Gary R., List:
GR: At the moment I am imagining that they might have a rather direct
bearing on the psychology of inquiry ("a feeling of surprise;" "a feeling
of satisfaction").
Does "feeling," understood in this context as a manifestation of
Firstness, entail psychology? Of course, Peirce was very concerned about
NOT grounding any aspect of logic in psychology or any other special
science.
I am also wondering if there is a parallel way to describe deduction.
Maybe something along these lines?
The middle phase of inquiry is deduction, which occurs when a proposed
belief-habit (3ns) is NOT confounded by any acts of imagination (2ns),
which produces a feeling of suspicion (1ns).
I am not entirely satisfied with this yet, but the idea is that the
initial "testing" is virtual, rather than actual; e.g., manipulation of
diagrams and observation of the results. The Secondness aspect is thus an
"inward clash," rather than the "Outward Clash" as described by Peirce,
which pertains to the induction phase. Suspicion here alludes to CP
5.189--"Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true."
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 12:03 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Jon S wrote:
>
> "The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief."
> (CP 5.374)
>
> The first phase of inquiry is abduction, which begins when an established
> habit of expectation (3ns) is confounded by an act of observation (2ns),
> which produces a feeling of surprise (1ns).
>
> The last phase of inquiry is induction, which concludes when a new
> belief-habit (3ns) is NOT confounded by any acts of observation (2ns),
> which produces a feeling of satisfaction (1ns).
>
>
> Jon, I like your formulations very much and agree with the associated
> categories you've provided. I think they clearly express these "phases of
> inquiry," pointing to, imo, something slightly different, perhaps something
> deeper in the logic of inquiry than the simple inversions of the deductive
> syllogism Peirce offers at CP 2.623 (which I still see as valid).
>
> At the moment I am imagining that they might have a rather direct bearing
> on the psychology of inquiry ("a feeling of surprise;" "a feeling of
> satisfaction").
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
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