Hi list:
What Gary said is wise. Still, it can be summed up in yet other ways: “The opinion which is fated <http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html#note2> to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.” “That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a very important proposition. It sweeps away, at once, various vague and erroneous conceptions of proof.” So basically, Peirce’s concept of truth and reality is a statement about the long-term future based on correct and stable opinion of a wise society about an object. Where is this society and how to get them to agree on whether which proposition is true? “A different *new method of settling opinions must be adopted*, that shall not only produce an impulse to believe, but shall also decide what proposition it is which is to be believed.” So, which proposition? What is a proposition, anyways, other than a statement that contains terms that admit of truth determination? Must it admit of the categories? As per what Clark said and quoted: “I remain convinced that some terms are used in such a variety of incompatible ways in philosophical history that they come to have a baggage that makes them perfect tools of confusion…Quite frequently I wish we could do away with the term entirely… “I desire to defend the three Categories as the three irreducible and only constituents of thought.” (EP 2.165 “The Categories Defended”)” What is left after you do away with all terminology/neologisms? Categories. What else is there to categories other than relations? Which relations, object sign interpretant (osi) or sign object interpretant (soi)? At the end of inquiry, it will be osi because it’s the natural way of seeing things as they are. Oh, and what organizes the categories as a proposition? CP 5.189. If not this, *which*? Don’t be a vegetable. Best, Jerry Rhee “We must state whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to inquire into the truths which are in mathematics called axioms, and into substance… Evidently then it belongs to the philosopher, i.e. to him who is studying the nature of all substance, to inquire also into the principles of syllogism. .. For a principle which every one must have who understands anything that is, is not a hypothesis; and that which every one must know who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; *which principle this is, let us proceed to say*... ..and if an opinion which contradicts another is contrary to it, obviously it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be; for if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at the same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to this as an ultimate belief; for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other axioms. -Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration); but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, *these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one*. We can, however, demonstrate negatively even that this view is impossible, *if our opponent will only say something*; and if he says nothing, it is absurd to seek to give an account of our views to one who cannot give an account of anything, in so far as he cannot do so. For such a man, as such, is from the start no better than a vegetable.” ~Aristotle, Metaphysics On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:12 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > I am not going to fish it out but I arrived as my initial understanding of > the three categories from reading Brent who is largely discredited I think > because of his conclusions about Peirce's personal life. But I sense in > reading him that his was a real effort to understand Peirce's unique > contribution: I had a distinct impression that for Brent the three > categories consisted of Icon, Index and Symol. I saw them as a sequential > one two three that led from a vague Reality to a (brute) Index and then to > a Symbol which I took to be at the border if not beyond the border or > actuality -- of the coveted pragmaticist outcome in something actual, > factual, real. These three categories (I see them in different terms as > Reality, Ethics and Aesthetics) are indeed semiotic in the sense of being > operative stages of the way our minds work, the way thought is achieved and > so forth. So yes the three categories exist within reality -- they are not > the mind -- a designation which for me is of modest importance. Reality > from its very vagueness and its universality is both the first in terms of > the semiotic process and the totality of all there is. I think Peirce is > pivotal beyond all other thinkers because he created a basis for conceiving > of how we think consciously and how the results of that thinking issue in > acts and expressions which can in fact be measured. That to me is seismic. > > Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU > > On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:52 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > >> >> On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: >> >> My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of >> reality. >> >> i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind >> is not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the >> three categorical actions of the actions of Mind - but the two are not >> identical. >> >> >> >> I remain convinced that some terms are used in such a variety of >> incompatible ways in philosophical history that they come to have a baggage >> that makes them perfect tools of confusion. I suspect mind is one of those >> terms. Quite frequently I wish we could do away with the term entirely. For >> all the problem of neologisms in philosophy (including Peirce’s own use of >> them at times) they do avoid that baggage. >> >> Your point is very important. I can’t recall if someone quoted it already >> but this quote of Peirce’s is useful. “I desire to defend the three >> Categories as the three irreducible and only constituents of thought.” (EP >> 2.165 “The Categories Defended”) >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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