Clark, list:
I think your recognition of the polysemic nature of terminologies when
discussing the Existence of God/Reality of God problem is very important.
In fact, I’m not sure if *any* person is capable of talking about this
consistently without external help.
Moreover, in terms of using Peirce to get beyond our current situation- one
that is well described and treated in the Fixation of Belief- just goes to
show how much winning an argument prevails over desire for clarification.
The scientific habit of mind is not something one adopts simply because
they hear about it.
I’ve not read Kant but he also speaks on the existence of God problem and
gives an account that brings into conversation the various necessary terms;
God, Being, existence, absolute, predicate, subject, etc…
For example from SEP:
“Clearly, the ontological argument is designed to show that, in fact, there
*is* one (and only one) candidate answering to this idea, namely, the *ens
realissimum*. But it does so by deducing the necessary existence from the
concept of the *ens realissimum* (a being that contains all reality or
predicates) only via the minor premise that “existence” is a predicate or
reality.”
Here is my attempt to clarify using Peirce’s normative structure.
I would appreciate if you or anyone else will improve on it:
C = *ens originarium*
A = *ens realissimum*
B= *ens necessarium*
One: *summum bonum*
My point here is to simply demonstrate that this is not Peirce’s problem.
It is a problem for philosophy (with constraints, common themes and
patterns that have previously been identified and discussed). To think we
can identify the best themes (physico-thelogical proof of God's existence?)
or understand it without getting out of Peirce is hubris or simply not
smart. Still, I understand this is a Peirce list and he was a prodigious
writer, has an inherently coherent system and hard enough to understand in
its own.
Best,
Jerry Rhee
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 4:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Jon, list
>
> My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of
> reality.
>
> i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind
> is not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the
> three categorical actions of the actions of Mind - but the two are not
> identical.
>
> Edwina
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 5:19 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: Now - you are diverting from your original criticism above of my
> reference by talking about it instead as 'analysis'. Why didn't you state
> that originally rather than reject the 'very paper' as 'too nominalistic'.
>
>
> You did not use the word "analysis" originally, and I did not mean to
> imply that the entire paper should be rejected out of hand as "too
> nominalistic." My apologies for being unclear about that; my intended
> point was simply that Peirce in 1892 considered his views in 1868 to be
> "too nominalistic," which implies that his views became even *less
> *nominalistic
> over time.
>
> ET: Your reference to 5.503 doesn't, in my reading of it, refer to
> Firstness or Thirdness as aligned with 'real', realism, reality'. He
> doesn't refer to the categories at all in this section - so, I fail to
> understand your claim.
>
>
> Peirce says in that passage that pragmaticism requires, as a prerequsite,
> being "convinced that there are real generals." All generals are examples
> of Thirdness. Therefore, Peirce held that pragmaticism requires, as a
> prerequisite, being convinced that there are real examples of Thirdness;
> i.e., at least some examples of Thirdness are real.
>
> ET: BUT - my understanding of the Peircean definition of reality defines
> it as generals or universals [which are not the same as habits in my view]
>
>
> Habits *are *generals in Peirce's view, but I will resist the urge to
> give multiple citations to this effect. Why are we suddenly talking about
> "universals" now?
>
> ET: That is, reality 'exists' [I know you'll object to the word but
> Peirce himself uses it with 'reality]...
>
>
> Yes, he did--but only until he got it clear in his own mind what the
> difference is. Why keep repeating his mistake, rather than embracing his
> self-correction?
>
> ET: In my view - this removes Thirdness [as well as Firstness] from the
> formation of universals because Thirdness, as pointed out above, is a
> action of THOUGHT, and a universal is not created by thought. ie, 'the
> property, the chaaracter, the predicate hardness, is not invented by men,
> as the word is, but is really and truly in the hard things and is one in
> them all" 1.27ff.
>
>
> There seems to be an equivocation here on the word "thought." My
> recollection is that, in other threads, you have acknowledged--even
> cited--this statement by Peirce.
>
> CSP: Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
> the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world;
> and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the
> shapes, etc., of objects are really there. (CP 4.551; 1906)
>
>
> Here he affirms the reality of both thought (Thirdness) and qualities
> (Firstness), but thought is clearly not limited to what happens in the
> brains of men (and women). There is hardness, regardless of whether any
> human being ever thinks about it; and there are colors and shapes,
> regardless of whether any human being ever thinks about them. In Peirce's
> carefully considered later terminology, this is precisely what it means to
> be *real*--and it is clearly different from what it means to *exist*.
> Hardness, colors, and shapes cannot and do not exist as such; *actual *objects
> that are hard and have *specific *colors and shapes can (and do) exist.
>
> In other words, there are real universals, but they do not exist; only
> particulars exist. That is my statement, not Peirce's, and I offer it only
> because you introduced those terms to the conversation. He would more
> likely say that there are real generals, but they do not exist; only
> individuals (or singulars) exist.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - you referred to my original quote from 5.311, wherein I referred to
>> Peirce's notion of 'community' as
>>
>> Your latest citations for Peirce's "view of reality" are from an 1868
>> paper, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"; as I already pointed out,
>> Peirce referenced that very paper in 1892, and explicitly characterized it
>> as "too nominalistic."
>>
>> Therefore - you DID refer to that quote as 'nominalistic'. Now - you are
>> diverting from your original criticism above of my reference by talking
>> about it instead as 'analysis'. Why didn't you state that originally rather
>> than reject the 'very paper' as 'too nominalistic'.
>>
>> Your reference to 5.503 doesn't, in my reading of it, refer to Firstness
>> or Thirdness as aligned with 'real', realism, reality'. He doesn't refer to
>> the categories at all in this section - so, I fail to understand your claim.
>>
>> Now, he DOES, refer to the third category, Thirdness, in 5.436 - "the
>> category of thought, representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine
>> thirdness, thirdness as such - is an essential ingredient of reality yet
>> does not by itself constitute reality, since this category [which in that
>> cosmology appears as the element of habit] can have no concrete being
>> without action, as a separate object on which to work its government, just
>> as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to
>> act".
>>
>> BUT - my understanding of the Peircean definition of reality defines it
>> as generals or universals [which are not the same as habits in my view] -
>> and "the real is that which is not whatever we happen to think of it, but
>> is unaffected by what we may think of it" 8.12. That is, reality 'exists'
>> [I know you'll object to the word but Peirce himself uses it with
>> 'reality]...outside of thought but can be accessed within the 'community of
>> thinkers'.
>>
>> In my view - this removes Thirdness [as well as Firstness] from the
>> formation of universals because Thirdness, as pointed out above, is a
>> action of THOUGHT, and a universal is not created by thought. ie, 'the
>> property, the chaaracter, the predicate *hardness*, is not invented by
>> men, as the word is, but is really and truly in the hard things and is one
>> in them all" 1.27ff.
>>
>> Again - universals, which are real, are, in my understanding of Peirce,
>> thus 'knowable' by thought - which uses the Three Categories.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 2:37 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> ET: Jon - the requirement for a community in the analysis of reality
>> [see 5.311] is hardly a nominalistic outline.
>>
>>
>> Yes, the community is required for the *analysis* of reality; but
>> reality is whatever it is, *regardless* of that analysis--in fact,
>> regardless of whether there even *is* a community to analyze it! What
>> is nominalism, if not the view that there must be thinkers in order for
>> generals to be real?
>>
>> ET: I think that, based on the obvious differences of our use of the
>> terms on this list, that we should clarify what we - and Peirce - meant by
>> those terms.
>>
>>
>> That is exactly what I have been trying to do--clarify what Peirce meant
>> by those terms, and how that differs from what you evidently mean by those
>> terms. This is not to say that Peirce's usage is some kind of infallible
>> standard with which all must invariably comply, just that we ought to
>> acknowledge when and how our usage departs from his.
>>
>> ET: I don't think that all three terms of 'real, realism and reality'
>> mean the same thing.
>>
>>
>> Does anyone? I do think that "real" and "reality" are, at least in most
>> cases, the adjective and noun that correspond to the same concept. That is
>> why the Commens Dictionary to which I linked treats Reality as a variant of
>> Real, such that defining one is sufficient to define both. These three
>> passages, two rather early and the other very late, summarize the
>> consistent thread that runs through all of those definitions.
>>
>> CSP: A real thing is something whose characters are independent of how
>> any representation represents it to be. Independent, therefore, of how any
>> number of men think it to be. (W2.439-440; 1870)
>>
>> CSP: If an object is of whatever character I or any man or men will have
>> it to be or imagine it, it is a fiction; but if its characters are
>> independent of what you or I or any number of men think about it, it is a
>> reality. (W3.58; 1872)
>>
>>
>> CSP: To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates
>> as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever
>> any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth.
>> Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality.
>> (EP 2.456-457; 1911)
>>
>>
>> On the other hand, "realism" is a particular stance on what *qualifies*
>> as "real" or "reality" in this sense, and a "realist" is someone who adopts
>> that stance. As I quoted previously, Peirce described his view in about
>> 1905 as "extreme scholastic realism"--the position that not only the
>> *actual* (Secondness) is real, but also the *possible* ("may-be,"
>> Firstness) and the *general* ("would-be," Thirdness). In fact, Peirce
>> *always* held that generals are real; that is precisely what he said it
>> means to be a "scholastic realist," extreme or otherwise.
>>
>> CSP: Hence, before we treat of the evidences of pragmaticism, it will be
>> needful to weigh the pros and cons of scholastic realism. For pragmaticism
>> could hardly have entered a head that was not already convinced that there
>> are real generals. (CP 5.503; c.1905)
>>
>>
>> Thus it is not "my interpretation" to align these terms--"real,"
>> "realism," and "reality"--with Firstness and Thirdness; it is what Peirce
>> himself *explicitly* did.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 12:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon - the requirement for a community in the analysis of reality [see
>>> 5.311] is hardly a nominalistic outline. Indeed, Peirce explains this
>>> requirement repeatedly throughout his works.
>>>
>>> I wrote: "And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of
>>> 'real', 'reality' and 'realism'. You chastized me for such a request -
>>> telling me that I thereby 'disagree with Peirce'. How is asking for
>>> clarification of terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'???"...Again - how
>>> is asking for clarification of terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'?
>>>
>>> I think that, based on the obvious differences of our use of the terms
>>> on this list, that we should clarify what we - and Peirce - meant by those
>>> terms. After all - you disagree with my interpretation of them [ telling me
>>> that my quoted references are from an 'old text of Peirce's] and I
>>> disagree with your interpretation of them [i.e., your aligning them with
>>> Firstness and Thirdness]. So- I think the clarification of terms is
>>> important. Plus, I don't think that all three terms of 'real, realism and
>>> reality' mean the same thing...
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>> *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 1:24 PM
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> In accordance with Stephen's gentle admonition, I will attempt to
>>> refrain from engaging in an "exegetical contest" with you. I provided
>>> links to Peirce's various (but largely consistent) definitions of "real"
>>> and "existence"; did you even read through them before replying? He
>>> evidently tightened up his usage of those terms over time to maintain the
>>> distinction that I have summarized; of what part of those definitions are
>>> you still "asking for clarification"? Your latest citations for Peirce's
>>> "view of reality" are from an 1868 paper, "Some Consequences of Four
>>> Incapacities"; as I already pointed out, Peirce referenced that very paper
>>> in 1892, and explicitly characterized it as "too nominalistic." Perhaps
>>> our disagreement is more over *which *writings of Peirce, earlier or
>>> later, we give more weight in attempting to ascertain what his views were.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon- you've done it again. The opinions you express on the issues are
>>>> your analysis of Peirce; the opinions on these same issues are my analysis
>>>> of Peirce - and are not, as you insist, 'my own system of thought' which
>>>> you declare that I 'ought to acknowledge'. They are, I repeat, my analysis
>>>> of Peirce - and I disagree with YOUR analysis of Peirce on those same
>>>> issues. But - you insist that yours alone are right!!
>>>>
>>>> Again, in my view, Firstness and Thirdness are not examples of 'the
>>>> real' - but are modes of organization of thought and the semiosic process
>>>> [which is thought]. I consider that your use of them to define
>>>> *reality* moves this reality into 'sensations' - and Peirce rejected
>>>> this definition of reality as 'nominalism'.
>>>>
>>>> His view of reality, to my understanding was "the very origin of the
>>>> conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the
>>>> notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite
>>>> increase in knowledge" 5.311....and this knowledge of the truth or the
>>>> universal is attainable in the future.
>>>>
>>>> As well, he writes, 'generals must have a real existence' 5.312. That
>>>> 'reality' of the universal or general - is what, in my view, Peirce is
>>>> talking about when he discusses the term of reality. Again - it has nothing
>>>> to do with the three categories - which refer to 'representation'.
>>>>
>>>> And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of 'real',
>>>> 'reality' and 'realism'. You chastized me for such a request - telling me
>>>> that I thereby 'disagree with Peirce'. How is asking for clarification of
>>>> terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'???
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 12:11 PM
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>
>>>> I trust our fellow List participants to judge for themselves, but I
>>>> think that a fair reading of my posts would not come close to suggesting
>>>> that I "hold [my]self up as The Master-Guru-of-Peirce," or have been
>>>> "arrogant," or have behaved as if I were "the Ultimate-Master of Peirce."
>>>> In this thread, I was even careful to state more than once that I was
>>>> expressing "my understanding of Peirce," although that should really go
>>>> without saying. The fact that you have a different "reading and analysis
>>>> of Peirce" does not entail that your resulting views are entirely
>>>> consistent with HIS views, which are quite clear on these matters as
>>>> expressed in his voluminous writings. It seems incontrovertible to me that
>>>> Peirce DID NOT confine the three Categories to "processes of semiosis," DID
>>>> consider Firstness (after about 1890) and Thirdness (his whole adult life)
>>>> to be examples of "the real," and DID (repeatedly) define "the real" in
>>>> precisely the way that I have summarized it (see
>>>> http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/real and, for good measure,
>>>> http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/existence). Your disagreements
>>>> on these three points are not merely disagreements with my interpretation
>>>> of Peirce, they are disagreements with Peirce himself, plain and
>>>> simple--not that there is anything wrong with that! You have taken *some
>>>> *ideas from Peirce and developed your *own *system of thought, which
>>>> is obviously *not *identical to his. Why not simply acknowledge this
>>>> and move on, rather than being so defensive about it and resorting to
>>>> name-calling?
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jon- I consider that you should not hold yourself up as The
>>>>> Master-Guru-of-Peirce. You are one person, with your own reading and
>>>>> analysis of Peirce. I am also one person, with my reading and analysis of
>>>>> Peirce. We have the right and ability to disagree with our interpretations
>>>>> of Peirce. Therefore, I object to your declaration, when I disagree with
>>>>> you - that I therefore ALSO disagree with Peirce. That is merely your
>>>>> view;
>>>>> it is not necessarily The Truth.
>>>>>
>>>>> And your statement that I am 'more than welcome to disagree with
>>>>> Peirce' is really quite arrogant on your part. You, again, are not the
>>>>> Ultimate-Master of Peirce.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, September 08, 2016 11:17 AM
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>>
>>>>> ET: Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no
>>>>> evidence that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life
>>>>> and
>>>>> there are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I never claimed that Peirce "discarded the Scotus view of realism."
>>>>> In fact, Peirce still calls himself a "scholastic realist" in drafts of
>>>>> "A
>>>>> Neglected Argument." However, he did write the following in about 1905.
>>>>>
>>>>> CSP: Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that
>>>>> universals are contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars,
>>>>> meaning, as he does, by singulars, ordinary existing things. The
>>>>> pragmaticist cannot admit that. I myself went too far in the direction of
>>>>> nominalism when I said that it was a mere question of the convenience of
>>>>> speech whether we say that a diamond is hard when it is not pressed upon,
>>>>> or whether we say that it is soft until it is pressed upon. I *now*
>>>>> say that experiment will prove that the diamond is hard, as a positive
>>>>> fact. That is, it is a real fact that it *would *resist pressure,
>>>>> which amounts to extreme scholastic realism. (CP 8.208)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> He basically says here that his own realism goes *beyond *that of
>>>>> Scotus, and calls it "*extreme *scholastic realism"! Both "may-bes"
>>>>> and "would-bes" are real, as well as actual facts.
>>>>>
>>>>> ET: Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the
>>>>> terms of 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them
>>>>> that way.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Where have I ever used the words "universal" and "particular"? I try
>>>>> to follow Peirce's lead by using "general" for Thirdness and "individual"
>>>>> or "singular" for Secondness, as well as possible/actual/habitual for the
>>>>> modalities of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.
>>>>>
>>>>> ET: I consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis -
>>>>> period.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then you disagree with Peirce.
>>>>>
>>>>> ET: I disagree with your outline that 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are
>>>>> examples of 'the real'.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then you disagree with Peirce.
>>>>>
>>>>> ET: I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms
>>>>> of 'real', 'reality', 'realism'.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then you disagree with Peirce.
>>>>>
>>>>> As I have said before, you are more than welcome to disagree with
>>>>> Peirce; but then, please do not pretend that your views and terminology
>>>>> are
>>>>> consistent with his.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 9:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon, list
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no evidence
>>>>>> that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and there
>>>>>> are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms of
>>>>>> 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that
>>>>>> way. I
>>>>>> consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis - period.
>>>>>> The
>>>>>> concept of 'the universal' as the definition of 'reality' is quite
>>>>>> another
>>>>>> outline and analysis. Therefore, I disagree with your outline that
>>>>>> 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness' are examples of 'the real' . Helmut's
>>>>>> question, after all, was on the difference between reality and existence.
>>>>>> And a universal is not a possibility or a habit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of
>>>>>> 'real', 'reality', 'realism'.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>> ------------------------------
>
>
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