Hello Ben U., List, I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we variously may think for our own parts. Having said that, my general aim is to draw from other sources, such as the lectures concerning the first principle of logic and the conception of continuity that are collected in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, as resources for interpreting "The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." As such, it is possible that I might go too far at times when reading some of these ideas and arguments from earlier lectures and essays into what Peirce seems be saying, either explicitly or implicitly, in the Humble Argument and the Neglected Argument.
For my part, I'm not yet able to see what you appear to be saying--which is that these passages from the Carnegie application and "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction" run at odds with the interpretative suggestions I am trying to explore. I'm starting to wonder if we might be working with different notions of what is, on Peirce's account, more instinctive in our habits of feeling, action and thought. The reason I suspect this might be the case is because I'm not yet able to get a clear idea of what you seem to be emphasizing when you talk about Peirce's account of "instinctual plausibility." I'll keep working on it in the hopes of clearing up some of the vagueness in my ideas. For my part, I think grounds of Peirce's the division between speculative grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic can be interpreted in a number of ways. Jeff Kasser has offered some nice explanations of what Peirce means when he talks about methodeutical considerations pertaining to the economy of research. Recently, I've been looking at Mats Bergman's Peirce's Philosophy of Communication: The Rhetorical Underpinnings of the Theory of Signs and have found his sorting of some of the competing lines of interpretation to be helpful. As I have suggested in earlier posts, I think that Peirce's emphasis on the relations between signs, object and interpretants that we need to focus our attention on in each of these areas of semiotics can be used to help steer the inquiries. When it comes to matters of the assurance of different forms of inference, I am drawn to the idea that the sort of mediation that is at work here involves relations of determination between the dynamical object and sign (typically the focus of inquiry in critical logic) and between the sign and normal interpretant (typically the focus of inquiry in methodeutic). My interpretative suggestion is that the relation between the dynamical object and the final interpretant (so that we have some assurance that the final interpretant is in a relation to the same object that was the object of the sign) should be understood as mediated by these two relations. As such, the mediation involves a triadic relationship between the three dyadic relations as well as a triadic relation between three triads. Gary F. has indicated that he finds the diagrams I've offered hard to make out, so I suspect that others might find them similarly puzzling. Having said that, I'll continue to look at the textual support for this interpretative hypothesis--and I'll see what might be done to make the diagrams clearer. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Benjamin Udell [baud...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 12:15 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking Jeff D., Gary R., list, I assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we variously may think for our own parts. Peirce spells out the difference between critical and methodeutical justifications in the Carnegie application _New Elements of Mathematics_ passage that I quoted earlier. The fuller passage can be seen both by Google preview https://books.google.com/books?id=aLxTkSob9UMC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=%22Methodeutic+has+a+special+interest+in+Abduction%22 in Joe Ransdell's reconstruction at Arisbe (although it looks like Joe missed some italicizations) http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27 : MEMOIR 27: OF METHODEUTIC [....] From Draft B - MS L75.279-280 The first business of this memoir is to develop a precise conception of the nature of methodeutical logic. In methodeutic, it is assumed that the signs considered will conform to the conditions of critic, and be true. But just as critical logic inquires whether and how a sign corresponds to its intended ultimate object, the reality, so methodeutic looks to the purposed ultimate interpretant and inquires what conditions a sign must conform to in order to be pertinent to the purpose. Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment. There is no such need of a subsequent choice after drawing deductive and inductive conclusions. Yet although methodeutic has not the same special concern with them, it has to develop the principles which are to guide us in the invention of proofs, those which are to govern the general course of an investigation, and those which determine what problems shall engage our energies. It is, therefore, throughout of an economic character. Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually made almost its only business are, first, the principles of definition, and of rendering ideas clear; and second, the principles of classification. [End quote] Note, that he is also saying that the principles of definition, and of rendering ideas clear, i.e., the principles of pragmatism, are part of methodeutic. The consideration of conceivable experimental consequences is how the logic of pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference. Methodeutic does not have the same special interest in deduction and induction; the specific justifications of deductions and inductions as valid are topics of critical logic. The difference matters because instinctual plausibility has to do with how much one thinks a hypothesis true. That a hypothesis is conceivably testable does not lend assurance of its truth. More specific concerns of methodeutic including the economics of resarch - the suitability of a hypothesis for testing because of cheapness, or because of its bearing on other hypotheses, i.e., its caution (as in 20 Questions), incomplexity, or breadth, have no direct bearing on one's assurance, going in, that the hypothesis is true. A hypothesis, merely by being easier or more promising to test, does not become a more plausible and naturally simple explanation of a phenomenon. In "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction" (Lecture VII of the 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism), see CP 5 196–200 http://www.textlog.de/7663.html , and somewhere in EP 2:226–241 .... What is good abduction? What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as a hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts. But what other conditions ought it to fulfill to be good? .... Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. [End quote] Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent that rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does not offer rules for instinct. Best, Ben On 9/25/2016 1:56 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Ben U., Gary R., List, The following remarks seem--at least to my ear--to bear on the some relationships between plausibility and methodeutical justification. Peirce says: "As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible"; this acceptance ranges in different cases -- and reasonably so -- from a mere expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting attention and reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to uncontrollable inclination to believe." The inference to a hypothesis expressed in the interrogative mood suggests that the holding of the question to be "plausible" (e.g., well-fitted to the surprising phenomena, well-formed as having great uberty, etc.) does seem to derive its plausibility from the first rule of reason. At the very least, the idea that the question has been formulated by a sincere desire to learn, and in a manner that does not embody undue bias or prejudice, and that it does not close the door of inquiry all seem to provide some justification to the claim that the question is plausible. What is more, the suggestion that plausibility comes in varying degrees, ranging from the lowest levels of assurance up to the "high peaks" of plausibility does suggest that the principle of continuity applies to the manner in which seek and then provide degrees of assurance. For instance, the efforts to rid one’s estimations of plausibility of the undue effects of bias and prejudice are something that one might seek to improve on an incremental basis. What is more, the manner in which one might assure that the door of inquiry is kept open might vary from something like a door that is barely cracked open to one that is wide open. Furthermore, the way in which the door is held open might vary from a door that swings uncontrollably due to the "winds" of vicissitude, to one that is firmly held open with a wedge. Finally, the remark that "where conjecture mounts the high peaks of Plausibility -- and is really most worthy of confidence" suggest that what makes a conjecture really worthy of confidence is that the many estimations of the suitability of the hypothesis as an explanation is a process that has effectively been guided by the pragmatic maxim. If the leading conceptions in the hypothesis have been clarified up to the third degree, then it really is most worthy of our confidence as a hypothetical explanation of a set of surprising phenomena. The fact that the surprising character fades the more worthy it is of our confidence does suggest that the fit is one with a large system of our other beliefs that are relatively well settled as habits--and that the hypothesis is sufficient to explain all that was, initially, quite surprising. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com><mailto:baud...@gmail.com> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:50 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking Jeff D., Gary R., list, Your quote from "A Neglected Argument..." bears on plausibility, which Peirce elsewhere in the same essay discusses as natural, instinctual simplicity; it bears upon assurance by instinct; I don't find him discussing methodeutical justification (e.g., testability) of abductive inference in the passage that you quoted. I've had some further thoughts on the nature of assurance by form, but they would just lead us further into byways. You get into some of the bigger question that you raised in earlier posts, including the idea that Peirce's Humble Argument may be the only game in town (my words) on the questions that it concerns. I have lots of half-formed remarks that I could offer on that, and when I try to get started, I digress. Maybe I should just mention topics that occur to me but that I'm unsure of how to address: • Only game in town - is the assurance of the Humble Argument's being the only game in town to be acheived by instinctual plausibility, by experience, or by form? Probably by a combination, but would one kind of assurance be foremost in the overall assurance? For example, suppose that string theory were proven mathematically to be the only consistent way to unite general relativity with quantum field theory. It would still have to have assurance by experience by accordance with all observations, but it would still lack confirmation of predictions that distinguish it from general relativity per se and quantum field theory per se, which predictions, since they are about quantum gravity, would currently require a particle collider the size of the known universe - a conceivable practical test, but contingently fantastically impractical for us. So, if it were to be found, I'd call such an assurance of string theory (as sole possible mathematico-physical unifier of GR and QFT) an assurance by form. See what I mean about my digressions? More to the point, I should just ask, how does one strengthen the assurance that the Humble Argument is the only game in town? • Common elements in theological ideals of various religions - how alike are those ideals, really? Best, Ben On 9/25/2016 12:06 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
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