Gary- enjoy your weekend. Hope the weather cools down a bit. Yes, the vitality of Thirdness in its three forms [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] shouldn't be overlooked. But, in your example of 'genuine Thirdness',..... this means that the triad of O-R; R-R; R-I, are ALL in the mode of Thirdness. This is Peirce's tenth class, the Argument, i.e., a syllogism. All three Relations are in the mode of Thirdness. But our phenomenological world doesn't operate within only this one class!
When Peirce was referring to the 'genuine form' 8.332, he was referring to the category of 3-3, rather than the 'two distinct grades of degeneracy [3-1, 3-2] But, Secondness can enter into the interaction [3-2]; or a vague idea [3-1]...And, in the actions of Mind - which is Thought - we will find pure triads of Firstness, as well as indexical and dicent interactions....all of them, operating within the complex process of Mind/Thought. I think we have to distinguish between 'Mind', 'thinking', 'cognition'. Now - can Mind operate without Thirdness? Obviously not. But since Mind is constantly thinking and interacting with existentialities and evolving - then, it can't operate without the other two categories as well. That is my reason for rejecting that thought is only Thirdness. Thought is a triadic semiosis - and requires not only all three Relations [R-O; R-R; R-I] but also all three modal categories. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce-L Sent: Friday, September 09, 2016 8:15 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking Jon, Edwina, list, About to head off for a weeklong "wellness retreat" in the Catskills, I have only time to suggest that in this discussion that the notion of genuine (vs. degenerate) 3ns should be kept in mind. 1903 | CSP's Lowell Lectures of 1903. 2nd Part of 3rd Draught of Lecture III | CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. [—] The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign (emphasis added GR). 1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | CP 8.332 In its genuine form, Thirdness is the triadic relation existing between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as constituting the mode of being of a sign. http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/thirdness Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: Edwina, List: One of the ways in which Peirce derived his categories was by means of phenomenology; or as he called it, phaneroscopy, because it involves examining the phaneron--"the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever" (EP 2.362). (By the way--is this what you mean by "the analysis of reality"?) Thus, in that specific sense, we can loosely say that all three categories pertain to mind or thought; after all, we can and do routinely think about Firstness and Secondness, as well as Thirdness. But that is obviously not what I mean when I say that mind itself or thought itself IS Thirdness. I trust that no one will dispute that Peirce clearly and consistently affirmed all three of the following propositions. a.. All thought takes place by means of signs. b.. Every sign represents an object to an interpretant. c.. Representation is (only) Thirdness. It follows deductively that all thought is (only) Thirdness. Note that in the third bullet, I use the word representation as distinguished by Peirce from quality (Firstness) and relation or reaction (Secondness)--not "representations," which could just be a synonym for "signs." I am well aware that a sign, both in itself and in its relations, can be classified in any of the three categories. However, when it comes to the interpretants, only those that are classified under Thirdness are possible, actual, or habitual thoughts; feelings correspond to Firstness, and actions correspond to Secondness. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: Clark, list: yes, that's my point. I disagree with Jon with his confinement of Thought to Thirdness. I consider that Mind, which is 'thought', is an action of all three categories. To focus on Thirdness as Thought, which, again, to my understanding, is Jon's view - is more akin to Hegel. All three cognitive modes are 'the semiosic process', i.e., the action of reason, of thought. Thirdness is an action of habit formation, i.e., of generalization, of 'predicate formation' 5.102. Obviously, it is a necessary action in the formation of an actualization, a discrete unit, but I consider that thought requires all three modes. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Clark Goble To: Peirce-L Sent: Friday, September 09, 2016 4:52 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of reality. i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind is not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the three categorical actions of the actions of Mind - but the two are not identical. I remain convinced that some terms are used in such a variety of incompatible ways in philosophical history that they come to have a baggage that makes them perfect tools of confusion. I suspect mind is one of those terms. Quite frequently I wish we could do away with the term entirely. For all the problem of neologisms in philosophy (including Peirce’s own use of them at times) they do avoid that baggage. Your point is very important. I can’t recall if someone quoted it already but this quote of Peirce’s is useful. “I desire to defend the three Categories as the three irreducible and only constituents of thought.” (EP 2.165 “The Categories Defended”) ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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