Gary F., Jon A.S., list,
I'm not sure why an argument has developed over whether human activity
proceeds from dissatisfaction or positive desire, etc. Usually we regard
those as various ways of talking about the same multifaceted phenomena.
A desire for something implies dissatisfaction with what one has, and
indeed can make one feel dissatisfied with one's lacks more than one
would otherwise be. "Want" originally meant "lack."
Desire - pangs (pains), frustration, etc. Pangs of physical hunger can
be physically painful.
Hope - annoyed or angry impatience.
Pleasure - distaste for imminent interference, something that can
feasibly get in the way.
Attachment - fear at the prospect of loss of that to which one is
attached. (E.g., parents' fears for their offspring.)
I wouldn't get too concerned about the emphasis on positive or negative
unless somebody comes along and says,
"Bite your tongue. Get a cinder in your eye. When you feel good you feel
nothing."
I had a friend who used to quote that with dramatic sternness and it
annoyed me not only because I thought it was stupidly glib, but because
I knew that he didn't believe it for a moment. He was more talkative in
more detail about positive pleasures than anybody I ever knew. I just
looked the quote up and found that it's widely attributed to Buckminster
Fuller.
It is possible do overdo the positive or negative emphasis. It's
interesting that Socrates sometimes argued in terms of practical
implications, oftenest practically implied conflicts of values,
unintended or unexpected bad consequences, etc. So Socrates's arguments
often have an admonitory cast. Peirce however also looks for practically
implied benefits and advantages that one might have overlooked.
On another note, the argument about the relative value of theory versus
practice, or of theoretical knowledge versus practical knowledge, or of
manipulation versus self-control, is unclear to me. I don't think it's
enough to say that one is needed for the other. They're all needed for
each other.
Best, Ben
On 5/23/2016 8:58 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Jon,
Replies to your replies inserted.
Gary f.
*From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* 20-May-16 20:05
Gary F., List:
Gf: Now I’m seeing the limitations of your hypothesis that ALL human
endeavor is rooted in dissatisfaction. It seems to ignore more
positive motivations such as curiosity, participation and playfulness
in all its forms. The quest for knowledge can be much more than an
escape from a state of dissatisfaction.
Js: Although I mainly had in mind the irritation of (genuine)
doubt, it seems to me that curiosity, participation, and
playfulness can all be understood as forms of dissatisfaction. The
quest for knowledge would cease altogether if everyone were
truly satisfied with the current state of their knowledge.
Gf: Are you claiming that everyone has to be aware enough of “the
current state of their knowledge” to make such a judgment on it before
undertaking any investigation? The fact that curiosity etc. /can be
understood/ as forms of dissatisfaction doesn’t imply that any feeling
of dissatisfaction necessarily enters into the actual process. I doubt
that all explorers are so introspective.
Gf: But discovery of principles /in nature/ — including the nature of
conscious purposes as a specialized subset of final causes, or
natural purposes — is, for any philosopher, ethically privileged over
manipulation of any kind, because self-control depends on it.
Js: I am not sure that I follow this. How does self-control depend on
the discovery of principles in nature?
Gf: This is such an essential part of Peirce’s critical common-sensism
and pragmaticism that I hardly know where to begin. How can you
exercise any control over your actions if you have no idea of their
predictable consequences? Where can you get such ideas except by
learning from experience about principles of causality in nature, and
intentionality in human nature? (Human nature is a part of nature, not
apart from it.)
Js: Where and how do we draw the line between what is "natural" and
what is "artificial"--i.e., the result of human manipulation?
Gf: The answer to that would vary with the contextual situation, and I
don’t see the relevance of the question in this context. My whole
point is that there *is no* definite division between natural and
conscious purposes; purposefulness, which Peirce calls Thought (or
Thirdness), is a continuum including everything from natural
tendencies to conscious decision-making and adoption of ideals of
conduct. Manipulation, like all conduct, is always done for /some/
purpose; ethics is a matter of becoming conscious of what those
purposes are, to the extent that one can judge some end (as well as
some means to an end) to be better than another. So your next question
makes no sense to me either:
Js: Why should "natural" purposes always be "ethically privileged"
over human purposes?
Gf: Since I didn’t say that, I might as well just quote Peirce on the
development of conscious purposes in humans:
[[[ To return to self-control, which I can but slightly sketch, at
this time, of course there are inhibitions and coördinations that
entirely escape consciousness. There are, in the next place, modes of
self-control which seem quite instinctive. Next, there is a kind of
self-control which results from training. Next, a man can be his own
training-master and thus control his self-control. When this point is
reached much or all the training may be conducted in imagination. When
a man trains himself, thus controlling control, he must have some
moral rule in view, however special and irrational it may be. But next
he may undertake to improve this rule; that is, to exercise a control
over his control of control. To do this he must have in view something
higher than an irrational rule. He must have some sort of moral
principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by reference to an
esthetic ideal of what is fine. There are certainly more grades than I
have enumerated. Perhaps their number is indefinite. The brutes are
certainly capable of more than one grade of control; but it seems to
me that our superiority to them is more due to our greater number of
grades of self-control than it is to our versatility. ]]] CP 5.533
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