Gary f and list,
You said, “Critical consideration of ends is what ethics is all about” That’s not correct. Critical consideration of ends is the business of esthetics. Ethics follows esthetics. “Spiritedness faces justice and desire faces beauty.” “611. What does right reasoning consist in? It consists in such reasoning as shall be conducive to our ultimate aim. What, then, is our ultimate aim? Perhaps it is not necessary that the logician should answer this question. Perhaps it might be possible to deduce the correct rules of reasoning from the mere assumption that we have some ultimate aim. But I cannot see how this could be done. If we had, for example, no other aim than the pleasure of the moment, we should fall back into the same absence of any logic that the fallacious argument would lead to. We should have no ideal of reasoning, and consequently no norm. It seems to me that the logician ought to recognize what our ultimate aim is. It would seem to be the business of the moralist to find this out, and that the logician has to accept the teaching of ethics in this regard. But the moralist, as far as I can make it out, merely tells us that we have a power of self-control, that no narrow or selfish aim can ever prove satisfactory, that the only satisfactory aim is the broadest, highest, and most general possible aim; and for any more definite information, as I conceive the matter, he has to refer us to the esthetician, whose business it is to say what is the state of things which is most admirable in itself regardless of any ulterior reason. 612. So, then, we appeal to the esthete to tell us what it is that is admirable without any reason for being admirable beyond its inherent character.Why, that, he replies, is the beautiful. Yes, we urge, such is the name that you give to it, but what* is it?* What is this character?... Best, Jerry Rhee On Tue, May 24, 2016 at 3:20 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, Ben, list, > > > > Js: I did not say anything about a particular *feeling* of > dissatisfaction, only that we engage in inquiry when we *are* > dissatisfied with our current knowledge; i.e., when we experience the > irritation of (genuine) doubt. > > gf: OK, I guess we have a case of polyversity here. To me, “experiencing > the irritation” of doubt IS a “particular *feeling* of dissatisfaction.” > My point was that if you classify even something like playfulness as “a > form of dissatisfaction,” “its being so consists merely in our so regarding > it” (Peirce, MS 293). > > > > Js: You said before that "discovery of principles *in nature* ... is, for > any philosopher, ethically privileged over manipulation of any kind." > Isn't this a judgment that one particular end is better than *any* other? > > Gf: No. Principles of nature, i.e. legisigns, are the ends which govern > means. Critical consideration of ends is what ethics is all about, not > knowledge of means to any taken-for-granted end (whether those means are > technological or not). That’s what I meant by “ethically privileged.” > > > > Anyway, as I tried to say awhile back, when we look at the semiotic or > meaning cycle as a whole, theory and practice take turns, and there’s no > way of determining which comes first in a cycle. But then, as Peirce says, > “of these two movements, logic very properly prefers to take that of Theory > as the primary one (EP2:304-5). > > > > Gary f. > > > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 23-May-16 13:35 > > > > Gary F., List: > > Gf: Are you claiming that everyone has to be aware enough of “the current > state of their knowledge” to make such a judgment on it before undertaking > any investigation? The fact that curiosity etc. *can be understood* as > forms of dissatisfaction doesn’t imply that any feeling of dissatisfaction > necessarily enters into the actual process. I doubt that all explorers are > so introspective. > > My point was that we are unlikely to undertake an investigation of > something that we already know, or at least *believe* that we already > know. I did not say anything about a particular *feeling* of > dissatisfaction, only that we engage in inquiry when we *are* > dissatisfied with our current knowledge; i.e., when we experience the > irritation of (genuine) doubt. > > Gf: This is such an essential part of Peirce’s critical common-sensism and > pragmaticism that I hardly know where to begin. How can you exercise any > control over your actions if you have no idea of their predictable > consequences? Where can you get such ideas except by learning from > experience about principles of causality in nature, and intentionality in > human nature? (Human nature is a part of nature, not apart from it.) > > Now I see what you meant, thanks for clarifying. > > Gf: My whole point is that there *is no* definite division between > natural and conscious purposes; purposefulness, which Peirce calls Thought > (or Thirdness), is a continuum including everything from natural tendencies > to conscious decision-making and adoption of ideals of conduct. > Manipulation, like all conduct, is always done for *some* purpose; ethics > is a matter of becoming conscious of what those purposes are, to the extent > that one can judge some end (as well as some means to an end) to be better > than another. > > You said before that "discovery of principles *in nature* ... is, for any > philosopher, ethically privileged over manipulation of any kind." Isn't > this a judgment that one particular end is better than *any* other? Is > the warrant for this perhaps the notion that achieving this end is a > prerequisite to properly evaluating all other possible ends? Even if so, > don't we have to know *how* to go about discovering principles in nature > before we can proceed with doing so--or else learn how to do so *by* > doing so (i.e., trial and error)? If mathematics is the practice of > *necessary* reasoning, for which *deductive* logic is the theory, then > what is the practice of *creative* reasoning, for which *abductive* > logic is the theory? > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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