
depends on the human mind (through discovery, creativity, and production), and
(ii) "real structures" that can exist independent of human mind. The S in
Possibility 1 and 2 above are of the first kind (i.e., real structures) and the
S in Possibilities 4 and 6 are of the second kind (i.e., mental structures).
(3) Even with my very limited reading of Peirce, I can recognize that
Table 1 is consistent with the basic tenet of the Peircean semiotics that all
signs (including S, P and M in Table 1) have in each the three basic aspects of
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, although each of the 6 possibilites shown
in Table 1 PRESCINDS different aspect of each sign. For example, Possibility 1
rescinds the Firstness aspect of S, the Secondness aspect of P, and the
Thirdness aspect of M. In contrast, Possibility 6 prescinds the Firstness
aspect of M, the Secondness aspect of P and the Thirdness aspect of S, etc.
If (2) and (3) are right, the 1-to-many view described in (1) would be
validated.
All the best.
Sung
On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
On Dec 1, 2015, at 7:16 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
(1) I agree with you on the definition of these categories of
Peirce.
We seem to disagree on how to assign these categories to the three
worlds of Burgin and the three roses of Scotus.
I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where
structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in
itself without relations.
You seem to be using firstness due to invariant and thus structures.
But I don’t see how that works. Being invariant is not the same as being
unrelated.
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Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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