Jon, Edwina, list, About to head off for a weeklong "wellness retreat" in the Catskills, I have only time to suggest that in this discussion that the notion of genuine (vs. degenerate) 3ns should be kept in mind.
1903 | CSP's Lowell Lectures of 1903. 2nd Part of 3rd Draught of Lecture III | CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. [—] The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or *cognition*. *But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign *(emphasis added GR). 1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | CP 8.332 In its genuine form, Thirdness is the triadic relation existing between a sign, its object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as constituting the mode of being of a sign. http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/thirdness Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > One of the ways in which Peirce derived his categories was by means of > phenomenology; or as he called it, phaneroscopy, because it involves > examining the phaneron--"the sum of all we have in mind in any way > whatever" (EP 2.362). (By the way--is this what you mean by "the analysis > of reality"?) Thus, in that *specific *sense, we can *loosely *say that > all three categories *pertain *to mind or thought; after all, we can and > do routinely think *about *Firstness and Secondness, as well as > Thirdness. But that is obviously not what I mean when I say that mind *itself > *or thought *itself *IS Thirdness. I trust that no one will dispute that > Peirce clearly and consistently affirmed all three of the following > propositions. > > - All thought takes place by means of signs. > - Every sign represents an object to an interpretant. > - Representation is (only) Thirdness. > > It follows deductively that all thought is (only) Thirdness. Note that in > the third bullet, I use the word *representation *as distinguished by > Peirce from *quality *(Firstness) and *relation *or *reaction > *(Secondness)--not > "representations," which could just be a synonym for "signs." I am well > aware that a sign, both in itself and in its relations, can be classified > in any of the three categories. However, when it comes to the > interpretants, only those that are classified under Thirdness are possible, > actual, or habitual *thoughts*; feelings correspond to Firstness, and > actions correspond to Secondness. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Clark, list: yes, that's my point. I disagree with Jon with his >> confinement of Thought to Thirdness. I consider that Mind, which is >> 'thought', is an action of all three categories. To focus on Thirdness as >> Thought, which, again, to my understanding, is Jon's view - is more akin to >> Hegel. All three cognitive modes are 'the semiosic process', i.e., the >> action of reason, of thought. >> >> Thirdness is an action of habit formation, i.e., of generalization, of >> 'predicate formation' 5.102. Obviously, it is a necessary action in the >> formation of an actualization, a discrete unit, but I consider that thought >> requires all three modes. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >> *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> >> *Sent:* Friday, September 09, 2016 4:52 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking >> >> On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: >> >> My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of >> reality. >> >> i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind >> is not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the >> three categorical actions of the actions of Mind - but the two are not >> identical. >> >> I remain convinced that some terms are used in such a variety of >> incompatible ways in philosophical history that they come to have a baggage >> that makes them perfect tools of confusion. I suspect mind is one of those >> terms. Quite frequently I wish we could do away with the term entirely. For >> all the problem of neologisms in philosophy (including Peirce’s own use of >> them at times) they do avoid that baggage. >> >> Your point is very important. I can’t recall if someone quoted it already >> but this quote of Peirce’s is useful. “I desire to defend the three >> Categories as the three irreducible and only constituents of thought.” (EP >> 2.165 “The Categories Defended”) >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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