Stephen Rose, List ~ "Dissatisfaction (or bemused acceptance) comes when things established (habits) are somehow not able to get the job done. Resolving that is among the gifts of conscious thinking."
The habit-signs (3ns) of an object must reflect its quality/endowment-signs and feelings-signs (1ns), or the object is not optimizing. That, in turn, will stimulate equilibrating changes in the object (1ns) and/or in its behavior (3ns). This is not simply the result of conscious thinking. Everything behaves that way in a Pragmatic universe. Regards, Tom Wyrick On May 23, 2016, at 9:49 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: Dissatisfaction (or bemused acceptance) comes when things established (habits) are somehow not able to get the job done. Resolving that is among the gifts of conscious thinking. But there are many other gifts as well. ᐧ Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU > On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 8:58 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, > > > > Replies to your replies inserted. > > > > Gary f. > > > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > Sent: 20-May-16 20:05 > > > Gary F., List: > > Gf: Now I’m seeing the limitations of your hypothesis that ALL human endeavor > is rooted in dissatisfaction. It seems to ignore more positive motivations > such as curiosity, participation and playfulness in all its forms. The quest > for knowledge can be much more than an escape from a state of dissatisfaction. > > Js: Although I mainly had in mind the irritation of (genuine) doubt, it seems > to me that curiosity, participation, and playfulness can all be understood as > forms of dissatisfaction. The quest for knowledge would cease altogether if > everyone were truly satisfied with the current state of their knowledge. > > Gf: Are you claiming that everyone has to be aware enough of “the current > state of their knowledge” to make such a judgment on it before undertaking > any investigation? The fact that curiosity etc. can be understood as forms of > dissatisfaction doesn’t imply that any feeling of dissatisfaction necessarily > enters into the actual process. I doubt that all explorers are so > introspective. > > Gf: But discovery of principles in nature — including the nature of conscious > purposes as a specialized subset of final causes, or natural purposes — is, > for any philosopher, ethically privileged over manipulation of any kind, > because self-control depends on it. > > Js: I am not sure that I follow this. How does self-control depend on the > discovery of principles in nature? > > Gf: This is such an essential part of Peirce’s critical common-sensism and > pragmaticism that I hardly know where to begin. How can you exercise any > control over your actions if you have no idea of their predictable > consequences? Where can you get such ideas except by learning from experience > about principles of causality in nature, and intentionality in human nature? > (Human nature is a part of nature, not apart from it.) > > > Js: Where and how do we draw the line between what is "natural" and what is > "artificial"--i.e., the result of human manipulation? > > Gf: The answer to that would vary with the contextual situation, and I don’t > see the relevance of the question in this context. My whole point is that > there is no definite division between natural and conscious purposes; > purposefulness, which Peirce calls Thought (or Thirdness), is a continuum > including everything from natural tendencies to conscious decision-making and > adoption of ideals of conduct. Manipulation, like all conduct, is always done > for some purpose; ethics is a matter of becoming conscious of what those > purposes are, to the extent that one can judge some end (as well as some > means to an end) to be better than another. So your next question makes no > sense to me either: > > Js: Why should "natural" purposes always be "ethically privileged" over human > purposes? > > Gf: Since I didn’t say that, I might as well just quote Peirce on the > development of conscious purposes in humans: > > > > [[[ To return to self-control, which I can but slightly sketch, at this time, > of course there are inhibitions and coördinations that entirely escape > consciousness. There are, in the next place, modes of self-control which seem > quite instinctive. Next, there is a kind of self-control which results from > training. Next, a man can be his own training-master and thus control his > self-control. When this point is reached much or all the training may be > conducted in imagination. When a man trains himself, thus controlling > control, he must have some moral rule in view, however special and irrational > it may be. But next he may undertake to improve this rule; that is, to > exercise a control over his control of control. To do this he must have in > view something higher than an irrational rule. He must have some sort of > moral principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by reference to an esthetic > ideal of what is fine. There are certainly more grades than I have > enumerated. Perhaps their number is indefinite. The brutes are certainly > capable of more than one grade of control; but it seems to me that our > superiority to them is more due to our greater number of grades of > self-control than it is to our versatility. ]]] CP 5.533 > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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