Ben, Jerry, list, Ben, i also like to thank you. This is exactly what i was speaking about.
Best, Stefan Am 20. Juli 2016 22:46:54 MESZ, schrieb Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>: >Ben, Stefan, list: > > > >Ben, thank you for that really great contribution. I must keep it for >my >records. > >Among other things, I recognized in it many ideas embedded in Plato’s >fingers example (cf., 523c-525a), which interestingly, focuses on the >sense >of sight. > > > >The other matter is regarding the beautiful as opposed to *the >Beautiful*. If >it is a matter of esthethics, do you think we can come to agreement on >a >notion of the *best* as a social principle? It appears we do, more or >less. For example, Lebron James is currently the best basketball >player…unless it’s Steph Curry. But Lebron is bigger and plays better >defense…but Curry is a better shooter and dribbler. Cavs won the >championship. Warriors won last year. Still, it is either Curry or >James >but not Thompson, or Smith… So, if not Curry or James, which, and for >what >reason? > > > >Can we not apply this type of reasoning to the question of *the best* >scientific >method or does it devolve into something like what is the best meal? >For >certainly, taste is of such an individual nature and there are such >different tastes, there is no good reason to pursue an idea of the best >meal...or "the best scientific method". If it devolves, then all >potential >benefits that come from considering the low with respect to the high >disintegrates. There is no longer a good way of persuading others of >how >to judge goodness of qualities. > > > >I think this is where the *divine* is useful. Many things are >beautiful >but not all beautiful things are divine. Many log spirals are >beautiful >but the phi spiral is divine. Why divine? *Because by their fruits ye >shall know them. *In other words, Nature provides a “solid ground of >fact” >where we have strong/weak assurances that we need not shift our footing >while "walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold >for >the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way. (EP 2:55)” >Recognition of revelation as true opinion will depend on whether strong >or >weak and piety. The divine serves as the object of piety. Ethics >follows >esthetics. > > > >One, two, three…Beauty, Goodness, Truth….Feeling, Reaction, >Thought…esthetics, ethics, logic….spiritedness, desire, reason…sophist, >statesman, philosopher. > > > >As for how esthetics might be pleasing to our consciousness, perhaps >the >answer has to do with constructing a well-ordered soul because not only >is >that just, it is also happy. > > > >“A man is just if the rational part of his soul is wise and rules and >if >the spirited part, being the subject and ally of the rational part, >assists >it in controlling the multitude of desires…This means however that only >the >man in whom reason properly cultivated rules the two other parts >properly >cultivated, i.e. only the wise man, can be truly just (cf. 442c); the >soul >cannot be healthy if one of its parts…is atrophied. No wonder then that >the >just man eventually proves to be identical with the philosopher. “ > >~Strauss, City and Man > >______________ > > > >One other thing: > >You said, “The spiral enters through the senses as an esthetic image of >a >natural material, nature promises definite [I would amend this to >*infinite* >--BenN) interrelations that can be made intelligible through use and >development “ > > > >I’m so glad you amended it, though I respectfully disagree (more or >less)! I believe this is the central distinction in Dewey and Peirce’s >ideas on convergence to truth. Phi spirals on mouse corneas occupy an >~500um field. One question is whether at the infinite limit, a >community >of inquirers can ever solve this issue to satisfaction or whether the >symbol will continue to grow, whether there will remain interrelations >that >require solving. > > >For this situation to even be worthy of consideration to speak on >convergence, we have to admit the argument as a representative >argument. That is, we need to agree at the outset that this example >sensibly captures the essence that is implied of the Dewey/Peirce >distinction on Truth. It is possible that we can never give an exact >solution to this situation but find that exactness is not desirable >because >of social principles. That is, we might simply get bored after we deem >no >more information is worth having; that we have reached the limit of >measurement and construction. > > > >With best wishes, >Jerry Rhee > > > >On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 11:58 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > >> (Sorry, I accidentally sent that last post while still working on it. >So >> take it in terms of working out ideas and forgive me for not having a >> finished thought) >> >> >> On Jul 19, 2016, at 6:02 PM, sb <peirc...@semiotikon.de> wrote: >> >> "It is a particular interesting thing, how scholars, who dedicate >their >> whole lifes to the separating of fiction from fact, are unable to >separate >> their own dreams about science from the true form of science." >> >> >> I think this is as true of philosophers as it is of scientists. As I >> mentioned in that last (unfinished) post I think there’s often a bit >too >> much arm chair philosophizing by philosophers of science at times. >Likewise >> I think some don’t take into appreciation the differences in practice >> between different fields or subfields. >> >> That said, I also think it undeniable some scientists write on the >subject >> without bothering to read up on arguments already made. i.e. a strong >> ignorance of literature on the subject. This is especially true of >> prominent scientists entering into the field of popularizing science >> literature. >> >> I’ve come over time to find arguments over method as far less >interesting >> than arguments over metaphysical implications of particular theories >- >> especially in theoretical physics. Things such as the nature of time >in >> light of general relativity and string theory. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in >the >> BODY of the message. More at >http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> . >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Diese Nachricht wurde von meinem Android-Mobiltelefon mit K-9 Mail gesendet.
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