Hi Ben,
Imagine Kepler having access to many A’s. That is, A’, A’’, A’’’, A’’’’, etc… These multiple hypotheses are all intended to be different in kind, with the intention of matching a representation for observation C. If you deduce the products of these different hypotheses and compare the solutions to actual orbits, i.e., use induction to select the best among multiple hypotheses, then you are adopting a new rule, that is, the rule that is associated with hypotheses A that makes it better than all other A’’’’s. Moreover, there will be further testing, and if the test is of nature, then you ought to expect that the hypothesis will grow, that is, it will have wings and you will learn more and more. “All there is to thinking,” he said, “is seeing something noticeable which makes you see something you weren’t noticing which makes you see something that isn’t even visible.” Norman Maclean, A River Runs Through It. “…an idea is situated in the context of thought exactly as is its object in the context of reality. Therefore, if there were something in Nature having no interrelation with other things, and if there were also granted its objective essence (which must agree entirely with its formal essence), then this idea likewise would have no interrelation with other ideas; that is, we could make no inference regarding it. On the other hand, those things that do have interrelation with other things – as is the case with everything that exists in Nature – will be intelligible, and their objective essences will also have that same interrelation; that is, other ideas will be deduced from them, and these in turn will be interrelated with other ideas, and so the tools for further progress will increase.” ~Spinoza If you're looking for an example, try phi spiral abduction. We provide contrasts for naming C and contrasts for selecting the best A and give a reason for why this pair is *good*. It's also important to remember that prior to our examination, there was no prescription for future action. That is, we adopt a new rule to subdue a dormant investigation. The truth is in the future, that is, there is not yet a clear conclusion. Hth, Jerry Rhee On Thu, Apr 28, 2016 at 6:07 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, > > ha! Thank you for your honest and clear input. I submit that if you were > to accept that supposition (that is, if you adopt that rule of "one two > three" as true), you will find that it will lead you to acceptance of the > truth. That is, if not this, which? Two? > > one, two, three...chance, law, habit-taking. > > Best, > Jerry Rhee > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 28, 2016 at 2:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Jerry R., List: >> >> You apparently find the absence of the letter B in CP 5.189 very >> surprising--thus demanding of an explanation--and suspect (i.e., >> hypothesize) that this was a quite deliberate omission by Peirce, such that >> there must be some deeply meaningful reason behind it. You even go so far >> as to claim that otherwise, the use of (C and A) rather than (B and A) was >> somehow a "blunder" on Peirce's part. You also invoke "the importance of >> triadic thought in Peirce's philosophy," converting it into a rigid >> maxim--"if no three, no Peirce." As you seem to have anticipated, I remain >> unconvinced. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Apr 28, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Jon, >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes, it is odd that I should cite something I haven’t read carefully. My >>> explanation is that I recognized the general structure of his argument and >>> am occupied by other matters. Moreover, I don’t believe you would >>> accept the reference as the “burst-like” reason you seek to transform your >>> belief. Those are not the type of reasons one accepts for such matters. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> As per “Wirth explicitly introduces "the background-presupposition B" >>> as his own suggestion”, >>> >>> Yes, that's right. But if one doesn’t introduce it by chance, then who >>> has the right to do that? Only Peirce? I mean, if one is not allowed >>> to introduce new ideas in abduction, when *is* one allowed or is it the >>> case that it is never allowed? >>> >>> >>> >>> As per “He goes on to assert that "The 'surprising fact' is the >>> incoherent relation between C and B"--which actually contradicts CP >>> 5.189, where the surprising fact is C itself.” >>> >>> How is a fact ever surprising in itself? >>> >>> For example, the fact that B is missing is surprising to me because of >>> the body of Peirce’s work. >>> >>> The fact that B is missing is not surprising to you because it’s simply >>> not even recognized by you. That is, (C and A) is equivalent to (B and >>> A) or even (Z and A). >>> >>> Besides, the more correct statement is “the surprising fact C is >>> *observed*”, which cannot mean that it is observed by no one because >>> something is not observed in itself. >>> >>> >>> >>> As per “If anything, B simply explains WHY the fact C is surprising; it >>> is the prior belief that is falsified by the observation of C, prompting >>> the struggle to formulate an alternative hypothesis A” >>> >>> Yes, that’s right. But what is the structure of a why-explanation >>> other than what you just said? That is, B becomes necessary. You need >>> the surprise because it contradicts a prior expectation that motivates a >>> search for some hypothesis that resolves the wonder (c.f., NA). Not >>> all hypotheses A qualifies because if you ask me “why no B?”, you won’t >>> accept simply any answer and will continue to ask “Why no B?” until you’re >>> satisfied by a statement that is closest to: “I, Charles Sanders Peirce, >>> mean to point out that B is the reader, or at least the interpretant for a >>> community of inquirers who are fated to share the same opinion” (CP 9.112). >>> There is no CP 9, of course, or did I need to state that explicitly? >>> >>> >>> >>> As per “For the beans example, B is evidently something like "these >>> beans are from bags that contain only non-white beans," which--as a >>> background-presupposition--would obviously make it surprising to observe >>> that "these beans are white." >>> >>> Yes, that’s right but B gets transformed in the process because >>> “suspect”. However, you make an important point. It’s hard (not >>> natural) for me to imagine why these should be beans that I ought to expect >>> to be from a bag of non-white beans. This is one reason why I dislike >>> the beans example. However, I get that a major reason for beans and >>> bags is the convenience with which to experiment with syllogistic >>> structure. >>> >>> >>> >>> As per “In any case, B is still not included anywhere WITHIN the form >>> of inference for abduction in CP 5.189 or the corresponding (deductive) >>> syllogism that Peirce invokes elsewhere.” >>> >>> Yes, that’s right. But this is why I asked you about the importance of >>> triadic thought in Peirce’s philosophy and in philosophy in general. If >>> you understood this, you wouldn’t even bother to ask this question. That >>> is, if no three, no Peirce. >>> >>> >>> >>> Moreover, here is where I would invoke Strauss’ account of the >>> difference between exoteric/esoteric writing. The reason I give for >>> missing B is an assertion that Peirce’s intention is driven by his desire >>> to teach “obscure matters, i.e., of making them understood, and to the >>> requirements of speaking, or writing, of such matters. The >>> contradictions caused by the former are bound to be known to the teacher >>> (provided he did not make them deliberately), and they escape the pupil >>> until he has reached an advanced stage of training; that is to say, they >>> certainly escape the vulgar... >>> >>> >>> >>> …The context in which a statement occurs, and the literary character of >>> the whole work as well as its plan must be perfectly understood before an >>> interpretation of the statement can reasonably claim to be adequate or even >>> correct. One is not entitled to delete a passage, nor to emend its >>> text, before one has fully considered all reasonable possibilities of >>> understanding the passage as it stands- one of these possibilities being >>> that the passage may be ironic. If a master of the art of writing >>> commits such blunders as would shame an intelligent high school boy, it is >>> reasonable to assume that they are intentional, especially if the author >>> discusses, however incidentally, the possibility of intentional blunders in >>> writing.”~Strauss >>> >>> >>> >>> The blunder here is (C and A) and not (B and A). Strauss goes on to >>> describe the expectation that such views will create conflict between >>> traditionalists, who operate with the expectation that proof is only in >>> explicit, literal meanings of whatever is contained within the immediate >>> text itself, and “higher critics” who seek a different unity based on the >>> entire oeuvre of the philosopher. But this basically creates a >>> different question. What is Peirce’s intentionality for CP 5.189, the >>> form abduction *ought* to take, and are there clues as to why no B >>> elsewhere? >>> >>> >>> >>> Is this evidence? >>> >>> “A *sign* is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its >>> *interpretant* sign, determined or created by it, into the same sort of >>> correspondence (or a lower implied sort) with something, *C*, its >>> *object*, as that in which itself stands to *C*. >>> >>> >>> >>> A *sign* is a thing which serves to convey knowledge of some other >>> thing, which it is said to *stand for* or *represent*. This thing is >>> called the *object* of the sign; the idea in the mind that the sign >>> excites, which is a mental sign of the same object, is called an >>> *interpretant* of the sign. >>> >>> >>> >>> …a sign has, as such, *three references*: 1st, it is a sign *to* some >>> thought which *interprets* it; 2d, it is a *sign* *for* some object to >>> which in that thought it is equivalent; 3d, it is a sign, *in* some >>> respect or quality, which brings it into connection with its *object*.” >>> >>> >>> >>> That is, one, two, three...object, sign, interpretant...C, A, B...icon, >>> index, symbol... >>> >>> Spiritedness over desire as ally of reason is on the way to a >>> well-ordered soul. >>> >>> >>> Hth, >>> >>> Jerry Rhee >>> >>> On Thu, Apr 28, 2016 at 10:11 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Jerry R., List: >>>> >>>> It seems odd to cite something that you admit not having read >>>> carefully. Here is the relevant passage. >>>> >>>> "The supposition that the antecedent A could come to the conclusion C >>>> is nothing but a suspicion, due to the incoherence of an expectation or the >>>> inconsistency of a belief. Therefore, I would like to suggest that we >>>> should represent these background-presuppositions by introducing 'B' to >>>> Peirce´s formula. The 'surprising fact' C is caused by disappointing the >>>> background-presupposition B." >>>> >>>> Wirth explicitly introduces "the background-presupposition B" as his >>>> own suggestion, not something that he found anywhere in Peirce's writings. >>>> He goes on to assert that "The 'surprising fact' is the incoherent >>>> relation between C and B"--which actually contradicts CP 5.189, where the >>>> surprising fact is C itself. If anything, B simply explains WHY the fact C >>>> is surprising; it is the prior belief that is falsified by the observation >>>> of C, prompting the struggle to formulate an alternative hypothesis A. For >>>> the beans example, B is evidently something like "these beans are >>>> from bags that contain only non-white beans," which--as a >>>> background-presupposition--would obviously make it surprising to observe >>>> that "these beans are white." >>>> >>>> In any case, B is still not included anywhere WITHIN the form of >>>> inference for abduction in CP 5.189 or the corresponding (deductive) >>>> syllogism that Peirce invokes elsewhere. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 10:13 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon, >>>>> >>>>> Uwe Wirth's essay relates to ours. I don't agree with everything he >>>>> says (and have not read it carefully) but there are overlapping themes, >>>>> such as an explicit account of B as "background-presupposition". >>>>> >>>>> http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/p-abdwir.htm >>>>> >>>>> Where do you suppose he came up with that or do you suppose Peirce >>>>> actually talked about B in other parts of his work but simply silent with >>>>> regards CP 5.189? >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Jerry R >>>>> >>>> >> >
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